50 CENTS NOVEMBER 1960

THE PROGRESSIVE



KENNEDY FOR PRESIDENT

An Editorial



Office Memo

THE CRISP days of early October saw *The Progressive's* Membership Campaign edge past the $18,000 mark—a heartening response, and a long stride toward our goal, but still $12,000 short of the $30,000 needed to keep *The Progressive* publishing in the year ahead. Our hopes lie in a renewed surge of contributions that will put us on safe ground before the turn of the year.

As heartwarming as the checks and money orders have been the comments and letters of praise and encouragement that have accompanied them. They remind us, again and again, what *The Progressive* means to many Americans.

For example, Muriel Symington, of Brooklyn, wrote, "One of the happiest contributions I make to any cause is the help I have the opportunity to give to *The Progressive*. No publication in the United States has a more notable record as a forum for the expression of the ideas and opinions of genuinely distinguished Americans. I feel privileged not only to be able to pay my subscription every year, but to pay my share of that extra amount *The Progressive* needs to survive."

Ray Stanley of Cheyenne struck a note that we feel should be emphasized. "I fully appreciate," wrote Mr. Stanley, "that a magazine like *The Progressive* must have income in addition to subscription revenue, or you would have to price the magazine right out of the market. I can't contribute much more than the subscription price, but I'm glad to send a few extra dollars, knowing that this makes it possible for some student or low-paid teacher to afford your wonderful magazine."

It's those "few extra dollars" from a great many readers who feel as Mr. Stanley does that will add up to the additional $12,000 *The Progressive* must have for the coming year. No contribution, no pledge, is "too small" to be of help. We urge every reader who can possibly manage a contribution, however modest, to join in the effort to reach the goal of $30,000 that will insure the life of the magazine all through 1961.

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The sun seldom sets on the reprinting of articles from the pages of *The Progressive*. The articles turn up in publications in Japan, Brazil, Germany, Lebanon, England, Africa—almost everywhere. But it took *Reader's Digest* to reprint a couple of paragraphs from a promotion letter inviting new subscriptions that we mailed by the thousands. We believe our own readers, too, might enjoy the timely quotation that sparked the *Digest's* interest:

"It was just a century ago, during much the same kind of critical election year we face today, that Abraham Lincoln made his earthy comment on responsibility at the polls:

> **" 'It is the people's business. The election is in their hands. If they turn their backs to the fire and get scorched in the rear, they'll find they have got to sit on the blister.' "**

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The

FOUNDED IN 1909 BY ROBERT M. LaFOLLETTE, S

NOVEMBER, 1960

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The Progressive makes no attempt to exact complete conformity from its contributors, but rather welcomes a variety of opinions consistent with its general policies. Signed articles, therefore, do not necessarily represent the opinion of the management of the magazine.

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PROGRESSIVE

"YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH
AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE"

Kennedy for President

THE PROGRESSIVE's choice for the Presidency is the Democratic nominee, Senator John Fitzgerald Kennedy of Massachusetts.

Negatively, our decision was an easy one, for the Republican candidate, Vice President Richard Milhaus Nixon, represents just about everything in American political life that a magazine calling itself *The Progressive* lives to oppose. Affirmatively, however, our choice of Kennedy is accompanied by a nagging doubt born of deep disappointment in the way he has responded to the challenge in the critical field of foreign policy.

At a moment in history when the world is boiling with political change and social upheaval, Kennedy continues to give top priority to an expanded military budget. Sometimes he appears obsessed with the notion that our retreat in world affairs stems exclusively from our failure to appropriate a couple of billion dollars more for missiles and rockets. Occasionally he seems to sense the peril of this oversimplified approach, but next day he is back on his armaments kick. There have been no answers to questions we raised two months ago: how can increasing our store of military hardware unsnarl the mess in Cuban-American relations, or enhance our stature with the new neutrals, or cope with the crisis in the Congo, or regain our position in Japan, or bring Laos back to the fold?

It is in this area of the campaign that those who insist there is no meaningful choice between Kennedy and Nixon make their most telling point. If this were the only issue, we would be sorely tempted to pronounce a plague on both their houses and cast a write-in vote for Adlai Stevenson. *(See Stevenson's "The Issue Is Peace" on Page Eight of this issue.)*

But there are other issues and other considerations, and in weighing all of them, the case for Kennedy becomes overwhelmingly clear. Even in the field of foreign policy Kennedy's *record* is vastly superior to Nixon's—and a considerable improvement over his own position as a Presidential candidate. The Democratic candidate, for example, was one of the few men in the Senate to fight for a more creative foreign economic aid program and one of the leaders in the struggle to provide genuine, long-run assistance to India despite her refusal to become our ally in the cold war.

Kennedy, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., reminds us, in his newly published book, *Kennedy or Nixon?*, was "an early voice calling attention to the gathering crisis in Indo-China and urging independence for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—a policy which France eventually followed, almost too late to do any good." In contrast, when the explosion came in Indo-China, Nixon thought the answer was to "put our boys in"—although, characteristically, he later praised the Eisenhower Administration for keeping our boys out.

Three years ago, Kennedy incurred wrathful rebuke from French imperialists and the Dulles-Acheson crowd in this country, when he dared condemn France's policies in Algeria. A year later, in 1958, Kennedy rose in the Senate to call for fundamental change in our attitude toward Latin America, and, specifically, to warn that "any vacuum we leave" in Cuba "will be swiftly filled by the Soviet Union." Nixon, in contrast, shared in the costly mistakes of the Eisenhower Administration against which Kennedy warned, and in his Latin American travels succeeded mostly in exposing to the world the personality described by the late Senator Robert A. Taft as one tending to "radiate tension and conflict."

Even now, when there is often little to choose in the field of foreign policy, Kennedy succeeds in striking a more affirmative note than does Nixon. The Vice President, for example, seems content to drift along with our present foreign aid program, but Kennedy has been emphasizing the need for a basic overhauling. "Our present foreign aid programs," he has been saying, "have neglected the great visionary partnership principles of the Marshall Plan and the Point Four program. They have been subordinated to narrow, expedient ends. What we need is a program of long-range commitments; a program that is planned to meet the welfare of the people of the individual countries—their welfare as they see it, not as seen by some individual in Washington, unaware of even the cultural background of the nation involved."

This kind of criticism annoys Nixon. On more than one occasion he has implied that it is somehow unpatriotic to criticize the Eisenhower Administration. "I do not think," he said, "that it serves the cause of peace or freedom to talk about America's weaknesses militarily, to talk about America's falling behind economically, to indicate that

America is losing the battle of ideas throughout the world, and that our prestige is falling throughout the world." In thus attempting to rule out discussion of many of the major issues, Nixon was colliding with a position he had expressed earlier this year, February 23, when he said: "Glossing over weaknesses which we have, denying that they exist, is not only naive, but it really is dangerous in today's world, in view of the challenges we confront."

The central issue in this campaign —the issue that provides Americans with a clear-cut choice—is to be found in the clashing concepts of the two candidates—and their parties—over the role government should play in promoting the general welfare. In last month's issue of *The Progressive*, two articles, "The Case Against Nixon" and "Kennedy's Liberalism," explored the records of the two candidates in detail. The conclusions tended to confirm each candidate's estimate of his own position. Nixon has identified himself as an "economic conservative." Kennedy is an avowed "liberal."

Nixon's conservatism, like almost everything else about the man, is hard to pin down. One searches in vain for the solid substance and the consistent pattern that mark the records of such conservatives of integrity as the late Senator Robert A. Taft or his heir apparent, Senator Barry Goldwater. One of the most dedicated conservatives we know reacted scornfully to the Vice President's performance in his first debate with Kennedy by dismissing Nixon as a "leap-year liberal."

Still, Nixon's record and speeches make it clear that when he isn't tiptoeing toward liberal "goals" in a campaign year, he is what he claims to be—an "economic conservative." He seems to feel that we are doing well enough, or if anything is needed, it is more of the same. He is shrewd enough to sense that as a candidate for the Presidency he must respond to the mounting demand for welfare planning, but he is at heart, or through personal or political accident, too conservative to propose more than the bare bones of what needed to be done yesterday. This shows up in his eager efforts to identify himself with the struggle for Federal aid to education, medical assistance for the aged, slum clearance and public housing, civil rights for Negroes, and related problems. On every one of these issues he is prepared to yield, for political reasons, only what he regards as absolutely necessary to forestall the enactment of a genuinely progressive program.

Kennedy, conversely, has an almost unbroken record of support for progressive legislation, and he is affirmatively committed in this campaign to a program of national growth and social legislation through government action that sharply separates his position from Nixon's.

We stand, said Kennedy, at "a turning point in history. The old era is ending. The old ways will not do." The Republican pledge "is a pledge to the status quo—and today there can be no status quo." The times, he asserted, "demand invention, innovation, imagination and decision."

"That is the choice the nation must make," Kennedy said, "a choice that lies not merely between two men or two parties, but between the public interest and private comfort, between national greatness, and national decline, between the fresh air of progress, and the stale, dank atmosphere of 'normalcy,' between determined dedication and creeping mediocrity."

What we like most about Kennedy is that he is not satisfied with things as they are and that the areas of his greatest discontent coincide with some of our own frequently expressed concerns on the domestic front. "It is time to get moving again," Kennedy has said. "I am not satisfied with having fifty per cent of our steel capacity unused. I am not satisfied when the United States had last year the lowest rate of economic growth of any major industrial society in the world. I am not satisfied when we are building 200,000 homes fewer than we should each year, when there are 1,800,000 children who go to school part-time, when many Americans are denied equal opportunity because of their race or color."

These are healthy dissatisfactions. They express the mood of a man who knows, as Walter Lippmann said, that "something very big is at stake and much that is very important needs to be done." They stand out in sharp contrast to Nixon's ambivalence in defending the status quo while seeking with a pitiful, almost painful desperation to identify himself with Kennedy's "goals"—to the withering disgust of sincere conservatives.

The contrast between the two candidates shows up most strikingly on the domestic issues we regard as topmost among our unsolved problems —the issue of civil rights and race relations. We have read almost everything Nixon has had to say on the subject. His approach is essentially decent; he would like to see Negroes have a better chance than they have. But as in just about everything else about his stand on basic problems, his position is heavily laden with ambiguities. He expounds endlessly on peripheral approaches but we have searched in vain for a clear-cut affirmation that he not only approves the Supreme Court decisions on desegregation but is prepared to use the full power of the Presidency to enforce them unreservedly.

Kennedy's position, on the other hand, is unequivocal:

"There is one domestic issue," he has said, "which is really a worldwide issue—the problem of securing once and for all full equality for all our people. I am particularly proud of the civil rights plank in our Democratic platform.

"If there were no international problems, full civil rights for all Americans would still be a major goal because it is morally right. In the light of today's worldwide struggle

Herblock in The Washington Post

"Come On, Come On—Hurry It Up"

for freedom, it is an absolutely imperative goal. We do not go with clean hands to the United Nations or to any part of the world as long as we do not fully guarantee the equality of every American.

"The next Democratic Administration will present legislative recommendations to complete the job, but even more importantly, we will use the tools now given us by the Constitution itself and the laws already passed to make the American promise come true for all its citizens. It is a tragic fact that, six years after the Supreme Court decision on school segregation, the President of the United States has not yet seen fit to endorse that decision. I fully back the Supreme Court decision and will do everything in my power to have it implemented."

It is the striking contrast between the two candidates on domestic issues of this character that provides independent liberals with a significant choice in this election campaign, however much they may complain—and rightly so—that they have been robbed of an opportunity to express their decision on many of the vital issues of foreign policy. On the issues on the home front, where there is a fundamental difference, Kennedy's militant commitment to a program of social planning for the general welfare stamps him as the clear-cut choice of those who share *The Progressive's* objectives for a more progressive America.



The News from the U.N.

We confess to few conclusions worth passing on, so far, regarding the bizarre proceedings at the star-studded sessions of the United Nations Assembly during the past month. Our only conviction is that this was easily the most wretchedly reported major event in recent memory. Reporters and headline-writers treated the sessions like a sports spectacle, chalking up victories and defeats in the manner of sports writers. With the exception of half a dozen or so correspondents, about whom more later, newsmen seemed content to rely on the hand-outs of our State Department, which invariably showed the West in general and the United States in particular scoring spectacular victories.

Vice President Nixon, whose press releases identify him as a sports fan, was quick to catch on. Referring in campaign speeches to the defeat of the Soviet move to condemn Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold's policies in the Congo, Nixon said: "You know what the score was? They got none. We got seventy. That's pretty good in football. It's better in international relations."

What Nixon did not go on to say, nor did most newsmen, was that the African and Asian nations nearly all felt that what they regard as the "legitimate" government of Patrice Lumumba, which we oppose, must be reinstated, and that there is some point to the Soviet charge of "imperialist intrigues" in the Congo. The more conscientious and seasoned correspondents shared the judgment of Marquis Childs of the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* that "the interpretation that it is a great triumph for the American position is dubious."

Several newspapers which carry Childs' syndicated column published editorials exulting over our victories at the United Nations—apparently unaware that a few columns further over on the page the seasoned correspondent who was there had this to say: "The fact is that the United States has been spending capital in the U.N.—the capital of long accumulated good-will. The outgo has been greater, despite the radiant personal good-will shed by the President, than the income. And as with all such transactions, the result, as this Administration understands so well in the fiscal field, can only mean ultimate bankruptcy and defeat."

There were occasions, in our judgment, when the press performed its duties conscientiously, as for example, when it reported in depth the crude character of Premier Khrushchev's unjustified assaults on Dag Hammarskjold and the Soviet leader's determined effort to emasculate the executive of the United Nations by saddling the post with the paralyzing veto power of a tripartite secretariat. But these were the exceptions. Mostly the press distorted developments so as to make it virtually impossible for Americans to know how their country's position was faring in the councils of the United Nations.

Take the case of Cuba's Castro and his crowd. Most newspapers gave more space to the chicken feathers and cigar butts in the Cubans' hotel rooms than to Castro's interminable speech to the Assembly. And yet Thomas Hamilton, the New York *Times'* U.N. correspondent, who was as revolted as anyone by Castro's conduct, quietly pointed out, nevertheless, that Castro "strengthened himself with the neutralists and with the Africans in particular."

Nikita Khrushchev's raucous rhetoric and crude desk-pounding made front-page headlines, but as Walter Lippmann emphasized on the inside pages of the papers that use his column, the Soviet premier "has staged a powerful and significant demonstration against the status quo." The headlines in the Washington *Post* celebrated the great victories of the West, but Chalmers Roberts, its experienced diplomatic correspondent, observed that Khrushchev is the "dominant figure" at the United Nations and "it is the Americans who are on the defensive. They do not admit it, of course, but they are."

Donald Grant, United Nations correspondent for the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* who writes for *The Progressive* occasionally, reported that President Eisenhower's refusal to meet with Khrushchev and the methods employed by the American delegation to strangle the resolution of the five

neutrals calling for such a meeting resulted in an "overall feeling of disillusionment [with the United States] among the Asians and Africans." Castro's speech, which was the subject of so much derision in the American press, was, in reality, "the most damaging speech" to the American position delivered "in this Assembly," in Grant's judgment.

I. F. Stone, whose courageous *Weekly* is an immensely helpful mine of information not readily available elsewhere, summed it all up by saying that the American press "is behaving almost as badly as the Soviet press in providing its readers with a distorted view of what is going on at this session of the United Nations. The reporters act more and more like a claque and a mob, cheering our side and hooting theirs in a way which may comfort the President and the Secretary of State but gives foreign visitors a poor impression of our free press.

"Like the Russian reporters, ours —with some honorable exceptions— get their cue from official briefings and run in so overwhelming a pack that the lone dissenter is made to feel unpatriotic. But our national interests are poorly served by misinformation, particularly when we confront a new United Nations dominated by neutrals. It is more important than ever to understand the neutral point of view."

We have quoted these cheerless reflections of some of the honorable exceptions in the American press because we feel it is urgently necessary for us not to be misled by headlines and dramatic shots on television into swallowing the cozy view that we are slaying the Soviets and winning the neutrals in this historic session of the United Nations Assembly. We can conceive of no more self-defeating course than to cling to policies because they produce the largely fictitious triumphs of the headline writers —policies that tend to tranquilize us into a false sense of victory in a struggle that is only beginning.

The AMA Backs a Fraud

At the height of the debate on old-age medical assistance legislation in the post-convention session of the last Congress, the American Medical Association released what purported to be an independent national survey by university sociologists. The survey

Herblock in the Washington Post

concluded that "nine out of every ten older persons report no unfilled medical needs;" that lack of money was not an important factor among those who did need more care; and that the vast majority of those over sixty-five preferred to finance their own medical care "without government intervention." The report not only made headlines, but undoubtedly helped scuttle the Forand-type medical-aid proposals then before Congress in favor of a weak and cumbersome system of federal-state matching funds that, in effect, throws the burden back on the states, which can least afford to carry it.

But the "independent" survey which so delighted the AMA has now been exposed as a calculated fraud. The study was made under the direction of sociology Professors James W. Wiggins and Helmut Schoeck of Emory University, in Atlanta. Sixteen sociologists around the country did the interviewing and provided the raw material for the survey. But when the survey was published, nine of the sixteen protested the conclusions and disassociated themselves from the results, using such strong language as "appalled," "amazed," "political propaganda," and "unscientific."

Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, who is a sociologist as well as a Senator, analyzed the survey in a scalding speech on the floor of the Senate which was buried, for the most part, in the fine print of the *Congressional Record*. Among the distortions, inaccuracies, and deceits of the AMA-approved survey exposed by Senator McCarthy are these:

¶ Deliberately excluded from the interviews were: anyone receiving old-age assistance; non-whites; and persons in hospitals, homes for the aged, nursing homes, and other institutions. Senator McCarthy estimated those excluded represented at least forty per cent of persons over sixty-five, most of them the neediest of all.

¶ The Wiggins-Schoeck survey reported that sixty-four per cent of those interviewed had some form of health insurance. This is in sharp contrast with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's official figure of forty-two per cent.

¶ The survey found thirty-four per cent of those over sixty-five in the active labor force, whereas the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports only twenty per cent.

¶ Professor Edith Sherman of the University of Denver, one of the interviewers who was "profoundly shocked" at the conclusions of the survey, said her instructions were to interview only sixteen per cent of the lower-income oldsters as against thirty-two per cent in the upper-income bracket. Professor Constantine Yeracaris of the University of Buffalo was asked for only nine per cent in the lower income group.

¶ Most persons interviewed in the survey reported a net worth of more than $10,000—an obvious indication of the grossly-loaded nature of the sample.

Not only was the AMA-lauded survey rigged to cover an unrepresentative higher-income sampling, but many sociologists—including Senator McCarthy—attacked as "naive" the survey's technique of attempting to determine a person's state of health merely by asking him how he felt. To document his argument, McCarthy cited a scholarly study published in the *American Journal of Public Health* which disclosed that fewer than one in four interviews revealed the true state of the health of the person answering the questions. Some of the discrepancies between statement and fact in that study were startling:

¶ Six out of ten heart conditions were not reported in the interviews.

¶ Nine out of ten cases of cancer were revealed only in clinical examination.

¶ One-third of diabetes cases found through clinical tests had not been recorded in interviews.

Furthermore—if more evidence is needed to discredit the AMA-advertised survey—the Federal government-sponsored National Health Survey reports that seventy-six per cent of those over sixty-five years of age have at least one chronic illness. Older persons see physicians forty per cent more often and spend more than twice as many days in hospitals than does the general population

Again, it was the big lie which won the day. The survey which so elated the AMA has been totally discredited as political propaganda, but it served its purpose of helping to kill effective old-age medical assistance legislation.

Fraud Begets Fraud

In the wake of the deceptive medical-needs survey, Congress passed an Administration-approved bill providing grants-in-aid to the states so inadequate that no state, at this writing, had submitted a plan for participation in the program. The bill provides for outright Federal grants for medical care of persons now receiving old age assistance, and matching funds for the care of other elderly people. Not only is the bill so loosely drawn that no standards are included, but it seems almost as if it were passed by Congress with the cynical knowledge that few states are in a position to raise still more taxes to benefit from participation in the new program.

Characteristic of the reaction of Republican governors is Governor Nelson Rockefeller's polite, but firm, wait-and-see policy of inaction. Rockefeller stated that he felt a better medical care program will be enacted by the next Congress.

Wisconsin's Democratic Governor Gaylord Nelson was more outspoken. He denounced the program as a "fraud." Nelson seemed to be speaking for many of his fellow governors of the fifty states in the nation when he said:

"I, for one, will not ask the taxpayers to handle the costs of a program that should be handled under Federal social security."

Thomas Hennings, Freedom Fighter

The nation lost a staunch friend of freedom when cancer recently took the life of Senator Thomas C. Hennings of Missouri. One of the most gifted members of Congress, Senator Hennings possessed a rare combination of a dedicated liberalism, a brilliant yet solidly practical mind, a capacity for formidable but always fair debating, and a fearless devotion to civil rights and civil liberties.

Senator Hennings was one of the first men in public life to stand up to the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy when he accepted—in his first year in the Senate—the assignment of investigating the notorious Maryland election of 1950 in which McCarthy played such a shadowy role in the defeat of conservative Democratic Senator Millard Tydings, running for reelection to a fourth term in the U.S. Senate. While serving as chairman of a subcommittee that investigated McCarthy's involved financial affairs in 1952, Senator Hennings single-handedly forced, against determined opposition from its members, the publication of a devastating report which marked the beginning of the end for McCarthy by laying the groundwork for his censure by the Senate two years later.

Mauldin in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch

"It's in Fine Shape and I'm the Man to Fix It"

From his post on the Senate Judiciary Committee Senator Hennings waged a ceaseless fight for the achievement of full civil rights and civil liberties for all. His last statement to the people of his home state, published on the day of his death, was a plea that they refuse "to accept the religious beliefs of a candidate as a worthy election issue."

The closing words of that statement are an eloquent summary of the faith of a man whose life was devoted to the fight for freedom and the elimination of prejudice and injustice:

"I have faith in my fellow citizens, an unshakable faith in their determination and ability to seek and find the truth behind any issue before expressing their ultimate opinion at the polls. I have faith that the false issues will be discarded and that the true ones will be faced with calm appraisal and solved only on the basis of proper consideration and intelligent reasoning.

"I have faith that unwarranted emotionalism and prejudice will be cast aside as sores which beget only solutions for which posterity may sadly pay and long suffer."

Latter-Day Hoover

Vice President Richard M. Nixon's campaign theme of Republican prosperity has begun to sound a little off key. The *Wall Street Journal*, which, on its highly opinionated editorial pages, shares Nixon's enthusiasm for Nixon's economic theories, has been obliged to report in its more objective news columns that Nixon's repeated claim that "you never had it so good" has acquired an ominously discordant sound.

"Actually," said the *Journal*, "a recession has been underway for some time, and the real question is when it may end." Jesse W. Tapp, board chairman of the Bank of America, predicted that the "readjustment" we are moving into may "prove to be more troublesome" than other postwar recessions.

The signs of deepening recession are multiplying daily:

¶ Steel production, which ordinarily picks up briskly after Labor Day, declined instead from the low August figure, and October production was scheduled to drop still further, from

54.7 per cent to only 52.6 per cent of capacity.

¶ International Harvester announced it was closing ten plants which manufacture farm implements, throwing 25,000 employes out of work.

¶ With 1961 model automobiles already on the market, a huge inventory of 575,000 of last year's models are still unsold. Chrysler has announced a cut-back in production of the new models; this will add more than 5,000 workers to the unemployed.

¶ In mid-September, 410,000 more workers were drawing unemployment compensation payments than a year earlier—an increase of more than one-third.

¶ The stock market, traditionally the barometer of the immediate future of business generally, has been moving downward sharply since mid-August, and by October the financial press was reporting on a mid-September plunge: "Stocks crashed to new low prices for 1960 in the sharpest break in nearly five years."

¶ Declines in housing construction, railroad carloadings, manufacturing employment—even a reduction in the production of such a universally basic necessity as shoes—all add up to what many expert economic observers are now openly calling a business recession.

It may be recalled that the recessions of 1953-4 and 1956-7 were never acknowledged as such by the Republican Administration until they were almost at an end. The decline in durable goods production has come even earlier this year, according to *Business Week*, but there is little likelihood that Republican Presidential candidate Richard Nixon will own up to the present recession in the closing weeks of the campaign. The 1932 Hoover slogan, "Prosperity is just around the corner," has been replaced by Nixon's "Prosperity is still with us." Thanks in part to the economic reforms of the New Deal, there is scant prospect that the present recession could turn into a major debacle. But there may be many voters with long enough memories and keen enough ears not to be seduced by the soothing syrup of the Republican Party and its latter-day Hoover.

The Issue Is Peace

by ADLAI E. STEVENSON

This article, reflecting a point of view almost untouched by other campaigners, is adapted, with his permission, from several of Mr. Stevenson's recent campaign addresses in behalf of the candidacy of Senator John F. Kennedy.—THE EDITORS.

THE ONE ISSUE in this election year which dwarfs all others is—Peace. Peace is not a partisan issue. There is no peace party and no war party. Every responsible man, Democrat or Republican, must say to himself in the words of a famous clergyman: "I stand for what unites; I hold at a distance that which divides."

Yet there are wide and legitimate differences about the way to peace; and it is the function of the political process to explore—but never to exploit—these differences. Largely, I think, they are differences of understanding, of political fortitude, and of priorities.

First, of understanding. The difference here is between an American policy—a peace policy—built only around the menace of Communism, and a policy designed to find and develop the basic elements of peace in a revolutionary world in which Communism is only one agent of disorder.

The danger of Communism is obviously no longer—if it ever was—only military and conspiratorial. It is by economic and political means that recent Communist successes have been won and recent American reverses suffered, and it will be by economic and political means that the new Communist offensive will be stopped when it is stopped.

And Communism no longer provides the revolutionary dynamic of the age we live in. The revolutionary dynamic of the contemporary world is something very different. It is compounded of nationalism, social unrest, and scientific progress. It is the great new political, social, and industrial revolution which is now sweeping the world, and which will inevitably alter the way of life of every area on every continent. This second industrial revolution does not menace us in and of itself: on the contrary it can be of the very greatest advantage to us. But our neglect of it—our obsession with the cobra of Communism to the point of thinking of the world revolution only in terms of pro- or anti-Communism—can be a danger and a very great one.

Almost a century and a half ago, in 1821, John Adams wrote to Thomas Jefferson about the upheaval which was at that time seizing a large part of Europe. Looking at it, worrying about it, Adams asked Jefferson: "Must we . . . surrender all our pleasing hopes of the progress of society, of the improvement of . . . the world, and of the reformation of mankind?" And Jefferson replied, in the authentic voice of democracy and of the Democratic Party: "I will not believe our labors are lost . . . Light and liberty are on steady advance . . . The flames kindled on the Fourth of July, 1776, have spread over too much of the globe to be extinguished by the feeble engines of despotism. On the

contrary, they will consume those engines and all who work them."

Jefferson answered, across the centuries, those who see only defeat in the face of change in the world today, those who fear that the new nations of Africa and Asia may be emerging from colonial rule only to pass into a world-wide system of dictatorship.

The flames of freedom—or at least the sparks from these flames—*have* spread over the world. These new nations are no strangers to the ideas of the American Revolution. Many of the Asian and African leaders look today to the American Revolution and the founding of the United States for their inspiration. When the Asian-African Conference was convened at Bandung, Indonesia, five years ago, the keynote talk made it clear that no event in human history said more to the peoples of Asia and Africa, or provided more nourishment for the moral imagination, than what happened in America from 1776 to 1789.

These people see more clearly than we sometimes do that they stand today where we once stood—at the threshold of history. A young man said to me once in Africa, where he had returned from one of our universities, "What we want is only the kind of freedom you wanted, and the kind of freedom you won." And then he added, "We wonder, when you seem sometimes to turn your backs to us, whether you have forgotten something of your own history."

The people of Asia and Africa think of freedom first, as we did, in terms of freedom from outside rule. And they ask us repeatedly whether we are prepared to help them work for that freedom. To the peoples of Asia and Africa, individual liberties can become a reality only when national liberty is achieved.

We are beginning to realize, as the President's speech at the United Nations finally shows, how important our material aid is to these new nations, and, therefore, to ourselves. What these people are deciding is in part whether they can *afford* the democratic way of life. They are being offered what are made to appear quicker, even if drastic, solutions to their problems.

Hungry people don't ask whether the rice which is offered them comes from freedom's larder. What they want in their stomachs may overcome what they feel in their hearts. It is not a case of being convinced by the fake gospel of Communism. It is more like getting in hock to the company store.

We simply cannot, in our abundance, ask this vast section of the world to take our principles on faith without offering them also the necessary help to implement those principles in their own countries. We have no choice but to use our economic abundance boldly and to the full to attack the breeding-grounds of desperate solutions. Until Asians and Africans live decently, they are not going to think much about the place of the individual in the scheme of things.

But we will not fulfill our role by preaching or teaching, by aid or by charity. And when Secretary of State Herter hands the Secretary General of the United Nations a check for five million dollars, as he did last week, or when the President pledges hundreds of millions of dollars, as he did before the General Assembly, that money will have been cast upon the waters unless we renew the new nations' confidence and their respect for the virility, in human terms, of the American experience in democracy.

Only by setting our own house in order, only by becoming in truth the free and civilized nation we claim to be, can we hope to do our part in shaping the future of the world.

As long as there are second-class—yes, and third-class—citizens in our nation, as long as we refuse to honor our solemn promise that all Americans shall have equal rights, we cannot pretend to have offered mankind the working model of a free society.

We mock our own ideals as long as there is poverty or remediable illness among us; as long as the growing number of "unemployable" or helpless aged remain a problem; as long as the gangs of young rebels we call "juvenile delinquents" are an open and national scandal; as long as we are crippled by an educational system that is understaffed and poorly housed.

For so long as we talk big and act little, for so long as power and material success are our national purpose and our individual goals—for so long as these present facts of American life continue to be facts, we cannot face the future with any confidence that the world will take us seriously for what we say we are, and what democracy means. Our urgent need is to identify ourselves, by our policies and our deeds, with the historic revolution of our time.

Unless we march with this revolution, unless indeed we share in leading it, the future it will one day shape may have no place for us. A great nation cannot stand still in a time of change, it cannot content itself with things the way they are, it must foresee, must think, must plan, must act, must lead—or its greatness will evaporate even while we watch.

If we continue to misread the history of the time; if we continue to assume that Communism is our only problem and that it is only military; if we continue to determine our relations with other peoples solely on the basis of their willingness or unwillingness to line up in advance on our side of a war with Communism, we may very well wake up to find that history has passed us by, that the second industrial revolution has taken place without us, and that we are no longer a dynamic and creative force in the world, which is to say, a great power.

I have said that the second difference in this area is one of political fortitude. Are people to be told the truth about their position in the world? Are they to be informed and asked, and their judgment sought? Or are they to be told when it is not true that all is well and just not to worry?

Are the American people really all of one mind about the human situation—the mind expressed by the present Republican foreign policy? Quite clearly they are not. There have been few periods in history in which the human situation was less settled and few periods in which the American people were less clear in their minds about what if anything ought to be done.

The plain truth is that we have been muddling along, living from year to year, doing what had to be done after the fact; and the result is the wasting of our moral assets and the loss of our convictions which

underlie the present public confusion. Whether we look at Cuba or the Congo or other trouble spots around the globe, the recent record of American initiative and foresight and planning is bare and empty. We have drifted with events and watched helplessly as events drifted into catastrophe. Our policies have always run out of breath behind yesterday's headlines, like a lagging commuter missing the last train to the city. From sputnik to the summit, from Suez to the Congo, from Caracas to Tokyo—the experience of the last eight years has been of coping with crisis and failure, and of packaging setbacks to look like triumphs.

In Asia, our policy has been mainly military alliances, containment, massive retaliation, and such foolish talk as "unleashing Chiang Kai-shek."

Because we have had no policy for helping the new African states—until the President was finally persuaded to address the United Nations—we have lost much of our opportunity to build a sound relationship there.

In this hemisphere, after ignoring for seven years the great social revolution that was plain for all to see, the Administration only recently hurriedly improvised a program for Latin America.

We can agree among ourselves to hate the Russians but we cannot agree as to what we should do about a world in which hatred provides the only dynamism. We cannot agree what should be done about the great positive ends of common human life, the first of which is peace. On the contrary, we have let Russian propaganda take the word peace away from us, leaving us little which can safely be discussed in public but the hatred.

And yet every sign indicates that although we have been blocked off from the word peace we are increasingly starved for the thing itself. Or, more precisely, we are bored by the talk of war and tension—and we want peace.

Mr. Nixon and Mr. Eisenhower have talked of peace fervently and often, but their policy is little more than preparation for fighting—inadequate preparation. Peace, in other words, is something we are led to hope may happen as the result of Soviet collapse or backing down: not something we are told we must bring about ourselves. The talk is merely an affirmation of virtue, not a declaration of purpose. So far as purpose goes, our apparent intention is to go on spending our tens of billions a year for armaments until something happens—that is, until something happens on the Russian side. Peace, to put it crudely, is something we hope the Russians will collapse into giving us, not something we are determined to bring about ourselves.

The basis for this policy is a series of assumptions. The first is the assumption that the Russians wish us ill—which they clearly do. The second is the assumption that the Russians are dangerously able to inflict harm upon us, first because they have a system, a religion, which is potent in its appeal to the minds of discontented men, and second because the Russian economy is vast and powerful, and getting more so.

But these assumptions, though religiously held by many Americans and though unquestionable under the present system of political taboos, are in fact dubious. Communism, at least in Europe and North America, is on the decline. Capitalism has had an extraordinary rebirth which has made it in fact, if not in repute, the seductive economic religion of the generation; while the Russian economy is far from the efficient agent we sometimes think.

How long are we to go on holding our fingers in the dike hoping for something to happen to end the necessity? How long are we to wait to receive the future at the hands of Russian failure or collapse or whatever? How long are we to leave the initiative in trust? How long are we going to be frustrated by the national conviction that there is nothing we ourselves can do about peace?

This is not a matter of whether we shake our fists at the Communists or smile at them; whether we argue with them in the kitchen or exchange toasts in the dining room. These surface events which win so much publicity are only the meaningless fluff of world politics. Communists are not impressed or changed by either smiles or insults; by angry debates or by champagne hospitality. Now, as in the past, they respect only power and they negotiate only in terms of hard facts. The real question is not who can stand up or talk back to the Russians. That's too easy. The real question is who can sit down with them at the bargaining table and negotiate with them from a position of strength and confidence.

We Democrats in this campaign are not indulging in the demagogic cry—"Who Lost Cuba?" Neither are we offering any simple solution. We are not going to suggest that a personal trip to Havana or Leopoldville by the next President will bring our difficulties to an end. We do not accuse the Republicans of lack of patriotism or a lack of good intentions.

Our indictment is a much more realistic and honest one. We charge this Administration not with a lack of loyalty but with a lack of judgment; not with an absence of good intentions but with a failure of foresight. We do not charge that it is responsible for all of the crises and difficulties in the world. We do believe that it should be held responsible for failing to anticipate any of these crises, for never moving with enough speed, enough imagination, and enough generosity of spirit to conquer manageable problems before they become unmanageable crises.

The third difference is in our priorities and in the degree of our commitment to the purpose, the prospect, the possibility, of peace.

The plain facts are that we have lost the peace initiative. The United States has failed to persuade the world that it is a nation intent on peace. The inconceivable fact is, indeed, that through large parts of the world, the United States is today regarded as a greater threat to world peace than the Soviet Union.

Only a few years back, we seemed to enslaved peoples the hope of the earth. America was a country which had gained freedom itself through successful revolution against European colonialism. Our great documents, from the Declaration of Independence to the Atlantic Charter, had spoken the aspirations of the common people for independence and growth. Our own colonial policies had been generous and forbearing.

Our great leaders—Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt—had affirmed the ideals of freedom with an eloquence that had won the allegiance of men and women everywhere. It was to us that new nations instinctively looked for sympathy, for support, for guidance.

When Franklin Roosevelt and George Norris built the TVA in the 1930's, the story of this remarkable success reached the people of the world and visitors from every corner of the globe came, as they still do come, to marvel at these mighty dams, at the re-forestation of eroded hills, and at the flowering of a richer, fuller life for millions of people.

But when the story of America is a story of apathy and neglect and indifference, no amount of propaganda can hide the truth from people in other countries. When a Negro child is denied admission to a school, or an unemployed miner faces grim poverty, the image of America is defaced.

You cannot separate foreign and domestic policy. A timid, unimaginative, and conservative government is bound to produce a timid, unimaginative, and conservative foreign policy. One test which the world rightly imposes on the sincerity of our professions is our own readiness to live up to them.

Disarmament is an ancient dream. In times past, it has often served as a means by which good-hearted but soft-headed visionaries could escape from the hard realities of international conflict. For centuries mankind knew that, though war was destructive, humanity still would survive, if by the skin of its teeth, and so it never took disarmament seriously. But nuclear weapons have changed many things. The hydrogen bomb has broken the pattern of history. As we consider that the next war may well blow up the world, we may begin to wonder whether the soft-headed dreamers are not those who think that disarmament is of no importance, and whether the hard-hearted realists are not those who demand that we make disarmament a top priority in our conduct of foreign affairs.

Four years ago I proposed stopping the hydrogen bomb tests. I mention this with no personal pride. I stated "my complete willingness to accept any better proposal for accomplishing the same purpose."

Justus in The Minneapolis Star

"Shouting Is Better than Shooting"

But there wasn't any other proposal at all. The President dismissed what I said as a "theatrical gesture." Mr. Nixon called it "catastrophic nonsense." He chose at that significant moment in history, which had to be grasped before it sped by, to do nothing, to say things were all right, not to worry, that anyone who disagreed was an irresponsible prophet of doom—and a little soft on Communism besides.

So we let the Russians make the same proposal—and receive the thanks and plaudits of the world. Then our government grudgingly followed the Russians and also suspended tests. Again, it was not the United States but the Russians that proposed complete disarmament at the United Nations last year, although fifteen years ago the Truman Administration declared that the only safety was in general disarmament under effective international control.

When I say that what the world needs is an end to the armaments race I mean that we should stop dragging our feet, resolve the conflicts within our government, give peace the priority and attention it deserves, and take the initiative again.

There is no matter of higher urgency or deserving of more sustained attention than the search for the abolition of war through the destruction of the means of war. Until we can attack war itself, peace can remain only an armed truce, an uneasy and explosive interlude between two agonies of destruction.

But disarmament is not all there is to a policy for peace. It is only the most important, the most indispensable, most neglected element. It cannot succeed of itself, it must be a part of a general attack on the conditions which make for war—on the poverty of much of the world, on the instability of the countries which are aspiring to independence, on the fears and antagonisms between the Communists and the West, and on the uncertain mind of the undecided peoples everywhere.

Peace, in short, is an all-pervading business. And I know that peace will be the central objective of the foreign policy of a Democratic administration, with vigorous leadership for disarmament under effective international control.

The world today has no place for an America that tries to stand in its own shadow—tired, timid, unwilling to take the initiative history thrusts upon us. The world cries out today for an America, born in revolution, to wake once more to demands no less than those we answered two centuries ago—to throw off the encircling chains of a new tyranny, to accept once more the flag of freedom, to take once again the leadership for liberty—because, again, the other choice is death. But let us do it this time in the ways not of war but of peace.

Only a liberal government can bring about the reorientation I have indicated. An administration devoted to the status quo can never hope to light fires of idealism and faith among the oppressed peoples of the earth. Only a new liberal administration next January can restore the image of our country once so well-known and well-loved—not as a country glutted with wealth and self-esteem, but as the nation which gave birth to the Declaration of Independence and the Four Freedoms—a nation marked, not by smugness, but by generosity; not by meanness, but by magnanimity; not by stale conservatism and a weary reliance on dollars and guns, but by broad vision and moral and social passion. We have drifted and stumbled long enough.

toward the end of night

by MURRAY KEMPTON

United Nations, World

NO ONE should think about this block of green glass and marble without writing above the record of his reflections the dateline, "United Nations." For it is very much another country.

A few blocks away, in New York, the world seems frozen, old ladies in the lobby of the Hotel Plaza hissing Nikita Khrushchev to the extreme limit of decorum and Nikita Khrushchev shouting "boo" back at them.

All through the week of September 19, New York looked at a world of two distempered giants. On the one side, the United States and its gang, the longshoremen carrying their signs, "KHRUSHCHEV POLLUTES OUR WATERFRONT," the manager of the Hotel Shelburne cursing Fidel Castro, a great nation defending its dignity with its dignity's forfeiture.

On the other side, the Soviet Union and its gang, Khrushchev and his vassals, Castro and his subterraneans, hard enemies facing frightened, nervous, and embarrassed ones.

But, in the United Nations, the same world seemed fluid, transitory, dangerous, of course, but at least adventurous.

This world does not sit in uniformly entrancing quarters. No one who reads those visions of the underground city where the survivors of the atomic apocalypse commence again to rebuild civilization can escape peopling those pages with United Nations inhabitants in a United Nations building. Its air, summer and winter, is uniform and dehydrating; the colors are pale decorator; there is an unrelieved and tedious prospect of unbroken surface. All the open glass cannot abate the sense of living always indoors and under artificial light, a sense heightened by New York's condition as a city without trees. The largest work of art on the premises is a mural of twisted, naked bodies, building, thinking, creating, expressing—the commission and gift of Generalissimo Trujillo.

This peculiar city has developed a special civilization of its own, unreal, of course, but not necessarily more unreal than other contemporary civilizations. Are Dwight Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev so entirely plausible? It has even developed its own language, UN-ese. A sample of UN-ese: Two international civil servants are leaving their diving bell for the boiling waters of New York.

"What," says one, "did you decide about that matter?"

"I suggested," says the other, "that the minister talk to the high commissioner about it."

The city of the United Nations also has its peculiar conventions. The strangest and most conspicuous of these dictates that, when Nikita Khrushchev comes to the General Assembly, he sits as the equal with, say, President Sergio Olympo of Togoland, once branch manager of a soap company. This, of course, is a convention entirely without weight across the street from the United Nations. When President Olympo gives a small and hopefully decorous party at the Plaza with Nikita Khrushchev in attendance, the host and all other guests are knocked against the walls while a herd of journalists and their mechanical instruments rolls through in search of Khrushchev.

But, in the great hall itself, the conventional illusion of a General Assembly where all men sit equal works surprisingly well. The Nineteenth Century's notion of diplomacy, for all the damage of history, is hardier than anyone could have thought. The United Nations may be a fiction, but its characters, after due immersion, act according to the dictates of that fiction and avoid it to their peril. Anyone who, like Mr. Khrushchev, insists on playing himself rather than his appointed part runs the dreadful risk of at once seeming out of character. At the moment when he pounded his flat hand on the table and arose to interrupt Prime Minister Macmillan, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Soviets looked like no one so much as the Father Karamazov in the quarters of the elder Zossima when every action designed to draw attention to himself became an embarrassment. Even Andrei Gromyko was reported shocked at this display. Gromyko is a loyal Bolshevik, but he he is also an old UN-ian.

And these occasions brought back the time when Tallyrand persuaded the Congress of Vienna that Czar Alexander of Russia was so outsize by himself that he must be "grouped" and surrounded and thereby obscured by other heads of state who were his equals only by diplomatic fiction. Yet it remains in practice an unexpectedly convenient fiction; Khrushchev, relaxed, was all but indistinguishable near the Sudanese; rampant, he risked seeming only a disorderly person. His excesses of gesture merely lit up by contrast the emergence of a United Nations as a force with its own strength independent of the great powers.

For this was Dag Hammarskjold's session when it opened, as Khruschev's truculent, menacing "so far" acknowledged, and it should be his session at its end. The Great Powers do not acquire clients any longer, Khrushchev's acquisition of Castro being a freakish exception; the new states go, if they go at all, to the

MURRAY KEMPTON, columnist for the New York Post, has covered most of the recent doings in and around the United Nations.

reserved, rigidly dis-partisan Secretary General, whose dedication seems to be the summoning of the new world to the rescue of the old.

The new African states dominate the stage not merely because they are new and picturesque—they are less picturesque than strangers would have expected them to be—but because they represent the drift of the world away from the great powers and their fixed and frozen positions.

Just before this session of the Assembly opened, Bruce Rothwell of the London *News Chronicle* went over his memories with the bartender of the Delegates Lounge and found the whole history of the United Nations in these recollections.

The lounge, they agreed, had been, not eight years ago, like some Settlers Club in Nairobi, its habitues white hunters who stepped out from time to time to seek some trophy—usually a shot at India's Krishna Menon. In 1954, Krishna came in himself to drink an orange crush and brought his Asian friends, the Burmese and the Indonesians; the lounge turned Anglo-Indian; the West came less and less, the British not at all after Suez.

Now the lounge is African. Its dominant figure is young Alex Quaison-Sackey, the Ghanian Ambassador (Oxford and the University of Tours), with, as Rothwell says, his hyphen, his London tailor, his Scotch-and-water. (Quaison-Sackey put on his tribal dress for the ceremonies welcoming the new African states; to his surprise and amusement, his new African brothers all took their seats in sack suits and Paris cut.)

The new Africans, being French colonials, drink vermouth cassis, and wear ties with small Eiffel Towers upon them, and seem, with Guinea a Marxist exception, somewhat *Gaullista*.

They voted in the main with the United States, somewhat to our surprise, against the seating of Mao Tse-tung's Communist China. What was more to the point, the Africans voted to support Hammarskjold on the Congo, taking their stand at a moment of his particular beleaguerment and comforting us with the knowledge that Mr. Khrushchev can on occasion read them as badly as we can.

We may, to be sure, be talking only about Kerenskys. But it remains, to surprise us for the moment, that they speak for African states, those symbols of the new nationalism, and stand behind Hammarskjold, the archetype of supra-nationalism, while Mr. Khrushchev, heir to the conception of the international working-class, is his enemy.

Mr. Khrushchev seems to have suffered more than anything else from the defect of those very qualities which must contribute most to his popularity at home. He is a Russian where Stalin was a Georgian and the Czars German. Standing on the balcony of his Park Avenue headquarters and playing one of those scenes so calculated to win the appreciation of the largest city of the most comic nation on earth, he sings the *Internationale* in response to Hunter College girls singing *God Bless America* across the street and makes it sound like a Russian national anthem.

But now he comes here to solicit customers who are, many of them, graduates of the London School of Economics and thus children of Harold Laski and who thus find his manners offensive and must recognize at once that he is a Marxist-Leninist the way the president of the Bell Telephone System is an apostle of David Ricardo.



Mauldin in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Full House

A wise observer of the United Nations was saying after the Congo vote that he who would move there to his own profit must recognize that, when certain flags go up, an automatic salute is to be expected from the majority. Anti-colonialism is such a flag; but so, unfortunately for Mr. Khrushchev, is non-interference by established powers. He is an extraordinary fellow, and certainly, when the fit is not upon him, the most adventurous, the most open, the most attractive man in public life, and, in fact, a rare case to come upon in private.

There are even, in fact, moments when he appears to think of a world where there are no policemen and all men are free. Who else would stand on his balcony and listen to the defiance of pickets and shout "Down with Gromyko" back at them in Russian? These are the japes of a man whose target is all established routine and order. When Nikita Khrushchev laughs, everything which is non-conventional and yearning to be free laughs with him. It is possible at such moments to conceive him hating himself and weeping when he turned his troops on the Hungarians, confessing at that horrid end a failure of his dream that all men might be trusted to make their own mistakes.

And yet, every time he has sat in the Assembly and faced the loss of a vote, it is somehow Nikita Khruchev's dreadful compulsion to cry out that he is awesome and that he is sovereign and to turn and look around to whistle up his vassals and to shout then that the stake is nothing larger than the dignity and majesty of the Soviet Union.

The United States does not make mistakes quite so conspicuously because the United States, whether through wisdom or carelessness we are unlikely ever to know, does not care to become so involved. Both Great Powers are now in the position of going to a track where horses are running with whose trainers they have no advantage of contact. At such tracks, wise men do not bet at all.

We did not bet in the Congo while the Soviets were betting on Patrice Lumumba; they lost and we held

our own. The world which is slipping through our fingers seems to us incalculable; the world which slips through Nikita Khrushchev's fingers seems to him still calculable, according to a theory he dimly recollects from night school, and that may be his most serious mistake.

For this world is mostly the possession of Dag Hammarskjold. There remain automatic salutes to flags; it is, after all, a socialist world; we must expect it to be neutralist and to declare for an end to colonialism and for disarmament and disengagement, but we forget at peril of misjudgment that it is also fiercely independent.

To an eye accustomed only to assigning heads to one side or the other, the speech of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, with its valid call for "restitution for years of injustice and crime committed against our continent," looked like a transcript of the Soviet line. Secretary of State Herter forthwith assigned Nkrumah to the Soviet bloc; and Khrushchev, who is no more immune to seduction by the superficial, was certainly as inclined to welcome him.

But Nkrumah, with infrequent excursions, stuck very closely to his native soil. One had to listen to Fidel Castro to hear a speech of pan-Sovietism entirely orthodox; and it was a consequence of Castro's posture that, by going too far, he destroyed a sound speech; he was required to do very little; his words would, for example, have had an effect entirely different if he had merely mentioned the misfortune of Tibet. But heads that can be squarely counted on one side or the other are not heads of much consequence in the new United Nations.

The world is spinning away from both the great powers. It is no longer theirs to decide. It is a world at once revolutionary and uncommitted, spinning away from our gravitational pull and from Khrushchev's too, on its own orbit.

And it could be traveling somewhere towards the end of the long night we have experienced since the war. There are far worse things than a world which, if it has slipped from our hands, has also slipped from Khrushchev's. There would be little difference between our society and his if we could not trust other people to make their own mistakes.

The Economic Case for Kennedy's Election

by LEON H. KEYSERLING

IN THIS ELECTION year, more than in any I remember, it has become the fashion among many people to assert they will refrain from voting in November because they see "too little difference" in the choices open to them. While I grant there may be some plausibility in this position when one considers only peripheral issues, I believe on central issues there are compelling reasons to choose the Democratic Party and its Presidential candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy.

There are several such major issues, but I would cite especially the economic issue. The economic behavior of a nation and a people is perhaps the best single indicator of their total philosophy and conscience. Economic activity commands a large proportion of our time and effort; economic justice is close to the core of social justice and fundamental morality; and economic programs are close to the heart of the action necessary to build the kind of America to which we all aspire and the kind of world in which people can live at peace with one another.

The two Administrations of President Dwight D. Eisenhower have made clearer than ever before in our history the wide gap between the center of gravity of the Republican economic philosophy and performance and that of the Democrats. And there *is* a center of gravity in each of the two parties, even though there are opposite poles in each which can be cited to provide a rationale for apathy on the part of people who are discontented or insufficiently informed.

The Republican Party reflects the conservative economic school, which stands for what might be called "the economics of scarcity." It has never become fully committed to the goal of "full employment." It has frequently asserted that unemployment of manpower and plant, considerably above minimum levels, helps to make the economy work "more efficiently." This school is opposed to large depressions, but it believes that smaller recessions have "a corrective value."

In contrast the liberal economic school, reflected in the Democratic Party, gives top priority to "maximum employment, production, and purchasing power"—the goals of the Employment Act of 1946. This school believes it desirable always to hold unemployment of plant and manpower to a minimum. And this requires a high enough rate of economic growth to absorb a steadily growing labor force and a rapidly accelerating productivity and technology.

The conservative school leans toward "watering the economic tree at the top," in the sincere belief that favoring the wealthier economic groups, those who "save and invest," is most beneficial to the whole economy in the long run. It thus neglects the fact that the production which results from investment must be sustained by consumption. This school argues that it favors protection of the value of the dollar and prevention of inflation. But the policies it adopts

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to achieve this end frequently boil down to doing relatively more for those who have more dollars, and for those engaged in the business of managing money.

The liberal school believes that all members of our society should share in our general economic progress. But on grounds of both economic performance and social justice, this school places special emphasis upon positive policies to help the great majority of the people who are in the middle- and low-income groups. Such emphasis, by combatting the tendency of consumption to fall behind our power to produce, helps the whole economy. This economic philosophy is called "watering the tree at its roots."

The liberal school—and the Democratic Party—are deeply concerned about protection of the dollar and prevention of inflation. But ultimately the liberal approach seeks to protect human beings. It looks not only at whether the dollar is getting bigger or smaller, but also at how many dollars there are and who is getting them. In its stress upon high economic growth and sustained maximum employment, this school concentrates mainly upon expanding the *real* purchasing power of the people as a whole. Liberal economists, and Democrats generally, advocate "the economics of abundance."

The old saw that the basic Republican approach is to water the economic tree at the top can be substantiated by careful examination of the evidence during recent years. Practically every national economic policy, during the Eisenhower era, is highly illustrative. The "new" farm policy of Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson has paid out huge bonanzas to relatively few large land interests. It has encouraged a corporative American agriculture, even while the farm population as a whole has suffered a loss of income as large as that which overwhelmed the entire economy during the years of the Great Depression. The tight-money, high-interest policy has constituted a shameless example of the use of powerful public instrumentalities to transfer close to twenty-five billion dollars in national income in a highly regressive direction. Republican policies of spending and taxation have exacerbated these regressive trends. Republicans have refused to accept the responsibility to use fiscal policy not only to improve the distribution of national income and to render essential public services, but also to promote maximum economic growth and reasonably full employment. While the industrial giants have not fared so well in the long run as they would have if a stable and high rate of economic growth had been maintained, they have been abetted powerfully in the drive toward business concentration and the serious weakening of medium- and small-sized businesses.

The economic philosophy of the current Administration has made itself felt in other ways besides the direct impact of public policies. The one-sided crusade of the propagandists in high public office against labor in general and unions in particular and the incessant clamor that rising wage trends have been responsible for inflation have encouraged practices in the "administered" areas of the private economy which have distorted price-wage-profit relationships in a regressive direction and militated against economic growth.

The consequences flowing from these Republican policies are easily discernible. From early 1953 until now, the actual rate of overall economic growth of the United States has averaged annually only about one-half the amount required to maintain reasonably full use of a rapidly accelerating technology and a constantly growing labor force. This actual rate has been hardly better than half that achieved earlier during peacetime under a different set of national policies. Consequently, during the past seven and one-half years, we have suffered, through idleness of productive facilities, a loss considerably in excess of 200 billion dollars in total national production measured in uniform 1959 dollars, and a loss of more than fifteen million man-years of job opportunity.



Two-thirds of these recent Republican years have been marked by decline into or recovery from recession. And the peak of each recovery has left us with far more unemployment of plant and manpower than the peak of the previous recovery. Thus far in 1960, unemployment of manpower has been about two-thirds higher than during 1953 as a whole despite the recession which began in the middle of that year. Further, from mid-1959 until now, the economy has been in virtual stagnation, ominously threatening another serious recession by 1961 if national policies are not fundamentally changed.

This ultimate economic evil of unused and therefore wasted productive resources has been compounded by the regressive nature of the default. Even though our total economy has grown only about one-half as fast as it should since early 1953, total national income and average family income in real terms are obviously considerably higher than they were seven and one-half years ago. But the number of families in the United States who have real incomes below $4,000 a year is as high now as in 1953, which means that there has been virtually no progress in the liquidation of individual poverty. Today, about one-fourth of all families have incomes below $4,000, and their average income is in the neighborhood of $2,500. Fully half of all families have incomes below the $6,000 figure which at least in urban and suburban areas is generally regarded as the amount required to maintain an adequate but modest standard of living.

The Republican economic policies which have halted progress in the reduction of personal poverty in America have simultaneously and through mutual interaction made poverty widespread in the performance of our public responsibilities. Even at existing tax rates, the more than $200 billion loss in total national production since early 1953 has resulted in a loss of about $65 billion in Federal, state, and local revenues. And under the aegis of a national

economic policy which measures our capabilities to perform the essentials by the amount of public revenues actually collected in a stunted economy, rather than by the challenge which unused productive resources offer to translate potential wealth into real wealth, the shortage of Federal revenues has been translated into the almost universally accepted principle that we "cannot afford" what we actually cannot afford to do without. In national defense and international economic cooperation, education and health and housing, development of our natural resources and redevelopment of our cities, social security and the general welfare, the wounds inflicted by this neglect are everywhere apparent and the scars will remain for many years even if we should promptly reverse our present course.

And if we do not reverse the course, if Republican economic policies persist, the future is even more foreboding than the recession now widely predicted for 1961. If the overall growth rate of the economy since early 1953 is repeated during the period from the beginning of 1960 through the end of 1965, we would have during this six-year period at least 450 billion dollars *less* total national production, and about 23 million man-years *less* employment opportunity, than if we establish and maintain the five per cent annual growth rate which would reasonably absorb the new technology and the growing labor force. The lower growth rate would thus have a devastating effect upon private economic well-being. And the lower growth rate, accompanied by the philosophy and policies to which it must be attributed, would, during the same six-year period, deprive Federal, state, and local governments of about 120 billion dollars in revenues at existing tax rates, thus leaving us still less able "to afford" to service the highest priorities of our domestic and world-wide needs.

At the lower growth rate, the true level of unemployment of manpower (full-time unemployment plus the full-time equivalent of part-time employment), standing at the intolerably high figure of more than seven per cent of the civilian labor force during the first half of 1960, might well rise to ten per cent by 1965. The idleness of our total productive resources, standing at the equally intolerably high figure of about ten per cent of our reasonably full capacities during the first half of 1960, could rise to fifteen per cent or more by 1965. If this should happen, the effects on the domestic scene would be compounded by further losses in the world-wide contest of performance between ourselves and the totalitarian states.

The regressive economic policies of the Eisenhower era are not an isolated phenomenon in the history of the Republican Party. It is significant that at least since the turn of the century, every great forward movement has been sparked by the election of a Democratic President, and every period of apathy or reaction has been sparked by the election of a Republican President.

The disastrous economic policies of the Republican Administrations between 1921 and 1933 require no review. And while the New Deal did not succeed fully, prior to World War II, in lifting the economy all the way out of the pit into which it had previously been plunged, the New Deal did accomplish a series of permanent economic reforms which have immeasurably strengthened our economic life in all the years since. These New Deal reforms, coupled with further legislation during World War II, enabled a transition from war to peace with an unparalleled minimum of economic dislocation. They also enabled us, between 1947 and 1950, before the outbreak of the Korean struggle, to maintain an average annual growth rate in excess of four per cent, accompanied by still further improvement in the distribution of the fruits of prosperity. It is these Democratic reforms which have safeguarded the economy since 1953 from major depression, despite the hammer blows of the economic policies of the new Republican dispensation.

Today, if one examines carefully the platforms of the two parties, the speeches of the two Presidential candidates, and the speeches of the majority of those members of the Congress running this year, he is likely to conclude that the Democrats, even if they do a good deal less than they promise, will be preferable to the Republicans even if they do as well as they promise. For the very promises of the Republican spokesmen, when carefully analyzed, are promises to continue a philosophy and pattern of performance which it would be much better to abandon than to perpetuate.

Turning from comparison of the economic policies of the two parties to comparison of the two Presidential candidates, I find equally strong ground for concluding that there is an immense difference between them. While Vice President Nixon is more vigorous, alert, and informed than the man he would like to succeed, and while his artful use of language puts him ostensibly on many sides of many questions, it seems clear that not only his fundamental ties but also his fundamental views on economic matters are inescapably Republican—and we have just examined the unhappy impact of Republican policies on the national economy.

Senator Kennedy is daily making available to the electorate a clear picture of his general thinking, his native impulses, his discernment of the needs of the nation and the world, and his concept of the Presidency. He seems to me, at this juncture, quite as firmly in the liberal and forward-looking tradition as Roosevelt was in the campaign of 1932, and perhaps more consistent and less vague. He is certainly sincere and unequivocal in his espousal of the Democratic platform, which seems to me the most commendable adopted by any party in the United States within the experience of those now living. Indeed, Senator Kennedy's record as a whole compares favorably with that of any other man in this century, as of the time when he first presented himself to the American people for election to the Presidency.

And let us always remember, as an axiom of our political life, that Democratic Presidents tend to do much better than their previous revelations would suggest, while Repub-

lican Presidents have done the reverse. Woodrow Wilson's opinions prior to 1912 stamped him as a fairly orthodox Manchester school economic thinker; but as President he immediately initiated and gave superb leadership to a program of economic improvement characterized by the establishment of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Trade Commission (worthy advances in their time). Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom so sagacious a liberal as Walter Lippmann characterized in 1932 as the least meritorious of all of the leading Democratic candidates, and as an engaging man with no particular qualifications for the Presidency except his yearning for the office, led the greatest peaceful improvement of a free people in recorded history. Harry S. Truman, when he became President by accident, was the greatest shock on record to those who were cocksure that he would be a disappointing President. In contrast Herbert Hoover, elected as a great humanitarian, proved in practical terms to be cold as marble to the suffering of his countrymen. It would be uncharitable at the moment to ask whether President Eisenhower has lived up to expectations.

The pattern of these events is too symmetrical to be accidental. Because of the wide gap between the centers of gravity of the two political parties, the election of a Republican President pushes the nation in one direction and the election of a Democratic President pushes it in another.

I want to turn briefly to the international scene. A continuation of domestic mistakes would hurt us; a continuation of international mistakes could destroy us. Even if it is debatable whether Kennedy or Nixon has had more "experience" in foreign affairs, most of the discussion on this subject seems to me pure tripe. For we can never afford to forget that the Presidential office subjects a man to the test, not of his prior experience, but of his innate quality—plus the test of whether the party which he leads is prepared to support him. No President, when first elected, was presumed to have had more experience in economic affairs than Herbert Hoover, or more experience in foreign affairs than Dwight Eisenhower. Compared with either of them, the previous experience of Franklin Roosevelt was shallow and that of Abraham Lincoln negligible.

The foreign policy of a great nation and its President must necessarily be the projection of domestic policy and performance. Essentially, this explains the difference between the achievements of the Roosevelt-Truman foreign policy and the failures of the Eisenhower foreign policy. An elected leadership which does not understand America cannot comprehend the world. An economic and social philosophy which is reactionary or static on the home front, which looks with complacency upon high unemployment and deficient education and lagging science within our own borders, cannot respond to the aspirations of the people of the world—people who with resources so much less than our own are struggling mightily to create technology and jobs, science and education. An Administration pledged to a philosophy which seeks, albeit unsuccessfully, to balance the Federal budget at the expense of our own national economy, and which throws up exaggerated "balance of payments" scares in an attempt to justify its inadequate international economic policy; an Administration which tries to blame "foreign competition" for the economic troubles at home which have resulted overwhelmingly from its own domestic derelictions, will never be able to lead us toward world comity and world peace.

Vice President Nixon may feel that his "debates" in Russia with Mr. Khrushchev equip him to handle foreign affairs. But Senator Kennedy has made clear his recognition that a stronger and more just America must be the foundation of all our efforts around the globe.

The next President of the United States, in the economic field, will



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need much more than a general philosophy and nobility of intent. He will need to lead us to a full realization—and quickly—that the great national purposes which we must achieve for domestic and international reasons, within the circumference of our general ideals, have quantification as their very essence. The real problems are not even defined merely by citing their labels and declaring our dedication to their solution. The real problems involved in the delineation and pursuit of our great national purposes are how much we intend to do in each area, how fast, how we intend to resolve competing priorities, and by what specific methods. In other words, faced by a worldwide challenge, how can we achieve our goals under the methods of freedom? This is the real crux of the whole matter of "national goals," even though most of those who prate about these goals do not admit it. Such national goals involve a nationwide concert of effort which reconciles the virtues of responsible free enterprise with the virtues of responsible free government. The next President will need to bring every instrument of national economic policy into harmonious accord with this reconciliation, and he will need through moral leadership rather than through explicit power to win the cooperation of the private sectors of our economy in this effort.

The dearth of a systematic economic approach in the United States in the 1930's was indeed a liability which left us with eight million unemployed even in 1939. But it did not prevent a courageous and forward-looking President in the Democratic tradition from building an enduring structure of economic reform, and accomplishing the humanization of government which at that time was the alternative to revolution. This President Hoover and the Republican Party could never do. And today, in the context of different problems, I feel that Senator Kennedy has the tough and practical mind to grasp the role of Presidential leadership and enable us as a nation to define our basic needs, bring them into harmony, forge the instruments for their attainment, and thus lift the concept of a great national purpose under freedom from a pretentious generality into a splendid performance.

A Socialist Looks at The Campaign

by NORMAN THOMAS

ONE THING stands out in this unsatisfactory campaign between two similar men: The United States is committed to a combination welfare and garrison state. John W. Davis and Calvin Coolidge, the Presidential rivals in 1924, would have called it, incorrectly, "Socialist." If anyone doubts the range of our commitment, let him read the 1960 Democratic and Republican platforms. These documents, which reflect rather than make public opinion, are both the most liberal in their parties' histories, not only on civil rights, but on other domestic issues.

The framers of the more liberal Democratic platform are Utopians. They promise everybody almost every conceivable economic as well as political right, but then pledge their devotion to our miscalled free-enterprise system and ignore our drift toward a garrison state. All our ills, it seems, can be solved by a change of leadership, by placing a Democrat rather than a Republican in the White House.

Socialists are realists when we tell our liberal friends that their Democratic Utopia cannot be achieved in a welfare-garrison state whose economy is so largely in the hands of great oligarchic corporations and is regulated with such deference to the two gods, Private Profit and Military Security.

It is a singular fact that for the sake of political success powerful conservative forces in America have been sidetracked by both parties in their platforms and in the speeches of their candidates. But the conservatives are not unhappy; they are conscious of their proved power to sabotage legislation designed to carry out the platforms. In appealing to the people both parties take the welfare-garrison state for granted. Such argument as there has been turns on how much should be spent for military security, for farmers, the aged, housing, education—and how the programs should be administered—rather than on any great underlying principle. Even so, neither party has had the courage and common sense to come out squarely for an American version of the socialized medicine which has been such a blessing in Britain and many other nations. They are cowed by the powerful AMA lobby and dare talk only about medical help for the aged.

Conceivably the Democrats may succeed in making something of an issue of their plans to raise the rate of increase of our gross production which they say the Republican Administration has paralyzed. Pressed for details on this subject on "Meet the Press" the Sunday before his nomination, Senator Kennedy could only remind his questioner that he had proposed spending several billion more on the arms race, hardly a wellspring for the economy of abundance either in goods or services. At Detroit, Kennedy indicated that a further Democratic contribution to increased production would be lower interest rates, but he has yet to reveal what, specifically, the Democrats would do to control inflation.

The major concern of the Democrats is to hold together the fantastic coalition which is their party—a coa-

NORMAN THOMAS, the nation's foremost Socialist spokesman, was six times his party's candidate for President.

lition which includes the most liberal and the most reactionary of our political leaders and gives disproportionate power to the reactionaries. The liberal welfare and civil rights promises of the Democrats are worth barely fifty cents on the dollar so long as the party permits men like Representative Howard Smith of Virginia and Senator James Eastland of Mississippi to remain as chairmen of powerful committees in the House and Senate. Kennedy and Vice Presidential candidate Lyndon Johnson and every Democratic candidate for the House and the Senate should be insistently urged, in these closing weeks of the campaign, to tell us what they would do to see that no chairman of a committee, designated by seniority, will be given his post in a Democratic Congress unless he is in accord with his party's platform on the important issues with which his committee will deal, especially civil rights.

The failure of the Southern Democrats in the convention to make more of a fight on the excellent civil rights plank was based on an expectation of revoking civil rights' promises—and to a lesser extent other liberal measures—at the legislative level, just as in former years. Should the victorious party conclude that it had won the election by virtue of Southern support, it would require the most insistent pressure to prevent that party from making as bad a record on civil rights in the next Congress as both parties, but more especially the Democratic, made in the last Congress. The failure of the liberal Democrats even to try to do something about the committee chairmanships and the rules was a public scandal. Their inaction helped the loose but effective Republican-Democratic coalition to defeat or water down much liberal legislation.

There is no evidence so far in this campaign of serious intentions to change the situation. Kennedy indicated that fact by choosing the conservative Senator Lyndon Johnson as his running mate at the very convention that had adopted the most liberal platform in the party's history. Johnson accepted despite all the harsh things he had said about his successful rival because, I believe, he had a vision of holding a power never before possessed by any Vice President, a power to dictate the legislation he would permit his party to pass. He would step straight from the shoes of a successful majority leader into those of the Senate's presiding officer, and, using the new majority leader as a deputy, he might be more powerful than the President in the legislative field.

But the ignominious post-convention session of Congress must have marred the luster of that dream. In the short and messy session neither party gained public approval. But the Democrats were responsible for the session and it was important for them, especially Johnson, either to pass liberal legislation on housing, health, and education or be able to saddle the White House and the Republicans with full responsibility for their failure. They did nothing of the sort. Johnson, the majority leader, failed to produce the necessary majorities.

Until well after Labor Day I was saying that I couldn't remember a campaign in which there was so little enthusiasm for either candidate. Part of my evidence was the number of people, by no means Socialists, who reproachfully asked me, "Why aren't you running? I'd like to cast a protest vote."

More recently, the campaign has been warming up and the candidates are getting larger and somewhat more enthusiastic audiences. They may even have found and discussed some issues in the nationally televised public debates which were yet to be held as I was writing. But until then at least, neither of the opportunists had taken a really notable stand on a major issue. (This could also be said of Presidential candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932.)

It is perhaps typical of our times and our political system that both parties nominated such similar, almost interchangeable men. Both are young, vigorous, adroit politicians, as they proved in the handling of their conventions. Both are personable. Both are good speakers. Both have shown some capacity and willingness to learn. Both are, in short, fairly enlightened practitioners in the school of politics which believes that it is the "science of the possible." Neither has acquired the stature of great leadership.

It is most unforunate that the religious issue in its most bigoted form has once more intruded, especially in the South. I had thought it virtually dead after Kennedy's success in the West Virginia primary, but one of the finest men I know, a Southerner, reports the growth of a most disheartening, ill-informed melange of prejudices—religious, racial, social—each bigotry somehow strengthening the other. This type of prejudice, among its other evils, tends to frustrate a proper, objective inquiry into the relation of a candidate's religious belief and church affiliation to vital political issues.

We have a right to know, for example, whether or not a Quaker candidate accepts the Quaker testimony against participation in war, whether a Christian Scientist in the White House would veto all bills providing for medical service, what a Roman Catholic believes about separation of church and state, public support of church schools, and the role of the state in birth control matters.

The Roman Catholic church has an historic record which invites inquiry into the relation of church and state and the kind of political obedience that a candidate may feel he owes the hierarchy. In Kennedy's case he has answered these questions so well that it is within his own church that some objections may be raised. For myself, I am more inclined to worry about the possible influence of his earthly father and financial angel,

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Joseph Kennedy, than about that of any spiritual father of the church, although so far, Joseph Kennedy has been content to sign checks without visible demands on his son.

In fairness to Nixon, whose past campaign methods have deserved sharp criticism, it must be said that his conduct in this campaign, especially in relation to the religious issue, has been admirable.

The great issue on which our lives literally depend is foreign policy. And here the candidates are doing at least as badly as I feared. Both have, on occasion, preached pretty good sermons about the American purpose and have said the conventional things about peace, disarmament, and aid to underdeveloped nations. But for the main impact of the foreign policy aspects of their campaigns they depend upon two contrasting statements, neither of which is true. Nixon says, "Everything has really been all right under Eisenhower. It will be under me. But let's not be complacent." Kennedy says: "Just about everything is wrong under Eisenhower and will be under Nixon. Trust us Democrats to set things right—but don't ask us how." Nixon's Pollyannaish optimism lends itself to caustic ridicule. And his self-perpetuated reputation for "toughness" with Khrushchev is scarcely reassurance.

Kennedy's position is at least as bad as Nixon's. His criticisms have force, but he has given the impression that his chief remedy would be to be even "tougher" with Khrushchev and Castro. He is committed to even bigger expenditures on arms, a position emphasized far more than ' is generalizations on disarmament. K - nedy shows almost complete unawareness of how far we have drifted into the status of a garrison state with welfare trimmings, a state in which our economy and our individual freedoms are all subordinate to a false god of security. If an angel from heaven on Christmas Eve would proclaim effective peace on earth great would be the rejoicing. And great would be the panic in the stock-market the day after Christmas. "Where your treasure is there will your heart be also." And probably your votes. Which is one reason why Kennedy and Nixon prefer to talk about disarmament in the usual generalities without specific suggestions on the way to give drive and determination and sincerity to our efforts to achieve universal disarmament.

Kennedy was somewhat handicapped because he was not able to compete in criticism of Eisenhower with Mr. Khrushchev while the Soviet Premier was at the United Nations Assembly. But this provides only more reason why he ought to talk positively on plans for disarmament, disengagement, strengthening the United Nations, and a cooperative attack on the world's poverty. Moreover, Kennedy is under obligation to prove his zeal and intelligence in pursuit of peace by rebuking some of his Democratic colleagues who have been making a bad record since his nomination.

ITEM—The Democratic candidates were less successful than the Republican Administration in gaining Senatorial support for the ratification of the twelve-nation treaty barring the cold war and the arms race from the Antarctic continent. Seventeen Democrats and four Republicans voted against it, thereby making it clear that they would never find any disarmament treaty satisfactory, since no future treaty is likely to provide better inspection or safer guarantees than does the Antarctica agreement.

ITEM—Kennedy's Democratic colleague, Senator Allen Ellender, expressed the wish that all the Latin American nations had a dictator like Trujillo, and the Democratic floor leader in the House, John McCormack of Massachusetts, who had been decorated by Trujillo, was largely responsible for denying to the Administration the right to withhold a bonus to the Dominican dictator out of the mismanaged sugar quota.

ITEM—Democratic Senators James Eastland and Thomas Dodd of the Judiciary Committee were responsible for the impertinence of ordering Linus Pauling to give the names of all who had helped him get the signatures of some 11,000 scientists to a petition to the United Nations for discontinuance of nuclear tests. These same Democrats charged, with no mention of our long and scandalous support of Cuba's dictator Batista, that lower echelons of the State Department and some journalists were partly responsible for the rise of Fidel Castro.

Do you wonder that we Socialists are crying out against a system that allows such reactionaries to hold high posts in an allegedly liberal party? Is it any surprise that we are demanding a meaningful political realignment?

This year, Socialists thought it best to campaign for our platform wherever we could get a hearing, rather than for a candidate. Obviously neither Kennedy nor Nixon is satisfactory to us, but in critical times like these the difference between more and less may be of considerable importance. One must consider not only the candidate but the men around him. Here the advantage would seem to lie with Kennedy, in foreign policy, because of the prominence of Chester Bowles and Adlai Stevenson. But I confess to considerable disappointment at the failure of both men to speak out on some of the issues, as well as at certain things they have said. Moreover I have been favorably impressed by the work at the Bogota conference of President Eisenhower's Undersecretary of State, Douglas Dillon.

On the other hand, the enthusiasm at the Republican Convention for the intransigent Congressman Walter H. Judd of Minnesota on the subject of China was frightening. I have debated Dr. Judd and the logic of his argument was war, not just non-recognition, and war is what we will get if we refuse even to try to get the real China into the United Nations on decent terms. Democrats are as determined as Judd to keep China out of the United Nations. They will "welcome any evidence" of Mao's change of heart, but will do nothing to encourage it.

I shall not be in utter despair whatever the outcome of the election. But once more I deplore the imperfections of our democracy, the way we elect our President, and the apathy, ignorance, and prejudice of so much of the public on issues which will determine whether man will use his new-found power for more abundant life or for the suicide of his race.

The Religious Issue

by JAMES MacGREGOR BURNS

As I write this in late September, religion is much in the news as a central issue in the campaign. In a highly publicized pronunciamento, the National Conference of Citizens for Religious Freedom expressed fears that a Roman Catholic President would be "under extreme pressure" from the hierarchy of his church to align United States policy with Vatican goals. In the ensuing storm, all four candidates have discussed the subject while evidently wishing that it did not have to be discussed; Reinhold Niebuhr and other theologians have roundly criticized their Protestant brethren for loosing "the floodgates of religious bigotry," and the issue adorns the front page and editorial columns of every newspaper in the land.

I am confident, however, that by the time this article appears several weeks from now, the religious issue will no longer be a national issue; it will no longer be discussed by the candidates or by their spokesmen; and it will no longer be on the front pages of the newspapers. I believe also—though this will be harder to test than the above—that religion will be a factor in November influencing a significant number of voters only in the Bible Belt.

I base this prediction of the early demise of the religious issue partly on historical grounds. The current furore is not the first but the third time that religion has arisen as the most discussed issue of the present campaign. The first occasion was the publication of Kennedy's answers to questions by *Look*—in which the Senator asserted unequivocally that "whatever one's religion in private life may be, for the officeholder nothing takes precedence over his oath to uphold the Constitution and all its parts—including the First Amendment and the strict separation of church and state."

The second occasion occurred in April this year during the West Virginia Presidential primary, which followed hard on the Wisconsin primary that Kennedy had won, some asserted, because of bloc voting by Catholics. On that occasion the situation reached such proportions that Kennedy interrupted his primary fight, returned to Washington, and devoted an entire speech (before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 21) to an eloquent, point-by-point refutation of the attacks on a Catholic President. It was in this speech, incidentally, that he rejected the suggestion of Walter Lippmann and others that he settle for the Vice-Presidential nomination; such a suggestion, he said, "assumes that Catholics are a pawn on the political chessboard, moved hither and yon, and somehow 'bought off' by the party putting in the second spot a Catholic whom the party barred from the top for reasons of religion."

In both these previous flare-ups of religion in the campaign, the issue quickly died down. Why? In large part, I think, because Kennedy met it quickly and squarely, in prepared speeches and in answers to questions raised after talks. His address and his question-answering before the Greater Houston Ministerial Association were even more dramatic and decisive than the talk to the newspaper editors, although he said almost nothing of importance that was new. In hitting back at the attack so directly, Kennedy has followed the opposite strategy of Al Smith, who debated the issue in *The Atlantic* in 1927 and then tried to ignore it the following year during the campaign. Kennedy's forthright counter-attack seems to have been much more effective.

This year, I believe, the issue as a *national* issue will die away just as quickly as it did earlier in this campaign. None of the candidates wants to go on with it; as I write Norman Vincent Peale has severed his connection with the National Conference; and others who raised the issue now seem to consider it a hot potato to be dropped, at least publicly.

If, then, the issue has only historical importance, what lessons can we learn from the recent episode?

One—Given a generally healthful environment, bigotry is politically self-defeating. To be sure, the recent action of the Protestants has aroused or at least reinforced fears of the Roman Catholic Church among some non-Catholics. But on the other side it has also aroused defensive feelings among Catholics, including some Catholics leaning toward Nixon, and it has brought Kennedy support from some voters who do not care deeply about the issue of religion but do feel strongly about the requirements of fair play in campaigns. Nor do the two sides cancel out. Even if it were true that the debate turned more voters against Kennedy than it swung toward him—which I doubt—it would still be true that Kennedy lost support in the smaller, rural states and gained votes in the big urban states where Catholics, like Negroes, labor, and other organized groups, have a major balance-of-power role. The issue, on balance, has strengthened Kennedy in the place where the election will be

JAMES MacGREGOR BURNS, professor of political science at Williams College, is the author of "John Kennedy: A Political Profile" and "The Lion and the Fox," a political biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Mauldin in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch

Relics

won or lost—in the Electoral College.

Two—Many of the Protestant leaders who have raised the issue did so, of tourse, in good faith and on wholly "religious" and non-political grounds. But one must then question their political judgment in publicizing the issue eight weeks before the election and in such a way as to hurt the chances of only one of the candidates. Millions of Americans interpreted the action—however sincere some of the instigators of it—as a political attack on Kennedy. This interpretation was strengthened when it was discovered that some of the leaders of the National Conference of Citizens for Religious Freedom were political conservatives stoutly ensconced in the Nixon camp. One wonders, indeed, if the Protestant leaders of this organization realized the gamble they were taking. For if Kennedy should win the election the results will be interpreted, however unfairly, as a repudiation of the arguments of these Protestants. By their action the Conference leaders in effect subjected the issue to a national referendum in November that may appear, if Kennedy wins, to repudiate their position even though the result actually will turn on far graver matters.

Three—The whole handling of the issue showed incredible political naivete on the part of the Conference leaders. They persisted in posing the issue "Would the Catholic Church put pressure on a Catholic President?" But this is not the real issue, for *all* organized groups put pressures of one kind or another on men in office, Catholic or Protestant, as they have every right to do in a free society. Catholic leaders would not be worth their salt if they did not take positions on matters of importance to their Church and, one way or the other, let the politicians know how they feel. The real question is, "To what pressures would Kennedy respond?"—and no candidate could have answered this question more categorically than Kennedy did.

Four—The whole case against a Catholic President was presented in the most arid, abstract, and rhetorical manner. One would think, from the arguments, that this was a country where governors and Senators of the Catholic faith had used their offices to carry out the dictates of Rome. One would think that Al Smith, who was governor of New York for four terms, had turned the state into a papal enclave. But in all the endless debate, there was no reference to the actual transgressions of Catholic governors and Senators—there could be none—except for mention of an Ohio official under Governor Mike DiSalle, a Catholic, who turned out to have been appointed by a previous governor who was a Protestant. To be sure, one can cite many dismal *local* examples of improper Catholic influence on or through Catholic councilmen, members of boards of education, and so on. But nobody seemed to face up to the fact that the higher and more responsible the office, the more Catholics in office have resisted Catholic pressures on them and in them. Lacking examples to support their suspicions of a Catholic President, the Protestant leaders had to resort to unhappy instances of anti-Protestant discrimination in foreign Catholic nations in order to produce a "parade of imaginary horribles" if a Catholic President were elected here. But it is precisely an American President, operating under the fierce white light of public attention, who would be most resistant to improper Catholic pressures—more resistant, I think, than many Protestant Presidents have been.

Five—One unhappy result of the episode may be that Kennedy has been pushed too far toward a total divorce of religion and politics. One can believe in separation of church and state and still want his President and other political leaders to respond, in their hearts, to religious dictates. If our Judaic-Christian heritage has any meaning, it calls for qualities of charity, humility, decency, honesty, integrity, on the part of those in government as well as outside. There is a case for the unity of religion and statecraft just as strong as the case for the separation of church and state in formal decision-making—but the former case has not received a hearing in this debate. Perhaps in calmer times ministers, priests, and rabbis will feel free to contend that our religious heritage, in its broadest sense, is too important to be shunted off from statecraft.

Six—The debate did produce one gleam of humor, with which I will close these comments. In the midst of the tempest over religion and politics Lyndon Johnson told a New York City audience that the previous Sunday his minister had approached him while he was sitting in church and had asked "Brother Johnson" to come up and help with the sermon. To which Johnson replied that these days there ought to be one day a week when a man could get away from religion.

Conrad in The Denver Post

"The Next Voice You Hear . . ."

that IMAGE in the White House

by KARL E. MEYER

You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

Like ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave.

True, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads? . . .

To them, I said, the truth would be nothing but the shadows of the images.

—PLATO, The Republic

IT MUST have begun in a flossy executive suite on Madison Avenue. The year was 1952, the subject was the latest account—a product named Eisenhower — and the momentous words might have been these:

"He's not penetrating, J.B. There's no smack, no punch, no consumer impact. What we've got to do is to crystallize a new . . . a new *image.*"

And there it was. We've been stuck with the word ever since, and no political discussion seems authoritative without a respectful reference to the candidate's image. Did I say candidate? Pardon. Like the Moliere character who found he had been talking prose all his life without knowing it, everyone by now has discovered that everything has an image—from people and parties down to the lowly prune (depth interviews showed that the prune's image "was ridden with meanings, all unfortunate," according to Vance Packard).

The term has become so widely accepted that it seemed wholly in order last summer for an Associated Press profile of Richard M. Nixon to be subheaded "Man and Image"—with the undeniable implication that there was a difference between the two. Inevitably, Rabbi Max Nussbaum of Los Angeles opened the third session of the Democratic Convention by beseeching divine assistance for an "America with a new image." At the Republican Convention, images flew like hailstones—most memorably, perhaps, when the Governor of West Virginia retroactively endowed Lincoln with the "image of freedom."

Political reporters vied with each other to find new and daring uses of the term. Chalmers M. Roberts of The Washington *Post* wrote that in agreeing to run together, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson "broke the standardized image so many have of them." But what can be broken can be mended, and the same week columnist William S. White explained that Kennedy approached Johnson "and asked him to provide the cement so sorely needed—the image of a Protestant Southwesterner—so that the total image would not be solely that of a Catholic Easterner."

Cemented or broken, images come in a variety of shapes and sizes, are negative or positive, bright or mousy, and even come in the big family size package. The most basic of all images is the father image—the fellow who is now in the White House. But tagging right behind is the new 1960-style image which was heralded in August by a front-page headline in The Washington *Star:* "THE SON YOU VOTE FOR MAY BECOME PRESIDENT." So testified Dr. Martin Grotjahn, a psychiatrist at the University of Southern California who found that Kennedy and Nixon "have remarkably similar images."

"Both appear as victorious sons," quoth the good doctor, "but they are also brothers, alter egos in a sense, to many middle-aged persons who feel 'I realize I cannot be President but my brother can.' "

Thus, among other distinctions, the 1960 campaign may afford the first instance of sibling image rivalry. But, with a bow to the growth issue, Dr. Grotjahn also held out this bipartisan consolation: "Of course, the son may grow later—in the voter's conception—into a benevolent father image the way Franklin Delano Roosevelt did."

KARL E. MEYER, editorial writer for the Washington Post & Times-Herald, is currently on leave writing a book on the contemporary political scene.

At the risk of grievously damaging the image of *The Progressive* and of battering up my own personalized image, I have consulted the dictionary to see what all the talk is about. The *Pocket Oxford Dictionary* scarcely affords comforting reading. An image by definition is a polite kind of fraud, a trick with mirrors, as well as a symbol or conception. The definition of image (root: *imitari*, to imitate) is:

> Imitation of object's external form, e.g. statue esp. as object of worship; form, semblance; counterpart; type; simile; metaphor; optical counterpart produced by rays of light reflected from mirror &c.

Now the primary meaning clearly conveys the impression of humbug, and the final meaning suggests compellingly that an image is a deceptive optical illusion. Surely it is appropriate that the word image came into currency after the 1952 Presidential campaign introduced, in a big way, two miracle ingredients into politics: (1) advertising agencies, and (2) television.

This coincidence is suggestive. An image, like an advertisement, is not the substance of an object but its ephemeral shadow; it is the beguil-

ing package, not the reality within. Most important, in all its meanings an image connotes something contrived. Whether in the fine arts or the black arts, an image is a conceit, a concoction, a cabalistic device. This is why, in the familiar usage, images are "projected," "created," "updated," "streamlined" and even (see above) "standardized." The shaping of an image, then, is a technique of manipulation, not of reasoned persuasion.

Above all, the image is associated with visual presentation. In the years when radio was the chief tool of mass communications, there was little talk about images and a good deal of learned discourse about the intangible quality known as "radio personality." The change came swiftly. In 1948, Thomas E. Dewey defeated Harold Stassen in the pivotal Oregon Presidential primary after a radio debate. In 1950, Mr. Dewey market-tested television by centering his campaign for re-election as Governor of New York on a carefully-staged question-and-answer TV show. It worked. And in 1952, General Eisenhower was the first candidate to be successfully merchandised nationally over TV.

The psychology behind this campaign was admirably stated by Rosser Reeves, partner in the advertising agency of Ted Bates & Co. Mr. Reeves, whose firm boasted such blue-chip accounts as Colgate Toothpaste ("It cleans your breath while it cleans your teeth") and Carter's Little Liver Pills, put it this way:

"I think of a man in a voting booth who hesitates between two levers as if he were pausing between competing tubes of toothpaste in a drug-store. The brand that has made the highest penetration on his brain will win his choice, and the nature of the human brain is such that a one-minute or thirty-second speech, expertly crystallized, gets a maximum penetration on its content."

One result was the rash of spots. (VOICE: "Mr. Eisenhower, can you bring taxes down?" EISENHOWER: "Yes. We will work to cut billions in Washington spending and bring your taxes down.") That is called crystallizing the image. Another result was the heavy reliance on TV spectaculars after the 1952 election. Bill Tyler, a columnist for *Advertising Agency*, wrote admiringly of one such performance in 1953:

"Undoubtedly the most effective commercial of the month was the President's TV appearance around the first of June . . . it closely followed the pattern of an agency new-business solicitation. The President let each department head, armed with slides, present the story of his branch of the business. Then he wrapped the whole thing up in a masterful manner and asked for the order. As a TV salesman, we think you will agree, Dwight Eisenhower has few peers . . ."

Dissent among connoisseurs was inaudible.

In 1956, the Eisenhower image presented new problems because of the President's illnesses. Pollster Louis Harris stated it this way in a *Collier's* article: "Eisenhower is no longer looked on as being vigorous. Courageous he still is . . . But the image has mellowed. He is now looked on as being more kindly, wiser, and as one voter put it: 'kind of a grandfather to the republic.' "

From the mellow, kindly gramps we have come to the children's hour. No doubt the image merchants—Irwin Ross' apt name for the public relations fraternity—see this as an important matter of visual contrast, sort of like switching from the adult Western to a college quiz show. And, significantly, the oracles are now saying that the campaign may hinge on the novel TV panel show involving both candidates.

A good deal of the preoccupation with the image is of course pretense and fad, springing from the innocent desire to appear *au courant*. But there is more to it than that. It can be plausibly argued that the advent of the image is a symptom of subtle corruption of the democratic process.

In essence, the assumption behind the talk about imagery is that appearance is far more important than reality. It is not whether the candidate *is* folksy, vigorous, experienced, and pious, but whether he appears to have those qualities. This is scarcely a shocking doctrine; Machiavelli phrased it in its classic form four centuries ago when he advised that on occasion the Prince must be faithless, adding:

"But it is necessary to be able to disguise this character well, and to be a great feigner and dissembler; and men are so simple and so ready to obey present necessities, that one who deceives will always find those who allow themselves to be deceived. I will mention only one modern instance.

"Alexander VI did nothing else but deceive men, he thought of nothing else, and found the occasion for it; no man was ever more able to give assurances, or affirmed things with stronger oaths, and no man observed them less; however, he always succeeded in his deceptions, as he knew well this aspect of things. It is not necessary therefore for a prince to have all the above named qualities [i.e. the conventional virtues], but it is very necessary to seem to have them."

What *is* startling is that this dissembling quality should now be treated as a matter of course—and that psychiatrists, theologians, and political writers should engage in solemn public autopsies on the candidate's phantom self. This is not only startling; it is alarming. It is a form of cynicism appropriate to the era of Charles Van Doren.

The mere avowal of the paragraphs quoted above, more than anything else, has made Machiavelli's name synonomous with guile. Today, one suspects, Nicolo would be a much-honored, much-quoted adviser to a Presidential candidate—as Murray Chotiner was until his image slipped.

In pragmatic political terms, there is an implication as equally disturbing as the ethical implication. It is that a candidate's potential for the White House is measured not by his true character but by the astral personality he manages to project through a vacuum tube. The most dramatic demonstration of the weakness of this thesis can be made by taking an image inventory of Presidents past.

Let us begin in the approved IBM manner by turning the image into a statistical formula. Let us divide the



image into seven components—manner, health, background, appearance, experience, viewpoint, and religion. In order for a candidate to compile a perfect score on the image-meter, he must (1) appear to have an acceptably homey manner; (2) seem in robust health; (3) suggest a background of modest means; (4) look like a heroic marble bust; (5) possess an apparent record of extensive experience; (6) seem moderate in all his views; and (7) appear to be a model of church-going piety.

It is an unnerving revelation to measure our Presidents by this standardized image yardstick. George Washington, for example, would score a meager four because of his hopeless dentures, his insufficient informality, and his wealthy plantation background. John Adams would do little better by virtue of his dubious Unitarian affiliation, his crochety personality, and his affluent Harvard taint.

Jefferson's image rating is a dismaying three. His eccentric religious views, his immoderate espousal of liberty and revolution, his excessive wealth, and his withdrawn, intellectual manner would hardly provide an adequate image for a county coroner. Andrew Jackson might do a little better (4.5), but his abrupt manner, his gaunt appearance, and his splenetic political views would give an account executive pause.

Of all our Presidents, Lincoln has the most dismal image; it is obvious why Stephen Douglas trounced Lincoln in the race for the Senate (I would give Douglas a high 6.5). Oddball views on religion, an almost total lack of experience, rumors of illegitimacy, scarecrow appearance, melancholy disposition, an unfortunate ribald streak, and *warts*—all this adds up to what the PR boys would call a big nothing. One can hear the authentic voice of Madison Avenue: "J.B., there'd be a civil war if the Republicans put up that village crank."

Cleveland, of course, is automatically out of the running because he publicly admitted to fathering a bastard child, and Teddy Roosevelt is too bumptious, too toothy, too dogmatic, and too wealthy. Mark Hanna, who knew a good image when he saw one, spoke for the ages when he gasped, "Now look, that damned cowboy is President of the United States!" Wilson would get the same low rating (3.2) for the opposite reasons: too aloof, too highbrow, too frail looking, too frostily righteous.

As for Franklin Roosevelt (4.9), the negative factors are physical infirmity, excessive wealth, a Harvard degree. Harry Truman is simply impossible: a failure in business, immoderate language, flashy sportshirts—how he ever beat the perfectly-imaged (6.99) Thomas E. Dewey is matter for wonder.

On the other hand, if we peer backwards, certain Presidential candidates emerge with impeccable images:

JAMES BUCHANAN: A muscular six-footer with a superb record of experience (Secretary of State, Minister to Great Britain, Congressman), magnificent bearing, a stout Presbyterian.

ULYSSES S. GRANT: Humble origins, a salty virility, sound experience, a good Methodist, and —as a bonus— name well-known.

RUTHERFORD B. HAYES: Stately appearance, with a reassuring patriarchal beard, moderate views, ample experience (Governor of Ohio), eight children; regular Methodist churchgoer.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY: Stunning profile, impression of enormous vitality, sound and sane views, well-seasoned (Governor and Congressman), a pillar of Methodism.

WARREN G. HARDING: Master of the common touch, handsomest President of this century, staunch Baptist, broad experience (editor, Governor, Senator), sturdily moderate.

The clinching argument is that all of these Presidents look far more impressive on a postage stamp than the likes of Jefferson or Washington. It is strange that the Post Office relegates the best images to the more exotic denominations such as nineteen cents or two dollars.

Finally, we come to the present, and there can be little debate as to which candidate has the more saleable image. Comparison tells, as they say in the advertisements. Richard Milhous Nixon's image is marred only by an unfortunate trace of Quakerism, but we have the word of Norman Vincent Peale that religious conflict has not been a problem for the Vice President. Self-made, well-publicized experience, zealously moderate, and as folksy as a Grandma Moses Christmas card, Mr. Nixon comes up with a respectable 6.5 score.

Then turn to John Fitzgerald Kennedy: controversial religious affiliation, overly callow appearance, a trace of arrogance in manner, reportedly an intellectual, the Harvard blot, millionaire background, an author. "He'll never do, J.B.," says a voice on the thirty-sixth floor, "with that corny New Frontier routine and that lover-boy look."

Another voice—the author's—asks, quietly, whether it is not time to call a halt to this silly and degrading game by burying the mischievously occult word. An appropriate epitaph might be the Commandment which, as you recall, warns the children of Israel: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image . . ."

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MADISON, WISCONSIN

The Crisis-Eaters

by MILTON MAYER

Milton Mayer, a regular contributor to The Progressive, *has just returned from a flying trip to eastern Europe, where he represented the American Friends Service Committee at the third Christian Peace Conference in Prague. He also spent some time in the other Communist countries (including East Germany) which he has visited before.*—THE EDITORS

DURING LAST month's Berlin crisis I was waltzing between the two besieged sectors of the city and I discovered what those three eminent students of human nature, Tom, Dick, and Harry, had known all along. I discovered that there is a kind of man—including all journalists, all welfare workers, all social scientists, all statesmen, and, of course, all soldiers—who simply could not bear to go on living if a *detente* ever occurred between warring worlds, nations, races, classes, or baseball teams. They are the crisis-eaters.

Their behavior is symbiotic; they eat crisis and feed it so that they will have something to eat. Nobody else wants any part of what is going on. Everybody else wants to be let alone and let other people alone. Nobody else cares about liberty *or* security, peace *or* justice, capitalism *or* communism; only these lifelong Eagle Scouts.

Their interests and their objectives are accidental; if they weren't thinking up liberty, security, and the like, they'd be thinking up Father's Day or penicillin or packaging. There is no real difference between Teddy Roosevelt and Teddy Khrushchev, or between either of them and Florence Nightingale or Trader Horn or Al Capone or me. They are the jumping-jacks-of-all-trades. The man they all differ from is Dwight David Eisenhower, who would like to practice his putting.

The tension in Berlin was acute last month; it was five minutes to midnight *again*. The West German crisis-eaters use Berlin for a slow burn—just as the East Germans would if they had a city in the West. It can be turned up to a fast boil whenever the awful threat of a lull occurs. This time it was a big exile-refugee "Day of the Homeland" rally of incendiary groups (like exile-refugees anywhere) calling for the return of Germany's lost lands in the East, which will never be got back without war (or with it).

The *East* German crisis-eaters responded—the way children used to and grown-ups do now—by forbidding West Germans access to East Berlin. I was careening around the East sector of the city in a car with West German license plates, and I made a wrong turn. A carload of the Dread People's Police came down on me, and I was told to get out and produce the car papers. The papers were in order—but they had been issued to a Mr. Braun of West Germany. The rockets were at the ready all over the world.

"Identity papers," said the Dread People's Policeman, and the rockets all over the world came up from their hidden pits. I handed him my U.S. passport. He was frustrated. The rockets sank into their pits. There was nothing he could do but stand me against a wall and deliver a long lecture on how to drive a car. The Dread Policeman enjoyed it as much as his father enjoyed beating a Jew.

That's when it occurred to me that the Eagle Scouts—the average age of the Dread People's Police must be well under twenty-five—would rather have the world this way than be selling yard goods or toting hods or punching street car transfers. Berlin is their dish—aye, their ambrosia—on both sides and at every level of importance. The crisis there has been unbroken since 1914 (except for the breather between the deflation of 1923 and the collapse of 1929). Only extremely old (and more extremely young) Berliners know what it is not to live on, or over, the brink all the time.

How have they done it? How do they do it? The only way for the temperamentally quiet man to live in Berlin—and name me the place that isn't Berlin—is to reject the crisis altogether. That is, to reject the world. This is what an Eisenhower does in the White House, sneaking out the back door with his putter. This is what the old lady does crossing Potsdam Place, between the East and West sectors of Berlin, with a baby carriage containing three cats. You have seen Ike and the old lady, and not just in Washington or Berlin but also in Oskaloosa and Pinsk.

These people are ninety-five per cent of all people. Most of them have no stake in the lost lands—in any lost land. And even those who have would rather forget it than try to keep up with Laos, Lumumba, and the Lama. The ninety-five per cent are vaguely aware—just as they are when the Freedom Fighters show up outside or inside the United Nations—that there is so much more than meets the eye in all these remote and unpronounceable matters that the only way to get any sleep is to shut the eye.

The five per cent have their reward, win or lose. Theirs is the continuous titillation of brinkmanship. They would rather dance on hot coals than be wallflowers. They are partisans of peace and/or freedom to whom either, should it materialize, would be worse than anathema; it would compel them to face the humdrum, yard-goods reality of life and find something to do on a long-term basis, such as punching street-car

transfers, and confess to their pillows that they were sent here only to swell the crowd after all.

A world which is producing more history than it can consume has got to be rejected by the ninety-five per cent who prefer (however mildly) the harness to the fire-alarm. Your putter in Pinsk or your old lady in Oskaloosa at heart hates the Whites as much as the Reds because they are both ringing the fire-alarm. Here he (or she) may think he hates the Reds and loves the Whites, but that is only a reflex. He never knew, or wanted to know, what went on in Hungary, or exactly what Hungary was, but he will cheer reflexively when you tell him that Imre Nagy is fighting the Reds there. You do him no favor when you tell him that Nagy is a Red himself; you drive him back to the apathy from which you had just aroused him. So you don't tell him; you don't want him to be apathetic, do you?

A man either rejects the crisis altogether or exploits it. And you need not be a clod to do the first (your artist rejects it, not just your yard-goods salesman) or a crook to do the second (your pacifist exploits it, and not just your Dread Policeman). In Prague last month I was one of two hundred selfless churchmen having themselves a ball, as one after another called upon God and man to save creation from the impending holocaust. Without the impending holocaust we selfless churchmen would be sitting in our separate holes and pasting up next Sunday's sermon to the hungover habituees who pay curled lip-service to their faith. Who wouldn't rather have a hand—even if it be burned, as it might be—in the holocaust? Who wouldn't rather be in Prague for a day than at Petosky's Resort for a month?

To be a Patriarch of the Church *or* a Policeman of the People—to be involved at the perpetual brink, at any level, be it a wooden-sword-bearer or water-boy—is to live big, as big as you lived in knee pants playing King of the Hill. You were once King of the Hill, you ninety-five per center. Now, by dint of keeping your mouth shut, or open, you are Vice-President of the First National at $50,000/a year, with a $51,000 house, with wall to wall carpeting, in a Gentile suburb.

Withdrawal from the five per cent's hurly-burly—rejection of the crisis—is the ninety-five per cent's way of defending the status quo. This is the hallmark of the established society in a world revolution. We call it apathy, but it is very energetic rejection; a man will drive a hundred miles at a hundred miles an hour to get away from it for a half-hour at the slot machine. And he is free to do it, in the established society. The revolutionary society is unfree; every revolutionary society (including ours, when it was revolutionary) always is. And there the hallmark is the involvement of the individual in the crisis. There all the engines of revolution are stuffing the current overproduction of history down the citizen, together with all past history so that he will understand the necessity of the instant revolution.

There, as here, he fights it off as best he can; the ninety-five per center, that is. He may have to buy *Pravda*, but he doesn't have to read it. He may have to look at the placards and the proclamations, but he doesn't have to read them. The Revolution is hell-bent on involving him, preferably on the side of the Revolution, but better a counter-revolutionary than a neutral; non-revolutionary neutrality, "apathy," is the enemy the Revolution cannot cope with.

And it is at this point, not at counter-revolution, that the pressure is most intense, here that the "police state," hell-bent on digging the ninety-five per cent out of their age-old cellers, is most active and offensive. But it must not crowd the ninety-five-per-center too far too fast. Every Czech village has a string of loudspeakers on the light poles, from one end of the village to the other. They are nearly always silent; the only thing I have ever heard coming out of them is music. When there's a fire or a flood,—or the President makes an *important* speech—they are used.

But there are always meetings, always crowded with delegations. At a great peace meeting in Leipzig (imagine a great peace meeting here!) there was no room for individuals; they had to stand outside and the delegations filled the hall. To be chosen a delegate from a factory or a school is an honor which—well, which is not declined. The man is lucky who is allowed to bury himself in his craft. The supreme privilege in the revolutionary society is the privilege of privacy; a privilege as narrowly confined as the Revolution can make it, ordinarily to eminent specialists the importance of whose work transcends participation in the crisis.

I asked a bright young man in a Communist city—not in Russia—to tell me about the young people. "From Saturday noon until Sunday night they drink and dance and go after the girls," he said. "Freedom means freedom from having to hear about 'building socialism.'" Did this mean that they were counter-revolutionary? "Of course not. A big majority—young and old—support the system. But 'support' means 'accept.' Half of them because they accept every system, the other half because conditions are really so much better than they were. And this is really the whole of the matter in all the 'socialist' countries except the D.D.R. [East Germany].

"That's why the pressure is so much greater there than anywhere else, with meetings, meetings, meetings all the time, political slogans everywhere, and nothing allowed from the West (especially from West Germany). Everywhere there, it is 'Karl Marx Street,' 'Karl Marx Park,' and so on. The old Opera Square is Karl Marx Square—twenty years ago it was Hermann Goering Square—but the people talking among themselves call it Opera Square. This is their escape. If you ask a really ordinary East German what he thinks he would like best in the West, he says, 'To be let alone.'"

It is hard to see, in the Communist countries, how any member of the five per cent gets any work of his own done. On the whole, he doesn't. No matter what his profession, he always *seems* to be free to engage in public work. One has the feeling that he'd better be. It is the Communist test of loyalty; the Communists don't fool around with loyalty oaths. Thus —except for the exempted specialists—creativity seems to be as dead there as here. Here we get what we "want": diversion from the crisis. There they get what is "good for them": immersion in the crisis. I like it here, where a man can duck the

diversion with no greater penalty than social ostracism.

It is not the fault of the counter-revolutionary segment—a very small one—of the five per cent that the Communist revolution has failed. It is not the fault of the counter-revolutionary segment that it is not socialism that is being built in eastern Europe. It is the fault of the ninety-five per cent whose self-interest is undisguised (unlike that of the five per cent) and takes the primary form of mere rejection of the crisis. This self-interest unveils the high-falutinism of the five per cent and ultimately dominates it. The Revolution is trying to foist a theory of human nature upon the ninety-five per cent to which the ninety-five per cent are resistant. Their resistance reveals the resistance of the revolutionaries themselves.

Every visit one makes to the Communist world displays increasing prosperity all the way down the line—*and up*. A refrigerator here, a motor scooter there, television everywhere (in the towns), and even (in the most prosperous areas) a private car, privately bought and privately owned. Communism is daily more triumphant—*in capitalist terms*. And its triumph is the ruin of socialism.

In these poor lands, where, of course, real want still exists, and where primitive living conditions are still the rural characteristic, there are women in the cities buying expensive furs and jewels; more all the time. Lenin's cap has been discarded for the homburg. The elegance—and pomposity—of a Communist reception equals that of a bourgeois France or England. Fancy food and sports shops and luxury restaurants and hotels are proliferating in the national and provincial capitals.

The New Marx seems to be having an increasingly hard time competing with the Old Adam. Atheist man alone is capitalistic, there as here. And there atheism is a virtue. Atheism (in theory there, in practice here) believes that man can be changed by man. The first principle there is that man's nature was corrupted by bourgeois production. The first principle here is (or was) that man was corrupted by Adam's fall. The second principle there is that man's nature can be healed by socialist production. The second principle here is (or was) that man's nature can be healed by the Second Adam called Christ.

It is the second of the two Marxist principles which seems to be falling on its face there—not the second of the two non-Marxist principles which is being validated. The Big Man in the revolutionary society (as it becomes stabilized) cannot resist displaying his Bigness to other Big Men and, willy-nilly, to the Little Man. Why should the Little Man—the absorber of Marxism, not its purveyor—be different? If the Big Man wants and gets a car, why shouldn't the Little Man blunt the edge of his own resentment, there as here, by wanting and getting a scooter?

True, there's a floor (if only a dirt floor) and a ceiling there, as there isn't here. Here an able-bodied man can starve. There he can't. Here a man can have a million-dollar income (and hang on to half of it, via the tax dodges). There he can't. So the capitalist expression is less crude there than here. But where the average income is two thousand dollars, a paltry income five times that high is enough to procure all the symbols of capitalist status essential to *capitalist* man. The most un-American suggestion ever made was Henry Morgenthau's in 1942—Roosevelt put the quick kibosh on it—that dividends be limited to six per cent and salaries to $25,000 for the duration.

True, too, there is an insistence upon *some* show of social equality there, but the insistence, compared with the first years of the revolution in Russia, seems to be declining, and perceptibly, as the opportunities for ostentation increase and the Old Adam remains. We were eating in an expensive restaurant in Prague, and a non-Communist admirer of the Communist drive for social justice pointed out to me a woman with a shawl on her head. "A peasant," he said, "just a peasant. That would have been impossible in a restaurant like this in the old days, even if she had the money." To which I could only have said—if I enjoyed argument with my meals—"And impossible today if she didn't have the money."

And so it is, not just as regards money, but as regards leisure. There's a cryptogram—with the incomes translated into something like American terms—quietly going the rounds in the Communist countries on a large scale. Life is divided into work, discussion (or "culture"), and representation in the control of society. The poor get lots of work and a bit of discussion and no representation; the middle income people get plenty of work and discussion and a bit of representation; the rich get lots of representation and a bit of discussion and no work.

The cryptogram is a libel on the actual state of affairs, but a symbolic libel. Different brackets of income mean different kinds of life. Is this socialism? Is it "building socialism"? Can socialism be built by either the Marxist atheist materialism of the East or the non-Marxist atheist materialism of the West? Is the New Man emerging—or the same Old Adam? To visit West Germany, even after a few months' absence, is to get a newly exacerbated impression of deepening cynicism and bottomless despair. The heart of man remains locked—certainly in the West, where the dream does not ask to open it. And in the East?

What is being built in the East—at least in the "satellite" countries, where bourgeois life was wider spread than it was in Russia—seems not to be a revolution at all; *not a new kind of human society*, but a revolutionary reform of volcanic violence and stupendous, superficial proportions.

The West is going to seed, miserable as it sees itself forced to surrender both its free enterprise and its freedom to the interaction of technology and revolution. The East is planting its seed, which as it sprouts produces more and more tares of free enterprise and freedom among the rigid rows of healthy socialist wheat. The West, to "stop" the East, would have to be alive, like the East; and there is no way whatever for the West to come alive. But the East may be stopped—by its own contradictions.

The *theory*—dogmatically intact and incessantly intoned—only half sustains the practice. Communism seems to be purest when it is fighting for its life, and progressively less capable of purity as it achieves success; like any scheme, and like any man.

UNIONS Under Khrushchev

by SIDNEY LENS

This is the second of two articles by Mr. Lens, who recently returned from a swing through the Soviet Union in the company of nine other American trade union officials. Mr. Lens is the author of several books, including The Crisis of American Labor, *and* The Counterfeit Revolution. *His articles have appeared in many American publications, including the* Yale Review, *the* Harvard Business Quarterly, The New Republic, *and* Liberation.—THE EDITORS.

AVERELL HARRIMAN, in a recent book on Russia, made a prediction with which I whole-heartedly agree, and which is already becoming at least a faint reality. The pressure for freedom, said Harriman, "will make itself felt as the immediate demand for more material needs is met." Freedom, in any degree, in the land of the Soviets, is a concept few Americans would consider possible. Yet as Premier Nikita Khrushchev increasingly appeases the desires of his people for consumer goods—to an extent unheard of in Stalin's times—the demand for freedom, slow to generate and even slower to take institutional form, becomes more and more visible.

Harriman's words carry a special significance for the Soviet trade unions. In a so-called proletarian society labor unions should be the main instrument of countervailing power. If there is to be freedom in the future, the unions should be in the forefront paving the way. But will they? Can they? Are they?

There were many aspects of the Soviet trade unions that irritated me during my intensive study of them in Russia this past summer. A particular annoyance was the rigid and distorted language of some of the spokesmen. Leonid Soloviev, a national leader, insisted that there never had been any strikes in Russia—not even one. When I pointed out to him that the Bolsheviks used to publish statistics on strikes in the 1920's, he argued that these were only against the private companies that operated during the period of the New Economic Policy. When I asked him about a certain strike in Kazakhstan which had been discussed by a local political figure and mentioned in a local Russian newspaper, he dismissed the story as a "typical lie" of the "bourgeois press." No such strike had ever taken place, he said.

A Leningrad union leader, L. B. Kotyura, boasted that the Soviet living standard was already higher than that of the United States. After arguing the point for half an hour, he was told by one of our American unionists that Khrushchev himself had stated that Russian standards were lower than ours and would not catch up until 1970. Faced with this "irrefutable evidence," Kotyura conceded the point. On another occasion, in talking with Peter Pimenov, an official of the international affairs department, we were amazed to hear him deny that there had ever been purges in Russia. Khrushchev himself had spoken of frame-ups in his Twentieth Congress speech, but Pimenov asked us: "Where did you get such information? You could not have learned it from your own experiences. You should stick to what you have seen or heard yourselves." Five minutes later, while we were discussing the fact that Western newspapers could not be bought in Moscow, he argued that Russian papers could not be bought in New York either. We resisted needling him on this score, but we wondered whether he learned *this* from "his own experiences."

Conversations like this cast doubts on the Soviet liberalization process. They make "free and frank" exchange of views difficult. Yet, in perspective, it seems that this stance of infallibility by so many Russian leaders in so many fields is a defense mechanism rooted in their own past. It is, after all, the same people who carried out the Stalinist practices who are now veering sharply away from them. They can attain a sense of continuity only by downgrading past evils and their association with them.

The transitional character of Khrushchev's Communism jumbles the past into the present in bewildering fashion. Different eyes, viewing the trade unions, can see in them either the vehicles to paradise or the instruments of hell.

Soviet unions have no right to strike. They are completely subordinate to the Communist Party. Their main function, clearly, is to increase production. It is difficult to understand at first why the Soviets go to the trouble of organizing unions at all. Why doesn't the Communist Party itself police production?

Looking at it from the other side, why do Russian workers join such unions? Of the fifty-nine million workers, fifty-three million carry union cards. The other six million are farmers who work only in the off-season, temporary workers, or floaters. The standard American explanation that Soviet workers are forced into the unions is not entirely true. Compulsion, in varying degrees at varying times, has certainly played a role. But there are two million unionists who serve without pay on the social security committees. There are millions more in other commissions. Not all of these men and wo-

men are terrorized into assuming these functions, nor do they necessarily gain material benefits from them.

Or consider the matter of hours and working conditions. This year the work week is being reduced from forty-six to forty-one hours. By 1962 it will be forty hours a week, and, starting with 1964, it is scheduled to drop to thirty-six. One can only wonder: Why in a "slave society" do the masters shorten the hours of labor? Why are they concerned with the plight of their people at all? Certainly at this point there is no fear of revolt. The secret police can always be revived to play the terrorist role it played under Stalin. Why then does the state improve housing, cut hours, increase the availability of consumer goods? The devil theory of a "slave society" is too facile. So is the thesis popularized by George Meany and other American labor leaders that Soviet trade unions are "company unions."

While in Kiev we watched a girl in a shoe factory putting tacks on the heel of a last. According to the leader of a Chicago shoe workers' union, the automatic machine she used was identical with those back home, as was the task itself. But the girl in Kiev was producing 600 pieces a day; the output of a union girl in Chicago is between 1,500 and 2,000. In the cutting room the pace of operations was perhaps eighty per cent that of the American; in the stitching room, only seventy per cent. Of the eight factories we visited, expert unionists concluded that only two were working at a speed comparable to that of similar plants in the United States; the other six were operating far more slowly.

This too does not conform to our pre-conceived image of a "driven" people.

To understand the Soviet labor unions—as well as Soviet society itself—one must take into account two important features:

¶ Despite its totalitarian character, Soviet society has an abstract—long-term—concern for its people. The top-down, total-rule of the Communist Party is considered the only means for satisfying mass needs.

¶ There is a complete absence of countervailing power in the Soviet Union. Under Stalin, as under Khrushchev, there were means, of a sort, of expressing dissatisfaction—letting off steam. But none of it yesterday could find an *institutional* outlet, nor can it today. Individuals may dissent from this or that facet of the Soviet way of life. But they may not organize their dissent into structural form; they may not appeal to public opinion.

This question of countervailing power is the key not only to Russia's past and present, but its future. In a society where everything is manipulated from the top down, how and when will independently organized pressures be generated from the bottom up? In the final analysis it is not the single, momentary improvement in the worker's living standards that is decisive, but whether he can forge an *institutional* weapon to defend, extend, and make improvement permanent.

The shifting character of the Soviet trade unions is a reflection of this basic problem. The unions played an important role in the revolution of 1917. Organized by the Bolsheviks as an instrument of "class struggle" against Tsarism they became a pivotal institution of the new state once power was seized. During the days of civil war Lenin and Trotsky disagreed on whether the unions should play an independent role to protect the workers against "their own state," or whether, in the emergency, they should be completely subordinated to the state. Until the Trotsky and Bukharin factions were liquidated in 1929, the unions retained some degree of independence, as evidenced by the fairly substantial number of strikes during that era. But once Stalin's monolith was firmly established the trade unions became a satellite force completely dominated by the Communist Party. Any autonomy they might have enjoyed was taken away. They became a beltline between the party and the workers, assigned to the task of increasing production.

This is still their basic role today—though there are some important changes in their operation. In all the factories we visited I asked union officials to tell us what took place at their last meeting with the plant director. Invariably we were told that the first item on the agenda had been production—how to meet "the plan" or exceed it. At the plant in Moscow which produces Moskevitch automobiles the major item of business at the meeting the previous day between the union and management had been the "chief engineer's report on automation." At a shirt factory the discussion pivoted around "socialist competition" with similar plants.

Everything is secondary to production. Inside the factories this emphasis is all too visible in thousands of placards that hang overhead and the signs on the bulletin boards: "Let's find more efficient methods so we can produce eight hours' work in our new seven-hour day." "Let's improve labor discipline." "Comrades, struggle for leadership in meeting the 1960 plan." The trade unions have the task of publicizing the most efficient workers. In public areas and inside the plants there are pictures of these men being honored and glorified. In Tashkent, in central Asia, we observed a conference of 1,200 "superior workers," each bedecked with medals and ribbons.

The unions organize what is called "socialist emulation." The workers in one factory are urged to compete with those in similar plants to see which group can exceed its production plan most. A tally sheet is kept on the bulletin boards and written up in the local plant papers as if the competition were a football game.

The preoccupation with production is pervasive. If there are tickets to the Bolshoi Theater they go to the workers with the best work record. If there is an apartment to be assigned, the union and the plant director consider the most productive worker first. When "accommodation tickets" are doled out for low-cost vacations the choice falls to those laborers who have done best in production. The whole wage system is geared to encourage industrial production. A medical doctor may be paid $120 a month, while a heavy industry worker will receive as much as $200. A miner is paid even more. The curator of an art museum earns

less than many workers. In the scale of Soviet values production ranks high. And the union is the instrument for policing it.

The Communist Party, which could do the job itself if it had to, prefers to stay in the background, exercising its controls through the unions. There is a Communist Party nucleus in each shop, each office, each government bureau; all threads of power intermesh with the party. An economic bureau may work out the national plan, but it is the party in the background that sets the goals. And it is the party that makes certain the unions explain these objectives to the workers and spur them on to reach them. Unions sometimes ask their directors to fire a worker because he is not productive enough. In the shirt factory we visited the union officials demanded that a girl who left the shop during working hours to buy fruit, and who refused to work at a new machine, be discharged. The plant director boasted she did not take the union's advice because all the employe's fellow-workers marched in a body to her office and asked that the girl be given another chance. But it is significant that the initiative came from the unions. At another factory the union asked that a repairman be fired because he refused to carry out the directives of his foreman. The worker was first called before a "comrades' court" of his fellow-workers, and when he refused to appear was discharged.

Production is so clearly the fixed star of Soviet objective that the lines between labor and management are hopelessly blurred. The director of a large textile mill, employing 15,300 workers, was also a member of the top union committee.

Properly speaking, then, the Russian trade unions are not unions at all. Comparing them with American or British labor organizations is like comparing tomatoes with refrigerators. Unions, as we understand them, can exist only under a capitalist system. They have no place under either feudalism or collectivism. Though they sometimes speak of overthrowing capitalism, their day-to-day activity consists merely of modifying capitalism—winning better wages, shorter hours. Unions are a limited institution for gaining limited ends from a single employer or a group of employers. They are an instrument of conflict that matches economic power with a limited entrepreneurial force. If they had to contest directly the great power of the state itself they could not survive.

That is what labor faces in the Soviet Union. The trade unions deal directly with the state on all matters. If they were totally free to strike they

would have to match power with the government up to and including the point of general strike and revolution. Clearly this is not possible—not only in Communist Russia but in the mixed economy of Sweden and increasingly so in capitalist countries. There must be some political outlet for resolving disputes that paralyze the economy. In Sweden there is delicate machinery for solving such problems through democratic discussion and all kinds of countervailing pressures. The press, the employers association, the farmers, the government, the political parties, all join in affecting the decision.

But in Russia there is no pluralism. The press, like the unions, is controlled by the Communist Party. So is the plant director, the ministry, the collective farm organizations, and everything else. The result is that the major decisions affecting workers are made without labor's participation.

The question of how to improve living standards is answered by each Soviet leader in his own way. Stalin decided that it was necessary first to build a basic industry, and if that meant cutting wages or postponing new dwellings, he felt that such "short-run" sacrifices were necessary for the long-term interests.

Khrushchev today tries to reconcile the long-term and short-term goals. Production of heavy goods is still his major economic preoccupation, but consumer goods are assigned a much more prominent place.

But even under this liberalized policy the Communists are unwilling to permit the unions to act as a genuine countervailing power. They believe that the Communist Party, rather than the people, must guide the economic destiny of the nation. They are willing to consult more with individuals, to listen more, to permit more dissent. But they will not tolerate an independent or semi-independent *institution*. Khrushchev's "revisionism" is therefore a "half-revisionism." It is a transitional type of Communism, neither dogmatic and orthodox, nor revisionist and flexible.

In the trade union movement "half-revisionism" does not permit institutional independence. But it does translate itself into more prerogatives both for the union and for the individual worker. The "big stick" has been put away—at least for the time being. Instead of terror there is now subtle pressure, plus consumer goods.

Since the trade unions are not an instrument of conflict, as they are under capitalism, the state must assign some function to them to make them attractive to the workers. That function, now being considerably enlarged, is social welfare.

The Soviet worker depends on his union for almost all his social and cultural benefits—housing, maternity grants, sick pay, pensions, sports, entertainment, in-plant meals, low-cost vacations, adult education. It is the union that, together with the plant manager, decides who will get the new apartments and in what order. It is a union commission that pays out social insurance, sick pay, maternity benefits, pensions. These benefits are not inconsequential. Pensions, for instance, begin at age sixty for men and fifty-five for women. The amounts run from one hundred per cent of the worker's wages, for the lower-paid, down to fifty-five per cent for the higher-paid. Social insurance costs for 1960 will run about $7 billion.

The union is also responsible for the commissaries, canteens, and special stores. It administers the reading rooms and libraries, organizes theater and cinema parties, and social affairs, forms sports clubs of a dozen different kinds, subsidizes orchestras and jazz bands. The union supervises chil-

dren's camps, rest homes, sanitoria, and some educational facilities. It not only conducts special schools of its own but helps assign workers to institutions where they can improve their skills and be upgraded to better jobs. At the Moskevitch auto plant 2,950 workers of a total of 14,000 were receiving some kind of schooling—and the union participated in the decision as to who should go, and how much of a subsidy he should receive, in every case.

The union's social welfare work is a veritable empire. At the same plant, for instance, there are four kindergartens for children. There is a club room with a seating capacity of 600, a drama club, two orchestras, a brass jazz band, a ballet group, a photography society, one football team for the whole plant and one in each shop. There are fishing, hunting, motorcycle racing, auto racing, and other sports groups. Each month the union assigns thirty-five workers to sanitoria and 120 to rest homes.

A worker who does not join the union loses benefits many times as great as the one per cent of his wages he pays in dues. It is actually his only insurance. If he should die the union administers the special payments to his estate. If he is hurt on the job the union handles his wage payments until he is better. If he wants to place his children in a summer camp he gets accommodations through the union in his shop. As a practical matter, then, he can hardly exist without the good will of his labor union. To incur its wrath is to cut himself off from benefits in every area: housing, social insurance, sports, culture.

Increasingly the Khrushchev regime has tried to involve the unions in more decision-making. In July 1958 a new decree was passed: the local factory committee was assigned a place in formulating the economic plan. As explained by Soloviev, the factory plan is drawn up by the unions and management. It is then discussed by workers in their departments and sent up the ladder to the regional economic development councils. There it is modified, summarized into the regional and national framework, and sent up to the central planning organization in Moscow. At each level the trade union committee participates. Once the national plan is formulated the process is reversed and discussion goes down scale until it reaches the workers at the grass roots.

As Soloviev explained this procedure it sounded most impressive. The only trouble is—as usual—that the worker in the shop can do absolutely nothing about the *total* national plan. He cannot form a group with like-minded workers in his plant, or join with laborers in other establishments to press for a different policy. If he feels, for instance, that the rate of heavy industry growth should be less than that of light, he can do nothing to change it, except perhaps talk a little in his own department. Such a decision is made at the top of the Soviet hierarchy. The rank-and-file worker can only suggest changes in his own factory plan. But this is more than he was able to do in the past and indicates a desire at least to permit him to let off more steam.

Under the 1958 decree, bonus payments, formerly decided at the top level in Moscow, are now somewhat decentralized. The planning commission assigns a certain sum to each plant to be paid out in bonuses; but the exact basis of the bonus is now determined by the local union committee. Thus bonus payments may vary from plant to plant. On a limited scale this is similar to the Yugoslav system; it is certainly a departure from the Stalinist system.

The July 1958 code gave the local union the final say in all discharge cases. In one plant we were told of a director who fired a worker even though the plant committee wanted him kept. The case went to court and the judge held with the union; the manager was reprimanded and subsequently discharged for violating the law.

The plant manager himself is now subject to a union veto. If it refuses to accept him, he cannot assume his post. I doubt very much that it works quite this way. More likely when there is a dispute of this kind it goes up to higher Communist Party councils for resolution. But the fact that the union is given such a prerogative indicates a growing concern to make the organization a living organism rather than a docile appendage.

The individual worker can relax more under present circumstances. He is no longer afraid of being arrested for voicing an opinion or making a mistake in his job. He is not pressured into "voluntary overtime"—working on special projects without pay. A decade ago if he were late or absent so many times a month he could be sentenced to jail. Today he is merely reprimanded or discharged, just as in capitalist countries. He still carries a labor book and an internal passport, just as in the past, but he can—and does—quit his job without reprisals. So long as he gives two weeks' notice and gets a new job quickly, he carries his vacation and pension rights to his new factory.

Probably the most heartening feature of the present transition is the fact that there is a growing emphasis on grievances. It is not nearly so extensive as, say, in our United Auto Workers. But there are now thousands of instances where a work norm is challenged or where a discharged worker is reinstated. And there are hundreds of cases where an employe takes his gripe to court over the head of his union. In one plant the union committee told us it has just resolved a grievance on a matter of job classification. Two employees who had been classified in a lower labor grade than they were entitled to were given a ten per cent wage increase and two years' back pay.

To say that the Russian unions are "company unions" therefore hardly provides a full picture. They change with the times, just as does the Communist Party itself. Under the present liberalization of Soviet life and the loosening of Communist Party domination the unions too enjoy a slight measure of autonomy. If you look for independent unions in Russia you won't find them. But if you try to establish the *direction* in which they are traveling you can see traces of potential independence tomorrow. That is the significant point.

As the national product grows larger and living conditions improve, the pressures for further relaxation of controls and more prerogatives must continue. At what point the unions might emerge as a real countervailing force no one knows. It may be, as some scholars believe, that such

a transformation is impossible under Communism. In my opinion the evidence of Yugoslavia and Poland shows the contrary. The decentralization of power by the Titoists has led to frequent disputes between the Yugoslav "republics." Competition between state enterprises—not only in price but quality and selling procedures—also unleashes healthy conflict and creates partially independent institutions, or at least institutions at the borderline of independence.

The day may not be too far off in Russia where basic decisions are genuinely debated in public instead of handed down from above. The Soviet citizen may yet have a say in whether The Plan emphasizes heavy industry or consumer goods, or whether education shall be for eight years or ten years or twelve years, or whether heavy industry workers should receive more pay than white collar employes or doctors.

Will the Soviet economic breakthrough be followed by a political breakthrough—*towards* institutionalized democracy? No one can say with absolute accuracy. But to deny that there is a *possibility* of such change is to flout the law of history. Democracy has come to no country overnight—not even to the United States. It is a long process. Only when there are enough goods available to appease the mass appetite and when there is enough education so that countervailing forces can group into mass organizations—only then does democracy emerge.

If a degree of democracy should be possible in the Soviet Union, it would come from an agglomeration of pressures, mounting until it blended into an *institutional* form of dissent.

Such developments would be almost as crucial for the United States as for Russia. A democratic or partially-democratic Russia would pose a challenge to the United States considerably different from that of present-day Russia. A Soviet Union that was made free would be much more attractive not only to underdeveloped countries, but to liberal segments in our society as well—particularly if we were to go through another decade of stagnation and world-wide retrogression, as we did in the 1950's. And it has always been America's proud boast that the more freedom a nation has, the greater is its strength.

the NEW NEGRO on screen

by MARTIN S. DWORKIN

This is the second of three articles surveying the role of the Negro in recent and current films. The third article by Mr. Dworkin, a distinguished student of the movies, will appear in the December issue. —THE EDITORS.

IN THE AMERICAN films of the 1950s, the imported Africans were increasingly depicted as unequivocally, and even uniquely, American—at the very least essential, carefully placed figures of background detail. The information and entertainment films of World War II, inescapably training and propagandizing for the times to follow as well as for the conflict at hand, had made audiences accustomed to seeing Negroes—apparently counted to represent their proportion of the population—in all sorts of movie scenes, excepting, usually, those involving sex and violence. Crowds in city streets, railroad stations, subways—even college football rallies, as in one including Bing Crosby as an aged freshman in *High Time* (1960)—show a colored face or two as a matter of routine realism, sometimes too ostentatiously to be unnoticed. The acceptance of even proportionally representative realism in the popular arts takes time.. The Negro policeman at the station house in *Detective Story* (1951) was correctly presented as just another cop. But his appearance at that time could not but catch the eye as evidence of change, assuming meanings concerning which the feelings take sides.

Even when not actually in focus in the foreground, the new images of Negroes could not but be conspicuously new, for the old backgrounds had so manifestly changed. Considerations of purpose or propaganda aside, the bare necessity of credibility in the most unrealistic fictions called for awareness on screen to match the new awareness of audiences.

The perfected techniques of documentary or journalistic realism required a reasonable faithfulness in even casual scenes in American cities, with their enormously expanded colored populations. The more realism, intended, the more Negroes had to be dramatically integrated—as in such varied examples as an expose of racketeering in a Southern locale: *The Phenix City Story* (1955); a tribute to a fiercely humanitarian Jewish doctor in the slums of Brooklyn: *The Last Angry Man* (1959); and a melodrama of the efforts of a multiracial conglomeration of driftwood to raise a talented boy out of the lower depths of Chicago: *Let No Man Write My Epitaph* (1960).

British and French films, too, were reflecting at least a minimal awareness of the presence of colored men in the white man's cities, everywhere. In the British *Tiger Bay* (1959), the seediness of the waterfront district of Cardiff is established not only by shots of the run-down buildings, but of the Negroes who share them. Racial tensions involving West Indians in London provide both background and plot motivations in the murder mystery, *Sapphire* (1959). French films, notably those laid in the cosmopolitan Parisian underworld, often include Negroes—as a matter of local color. Significantly, scenes show-

ing the familiarity of white men with those colored people who happen to be women, as in *The Wages of Fear* (1953), set symbolically on an edge of civilization in Central America, have been excised before distribution in sensitive areas, including the United States.

The exotic possibilities of Paris, as well as of more or less tropical areas, are commonly emphasized, on screen as in novels, by the traditionally erotic presence of Negresses of presumably or obviously easy virtue. Whether the representations are for purposes of promoting realism, tourism, or a condescending racism more often than not depends only upon the viewpoints of audiences. Mussolini, according to Lo Duca in his *Histoire de l'Erotisme*, used pictures of undraped Negresses to make propaganda for his war against Ethiopia.

As Negroes are projected from backgrounds to foregrounds of concern and power, in widely separated areas of the world, changes of focus on screen are inevitable. A film such as *Lydia Bailey* (1952), laid in Haiti during the Negro revolt at the turn of the Nineteenth Century, would have appeared impossibly courageous before the war—although the revolution itself is still primarily a background for an old-fashioned costume romance.

The political and social ferment in the modern West Indies is the setting for *Island In The Sun* (1957), that is at least as far from *Lydia Bailey* as that film is from pre-war Hollywood productions. Its confusion of sub-plots and running themes may be even further from reality, but there is no denying the significance of the elements. Taking place in a fictional composite of the British West Indies, the story of the film contains two separate interracial love affairs—manifestly requited but cinematically still unrevealed; a bitter election campaign between a white planter and a colored labor leader; a murder and detailed police investigation; and several other story threads, all shadowed or permeated by the problem of color in a society moving away from white domination. The narrative confusion hardly hides the equivocations over miscegenation and even politics. But that these subjects should be raised at all illustrates the force of the push to foregrounds of concern—as does the appearance of colored performers Harry Belafonte and Dorothy Dandridge on levels of importance with established stars such as James Mason, Joan Fontaine, Joan Collins, Michael Rennie, and Stephen Boyd.

The changing background of the mother continent of Africa, particularly since the war, has made profound differences in the images of Negroes projected on screen. And yet, these are only provisional—and may remain so until Africans themselves create their own movies. How different the Africans' images of themselves may be from even the most sympathetic ones held by white men may be hinted at, albeit only slightly and vaguely, in studying works of modern African imagination.

The movies made by Europeans and Americans in recent years, however, offer sufficient evidence of changes in the popular awareness of Africa. Some of the perennial *Tarzan* movies may still treat native warriors as the enemies to be guarded against and defeated. But even this more often than not is done in the spirit of describing just one more of the inhospitable forces of nature in the jungle. The lowliest gun-bearers in white hunter or safari films, such as *The Macomber Affair* (1947), *The Snows of Kilimanjaro* (1952)—both from Ernest Hemingway stories—or the British-made *Elephant Gun* (1959), now carry themselves with evident dignity and sense of professional comportment. The hunters themselves have come to be affected by a deep love of the land, reflecting the now desperate concern of conservationists over the preservation of the riches of the jungle and savannah. The British *Ivory Hunters* (1952) dramatizes the efforts of game wardens to enforce laws—the reasons for which the natives sometimes have difficulty comprehending, since their abundant land never needed them before. In *The Roots of Heaven* (1958), from the novel by Romain Gary, the preservation of elephants from slaughter by an improbable visionary is made into a parable of the struggle to preserve life itself in an age of incipient destruction. This, in the film, the Africans do come to understand. And, the saving of life in Africa may indeed mean the saving of life in the world—although hardly in any manner suggested in the film.

After the obscene falsities of travelogues and jungle epics without number, the Belgian-made documentary, *Masters of the Congo Jungle* (1959), presents the most sensitive and beautiful appreciation in the history of cinema of the organic balance of the African land and seasons, animals, and indigenous mankind. (See "The Search For Africa," *The Progressive*, August 1960.)

The revealing irony is that such artful understanding should have come so late—in time to illuminate an Africa never grasped before by white men, and passing even as the film unreels. It is difficult to find comparable sensitivity and truth in fictional films about Africa. Amid the continuing flow of stereotyped melodramas, however, a modest work, *The Naked Earth* (1958), stands out as relatively honest. In telling of the odd but credible struggle of a Scottish sailor and a French trollop to create a farmstead in the unfamiliar land, the film at least begins to take into account the attitudes of Africans being introduced to unfamiliar ideas of settled agriculture and of farming for cash rather than for immediately useful food.

Films since 1950 increasingly reveal a sense—informed by modern anthropology but enforced by contemporary politics—that indigenous African beliefs have at least relative validity, even when confronted with the missionary certainties of Europeans. Both Catholic and Protestant Christianity gain triumphs of conversion, in *The Nun's Story* (1959), and *The Sins of Rachel Cade* (1960), respectively. But the victories are by no means unequivocal—due in large measure, perhaps, to narrative unclarities and inconsistencies that may be significant in themselves.

As would be expected, native reversions to savagery are both bitterly condemned and sensationally exploited, as in films treating the Mau Mau and similar terrorists—for example, the British *Simba* (1955), featurning Earl Cameron as a European trained native doctor; and the Ameri-

can *Something of Value* (1957), with Sidney Poitier as a man embittered by white violence into joining the Mau Mau; and *The Mark of the Hawk* (1958), starring Poitier, Eartha Kitt, and Juano Hernandez. Each film, however, attempts to relate the atavistic violence to quite modern forces of African nationalism—arguing, in fact, for the idea that the continent is by now the homeland for white men as well as Negroes. The reasoning is dissipated by emotional elements and flourishes, intended to sell the films to white audiences primarily—except for *The Mark of the Hawk*, made under religious auspices to promote financial support of missionary activity and the adoption of religious toleration instead of violence. That the argument is made at all, of course, is a striking indication of the movement of African concerns away from backgrounds of unawareness, paternalism, and disparagement.

In general, it is the tentative, usually superficial, often meretricious—but nevertheless significant—attempts to represent Africans in their own terms that distinguish the films of the 1950s from almost all made earlier. The images on screen often provide ominous commentaries upon events and the attitudes of the people about whom and for whom the films are made. *Cry, the Beloved Country* (1951), from Alan Paton's bitterly lyrical novel—and featuring the young Sidney Poitier as an Episcopal chaplain—came as a shock to people accustomed to Hollywood or travelogue stereotypes of African Negroes on screen.

After almost ten years, it was in many ways more shocking to see again on screen the conditions of misery, violence, tribal and family disorganization, and all but hopeless existence in the native slums of Johannesburg, in Lionel Rogosin's *Come Back, Africa* (1960). The film may be somewhat confused in form between documentary and fictional narrative. Apart from what several critics thought is a sometimes self-conscious artiness, its faults may actually be in themselves significant, as the film had to be made under very difficult conditions, in a semi-clandestine manner, in what is surely a police state. That it was made and how it was made not only indicts the forces determining the life of Negroes in South Africa, but the vast proportion of what has been passed off as African on screen.

The changing images of American Negroes in the movies are also integrally related to changes in the portrayal of a homeland: the assimilated homeland of the southern United States. As the South and Southerners have altered in shape and size, as the conventionally romanticized magnolias and Grecian porticos came into new perspectives, the ubiquitous darkies took on different dimensions of character—along lines of development deeply rooted in the history of dramatic art, as well as in the endless dynamics of society as a whole.

In the sixty-odd years of cinema, as has been noted, the images of Negroes on screen have been changing—from clowns to comedians to integral characters and even heroic protagonists. The metamorphosis has been long and relentless, albeit by no means consistent. And while agonizingly slow in terms of the passing of generations, the process may be seen as a relatively instantaneous recapitulation of the arduous advance of actual Negroes over the centuries, from slaves to servants and citizens, employes and masters of destiny. Again, the movies both symbolize and effectuate a revolution in the imagination and in behavior.

The most popular of the popular arts created in the rise of common people to economic, as well as political, sovereignty, the movies carry on the long popular revision of classical, aristocratic entertainment. From the first films to tell a story, common folk have been cast as heroes and heroines—while aristocrats, of course, have been brought within the reach of the mass imagination. The new roles took over from the popular drama of the revolutionary Nineteenth Century the new status given to orders of society that since ancient times had been represented in the theater chiefly as varlets or buffoons. The Negro, the last, lowest commoner of all, had been raised from chattel bondage in one of the great revolutions of that century, a conflict that in one sense was one of landed versus commercial and industrial power, continuing the process in modern history of the gradual attrition of localized feudalism and the rise of national authority. The Civil War, significantly, was the first to be fully recorded by means of photography—the new technical means for the dissemination of authentic representations of events, places, and people.

The development of cinematography, within the following thirty years, came to fruition by punctual coincidence during the very decade when the last equalities gained by Negroes in the Civil War and Reconstruction were forced or legislated into desuetude or discard. By still more punctual coincidence, the new cinematic art, industry, and universalized drama arrived at maturity, some twenty years later, with D. W. Griffith's classic production, *The Birth of a Nation* (1915). This film, based upon one of the most bitterly partisan novels about the Reconstruction era, Thomas Dixon's *The Clansman*, offered naïve but immensely influential propaganda on behalf of the myth of Negro inferiority.

The historical importance of Griffith's epic is unassailable, leading to a certain peculiarly but vigorously unpersuaded defense of its content on the part of some historians of cinema and of popular culture. But *The Birth of a Nation* is not yet a merely magnificent artifact for archaeological study in film societies. One devastating evidence of its vitality, during the mid-century agonies over the treatment of Negroes, on and off screen, was its run at a theater in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957. A poster over the entrance appropriately, if pathetically, proclaimed some of the advantages of segregating the races in education, as it asked the crucial question: "WILL INTERGRATION SUCCED *(sic)* IN THE SOUTH?"

Pressures of politics and flights of imagination have never allowed any abatement of popular interest in the ante-bellum South, the Civil War, and the period immediately thereafter. Here were inexhaustible lodes

of subjects for romances and histories; memoirs, collections of memorabilia and manufacture of replicas without number; record albums of readings of wartime oratory, marches and campfire songs—and, of course, movies and cycles of movies, apotheosized in David Selznick's production of Margaret Mitchell's thick fiction of embattled Georgia, *Gone With the Wind* (1939). Deep significances and apparent turbulences were always involved; in particular, attitudes towards Negroes were inevitably implicated, even when invisible. For example, few Negroes appear in pre-1960 Western melodramas—for no reasons, surely, having to do with historical fidelity. A beginning towards the desegregation of the history of the West on screen may be seen in John Ford's sometimes labored *Sergeant Rutledge* (1960), with Woody Strode as "Top Soldier" of an outfit of the Negro "Buffalo Soldiers" who served for so long against the Indians.

But while Negroes rarely appear in traditional Westerns, auras of darkies on old plantations accompany the almost invariably present Southerners. These latter, of course, are instantly recognizable—complete with slow drawl and quick temper, ceremonial adulation of respectable women and disparagement of the uncivilized, including workingmen and immigrants, as well as Indians and Mexicans. The beginnings of the new visibility of Negroes in the movies during the war, however, could arrange at least a tentative confrontation. In *The Ox-Bow Incident* (1943), from the novel by Walter Van Tilburg Clark, the men being lynched may be white men—who happen to be innocent. But the leader of the party, fanatically insistent upon the justice of violence, is an embittered ex-Confederate officer. His significance is underlined not merely in his affectation of his old uniform, symbol of the society that now was only a lost cause, but by the presence of a Negro preacher. The ironic message, even then, could be recognized as self-conscious and overdrawn. By the late 1950s, when the film came into the repertory of television, popular imagery of the South and Southerners was being so profoundly revised that many found the point an anti-climax—and some, especially among the young, did not recognize it at all.

Epstein's Humanity

by ALFRED WERNER

As RARELY as a new genius is discovered and proclaimed in a twenty-year-old boy, even more rarely are all the predictions for a distinguished career fulfilled. Yet all of this miraculously happened when Hutchins Hapgood discovered Jacob Epstein. Almost sixty years ago, Hapgood found the art student Epstein on New York's Lower East Side, and was so fascinated by his skill as a draftsman that he commissioned him to illustrate his book, *The Spirit of the Ghetto*, with drawings from life. One chapter, "The Young Art and Its Exponents," singles out Epstein above several colleagues. Since this excellent volume about New York's ghetto, published in 1902, has long been out of print, the reader will appreciate liberal quotations from it. Here is Hapgood's description of Epstein's "studio" in a dilapidated house at the corner of Hester and Forsyth streets:

"A miserable iron bedstead occupies the narrow strip of floor beneath the descending ceiling. There is one window, which commands a good view of the pushcart market in Hester Street. Near the window is a diminutive oil stove, on which the artist prepares his tea and eggs. On a peg on the door hang an old mackintosh and an extra coat—his only additional wardrobe. About the narrow walls on the three available sides are easels, and sketches and paintings of ghetto types."

ALFRED WERNER, Vienna-born art critic, has written and lectured widely in the United States and Europe. His articles on art have appeared in a number of publications including Commentary, The American Scholar, and the Chicago Jewish Forum.

This son of poor immigrants from Poland had little formal education and had worked only at odd jobs; but he fascinated Hapgood:

"For so young a man, his intellectual, as well as his artistic, activity has been considerable. He belongs to a number of debating societies, and is now hesitating in his mind whether to become a Socialist or an Anarchist, although he is tending towards a humane socialism."

Young as he was, Epstein had no doubts about the career he wished to pursue:

"Two things . . . he seems definitely to have settled—that he will devote himself to his art, and that that art shall be the plastic picturing of the life of his people in the ghetto."

Jacob Epstein continued to be an artist until his death, last summer, at the age of seventy-eight. He and his patron erred in two details only: Epstein achieved fame as a sculptor rather than as a draftsman or painter, and the art he was to produce was to transcend the narrow boundaries set by nation, race, or religion. But the body of his entire work, from the sketches he made for Hapgood to the still unfinished work found in his studio on August 20, 1959, is permeated with a profound humanity which one may, perhaps, trace back to his early years. Looking back, from the peak of his fame, he remarked in his *Autobiography:* "Rembrandt would have delighted in the East Side." And he added gratefully: "I imagine that the feeling I have for expressing a human point of view, giving human rather than abstract implications to my work, comes from these early formative years."

Epstein used what he earned for

illustrating *Spirit of the Ghetto* to pay for a journey to France. He studied and worked in Paris for three years, then moved to England where he married a Scottish girl, Margaret Gilmour Dunlop, who bore him a son and a daughter. She lived with him through the early lean years and the many years of heated controversy over her husband's work until she died in 1947. In 1955 the aged sculptor married his secretary and model, Mrs. Kathleen Carman.

Epstein's unceasing fight for untrammeled artistic expression is a long story filled with amazing, though often disturbing, details. I shall concentrate here on one or two of the artistic "scandals" that shook his life, turmoils that he managed to withstand only because he firmly believed that he was on the right path, and that the battle he waged against bigots and reactionaries was one fought in the name of seriousness and freedom. The first of these battles raged around the decorations made in 1907 and 1908 for a London building newly acquired by the British Medical Association.

The safe thing would have been to adorn the facade with "inoffensive" likenesses of celebrated surgeons. Jacob Epstein, however, proposed an artistically more gratifying sequence, "The Birth of Energy." This theme, depicting men and women in various stages of their development was, he felt, more appropriate for an edifice of this character.

Epstein spent fourteen months carving a series of eighteen nudes. Artistically they were beyond reproach. They blended perfectly with the building. Yet the public was shocked because one of the figures was of a woman in advanced pregnancy. How could a father expose his young daughter to this alarming sight? How could any pure-minded young man let his fiancee behold these "obscenities"? These were some of the arguments proffered by the National Vigilance Society.

An enraged Father Vaughan made the most of the fact that, at that time, the Epsteins lived in the Bloomsbury section of London, a neighborhood which, the clergyman asserted, was devoted to the manufacture of contraceptives. While bigots, supported by the conservative press, loudly clamored for the removal of the "indecent" statuary, Epstein got unexpected help from no less a person than the Bishop of Stepney, Dr. Cosmo Lang, later to become Archbishop of Canterbury. Inspecting the figures, Dr. Lang saw nothing indecent or shocking in them. Some of England's outstanding writers and critics also sided with Epstein: "Had Michelangelo ever disguised sex?" they asked. Epstein won, and the statues were left alone.

I mention these nudes not because they are Epstein's most important work—which they are not—but because these early works are pivotal in his development. (They were destroyed in the mid-Thirties, when the building was taken over by the Southern Rhodesian government.)

Epstein's course was fixed long before he had reached thirty years of age. He would never compromise with a public to which subject matter is the only important thing in art, and which punishes, with anything from indifference to downright hostility, artists who deviate from the insipid idealizations commonly considered "beautiful." While anti-Semitic prejudice was not entirely absent from the case of Epstein vs. the British public, it was a repetition of the story of William Blake, that most un-English Englishman. Blake insisted that exuberance was beauty, and that the gateway of excess led to the palace of wisdom. In the same spirit, Epstein created sculpture that, above all, expressed emotions and ideas. He took upon himself the arduous task of disentangling the eternal from the ephemeral so as to catch the structure of essence.

In the revolutionary first decade of this century, sculptors in many lands were abandoning the "Greek" tradition and looking with astonishment at the firm and compact art of aborigines. Epstein admired the inchoate sculptural wisdom of anonymous African and Polynesian carvers in the British Museum and put his own creative imagination to good use while applying the tenets of aboriginal art: simplification, architectonic organization of structural planes, and fidelity to material.

Without having learned these lessons, he could not have fashioned "Genesis," the large statue symbolizing motherhood that, in spirit and in expression, is much nearer to Negro sculpture than to the naturalistic knick-knacks produced during Epstein's fighting years in Europe's academies. "Genesis" is the eternal primeval woman, the fertile mother of the human race, in the dormant fullness of gestation. The millionth variation of a chorus girl Venus would have been preferred by most people, who did not understand "Adam" as Epstein had conceived him. Intentionally, Epstein made his huge "Adam" resemble a hairless gorilla beating his breast. The hostile critics failed to notice a significant detail: Adam's head is thrown back to indicate that he is different from other animals, that he alone of all creatures had received the breath and the spirit of God.

The loudest outcry was raised, however, when Epstein turned to sacred figures of the New Testament. This protest died down only in his last decade when a London convent commissioned him to do a large "Madonna and Child" group, and the Cathedral of Cardiff, Wales, solemnly unveiled his "Christ in Majesty." When I visited Epstein, the summer before he died, one of his most controversial New Testament sculptures occupied the center of his studio. "Ecce Homo," a colossal stone carving, had just been rejected by the Canadian "man in the street." The Vancouver Art Gallery had intended to purchase it, but a local group was formed to stop the museum from using public funds for what the group called a "monolithic monstrosity."

I looked at the statue and was overawed by the huge head bearing a crown of thorns, thick, sad lips, and sightless, almond-shaped eyes. When the work was first shown, London's *Catholic Times* saw in this work only "the debased, sensuous, flat features of an Asiatic monstrosity" (the same word, "monstrosity," was used in 1935 that occurred to hostile British Columbians more than two decades

later). G. K. Chesterton called it "one of the greatest insults to religion I have ever seen."

But it would be unfair to the British people to pass silently over the favorable opinions. Those who had attacked Epstein because the figure did "violence to treasured ideas" were challenged by the well-known critic, T. W. Earp, who spoke for many progressives when he wrote that sculpture in England owed Epstein a "considerable debt of gratitude" and that "Ecce Homo" was a noble work of art, reminiscent of Romanesque sculpture. "An impressive energy," he noted, "radiates from the self-contained rhythm of its volume, while its austere pattern, and the rudimentary indication of facial features, possess greater emotional content than would a nearer approach to physical versimilitude."

Even as a portraitist, Epstein often ran into trouble, though his bronze portrait busts were, of course, less "shocking" to untutored eyes than his free embodiment, in stone, of his inner vision. The artist never flattered his sitters. An art patron who commissioned Epstein to portray herself as an aristocratic lady was infuriated when he made her look as she actually was, a middle-aged, schoolmarmish woman, instead of a Juno. When a duke asked to be posed in the ceremonial uniform he had worn at the coronation, the artist sternly refused to portray the man in a majesty he did not really possess, and insisted that he wear ordinary clothes.

The work he modeled in clay was grudgingly admired even by some of those who could not forgive him the liberties he took when carving in stone. Here again one may recall what Hapgood wrote about young Epstein's pencil renderings of Lower East Side characters:

"It is a forcible illustration of how, while really remaining faithful to the external type, his love of the race leads him to emphasize the spiritual and humane expressiveness of the faces about him and so paves the way to an art imaginative as well as typical. . . ."

All of this can be applied to the portrait sculptor, if we insert the word "human" before "race." For as a mature man Epstein loathed what he called "this pernicious racialism," and his sitters included people of all faiths, nations, races, and from all stations in life. Some who sat for him were: Joseph Conrad, Tagore, Paul Robeson, Chaim Weizmann, Albert Einstein, George Bernard Shaw, Haile Selassie, Ernest Bevin, Winston Churchill, Ernest Bloch, Jawaharlal Nehru, and T. S. Eliot.

Epstein never forgot that a portrait, though rather faithful to the sitter, must be shorn of superficialities and non-essentials, and that the artist's task is to epitomize the sitter's personality rather than to create a three-dimensional replica perpetuating the subject's external aspects. With mild, yet penetrating eyes, he looked at his sitters searchingly, trying to find a key to their essence. He, whom his opponents believed to be an irresponsible Bohemian hedonist, was basically a good-natured and benevolent family man, though, when irritated, he could suddenly become angry. I have seen him angry for a fraction of a minute—and in this tiny interval the artist's normally kindly eyes expressed a scorn of such dimensions that I could think only of the eyes Michelangelo gave to his infuriated Moses.

I believe that whatever portion of Epstein's work survives will live on because it conveys the emotional power of this sturdy, strong-willed innovator who had established his studio among a more inhibited people, unlikely to tolerate his Biblical ardor. But which portion will it be? Some insist that it will be his portraits that rank with the best work in this genre ever produced by Rodin or Despiau. Others maintain that it was through his huge carvings that he gained for himself a niche in sculpture's Hall of Fame.

Esthetically they are not always convincing, but it was through these efforts that he tried most valiantly to convince the public that sculpture was a limitless art of pure metaphor, a spiritual triumph over the intractability of matter.

Oddly, by the year 1954—when the Queen of England bestowed knighthood on Epstein, a naturalized citizen—he had long ceased to be a maverick, a stormy petrel, a dreamer of startling dreams. By 1945, he had become acceptable to most English art lovers, even those who could not quite forgive him earlier "sins," and in his old age he himself leaned more and more to conservatism, to the point of declaring that all abstract art was "downright bad."

When they are old, great people often suffer from amnesia. In a radio interview, the aged sculptor remarked about his younger colleagues' work that "Ugliness is what is sought for, and, by Jove, found." Yet, how often, in the past, had his own work been dismissed with the utterly inadequate term, "ugly." With all his astuteness and open-mindedness, Epstein was unable to fathom the goals of those twenty or thirty years younger than he. Twentieth Century sculpture has gone far beyond Epstein. But we must never forget that he stands, or stood, at the beginning of the road which left the romantic Expressionism of a Rodin and developed into the trends that have become clearly noticeable since the end of the last world war.

STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, AND JULY 2, 1946. (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233.)

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MORRIS H. RUBIN, Editor

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 30th day of September, 1960.

MILDRED LOHFF

Notary Public, Dane County, Wis.

(My Commission expires Jan. 25, 1963)

THE PEOPLE'S FORUM

'The Big Issue'

Dear Sirs:

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., reveals what seems to me to be a tragic blind spot in his otherwise commendable article, "The Big Issue," in the September *Progressive*. I think he is quite right in stressing "allocation of resources" as a fundamental issue. But as I see it the problem is not so much one of shifting resources from the "private sector" to the "public sector" as it is one of reallocation of funds *within* the public realm. The public sector already claims a very substantial portion of my income.

There is a fantastic imbalance between money spent for military purposes as against nonmilitary foreign aid and domestic welfare purposes. The additional ten or twelve billion dollars a year that Mr. Schlesinger suggests we spend for public purposes represents a mere fraction of our military outlay.

It is remarkable that Schlesinger can argue his point for seven pages without once raising the hope or the prospect of an eventual, to say nothing of an immediate, reduction in military spending as the most effective means of financing and expanding our public services. Indeed, he would have us spend still greater sums on our "tragically inadequate" defense. Apparently Schlesinger is as paralytically attached to the policy of "obsessive reliance on an ever greater accumulation of military power" (in the words of *The Progressive* editorial in the same issue) as are Kennedy, Johnson, Jackson, Harriman and others. Presumably Mr. Schlesinger would be sympathetic to the Hyannis Port proclamations calling for spending an extra two or three billion dollars for military purposes, not to meet any specific demonstrated need, but solely to "jar" Khrushchev.

Pathetically few liberals question the efficacy of this "shock therapy" type of foreign policy, to say nothing of its cost. It is part of the weary, depressing old refrain joined in by members of both parties, but sung most enthusiastically by the liberal Democrats. It is a policy which seems to me as ineffective as it is unimaginative, as demoralizing as it is costly. It suggests to me that they really are not serious about this business of disarmament, that they really never come to grips with its demands or implications. Russian intransigence is an obstacle that is formidable enough, but we seem to be further handicapped by our own mental sets.

Like Schlesinger, I also favor a shift of values from emphasis upon things to emphasis upon people, to spending more on education and roads and less on television sets and automobiles. But until he, and other liberals, show evidence of seriously looking around for some new, creative foreign policy attitudes and programs that show promise of reducing the outlandish waste of our resources on military matters, I shall continue to be unimpressed by their arguments.

HARRY R. DICK
Denton, Texas

Schlesinger's Brilliant Essay

Dear Sirs:

Thanks for giving us Arthur Schlesinger's brilliant essay, "The Big Issue." He is precisely right when he notes that "We are in trouble purely and simply because of the way we have chosen to employ our talents and resources."

BYRNE STEVENS
Princeton, New Jersey

The Real Issue

Dear Sirs:

Arthur Schlesinger's article, "The Big Issue," in the September issue, strikes me as incredibly superficial. Schlesinger's "Big Issue" is merely one step on a long road. In some respects, specifically in increasing arms expenditures, it is a backward step. Schlesinger fails to mention the problem posed by ultimate weapons and international anarchy. Like Nixon, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and other refugees from the Bronze Age, he brushes it off with the euphemism, "defense."

The most urgent job facing Americans today is outgrowing tribalism. Public acquiescence in the U-2 fiasco showed how deeply we are infected with that primitive disease. And it is clear that sooner or later, and preferably sooner, we and other peoples have got to relinquish part of our national sovereignty to an international organization as a condition of survival. The alternative, as Koestler puts it, is to follow the trail of the dinosaur.

C. W. GRIFFIN
Denville, N. J.

Disputes Schlesinger

Dear Sirs:

What are the special qualifications that make Arthur Schlesinger a "liberal"? This question has troubled me ever since reading his article in the September issue.

True, most liberals would agree, too, with his general premises concerning the urgent need for government spending in the fields of health, education, welfare, and housing. But there any resemblance to "liberal" thinking ceases.

Mr. Schlesinger makes no bones about the need for more and more missiles and makes it plain that he adheres wholeheartedly to the old familiar line of "keeping up with the Russians." Evidently he does not consider our overwhelmingly large defense budget as contributing in the slightest to the insecurity engendered by the misallocation of wealth which is the major theme of his argument.

We are told that all this vital public spending (which, by implication, would unquestionably be immediately implemented by a Democratic Administration) can be handled by "a marginal shift of resources." It appears that, since Mr. Schlesinger is interested in increasing rather than decreasing the defense budget, the "marginal shift" will be onto the shoulders of the taxpayers—and we know which group of taxpayers suffers most with each increase.

Considering that the "liberal" Mr. Schlesinger's views coincide closely with Senator Kennedy's, it is little wonder that thinking people today recoil at the prospect of voting for either of the available candidates.

MRS. AUDREY A. ROTHKOP
Stockton, Calif.

Leader

Dear Sirs:

Arthur Schlesinger's "The Big Issue" is one of the most challenging articles you have ever published. Its concepts go to the heart of our problem and illuminate areas of our national life too long obscured by political cliches and shoddy thinking. In publishing Mr. Schlesinger's article, and a number of others of comparable excellence, *The Progressive* has reaffirmed its leadership among the nation's thoughtful journals.

JONATHAN MEADE
Alexandria, Virginia

Schlesinger 'Wrong'

Dear Sirs:

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in "The Big Issue," focuses attention on the big difference in philosophy of government between the liberal Democrats and the conservatives in the United States, whether Republican or Democrat.

Mr. Schlesinger offers national planning by men who know what the people should do, even if the people themselves do not know. He believes there is a real difference between the sum of individual purposes, and a national purpose. I think Mr. Schlesinger is wrong—his thesis is merely a totalitarian philosophy tricked out in fancy "liberal" clothes.

Mr. Schlesinger declaims the nation's need for schools. To be specific, whose responsibility is it here in Cranford, New Jersey, to build a high school which this community needs? I believe it is the responsibility of the people in this community—not the state government and not the Federal government. If we, as citizens of the community, are so blind as not to see the value of putting a substantial part of our income into better educational facilities, then we do not deserve

any better. Furthermore, it is far better that we learn to do better by making mistakes, such as delaying a new high school, than by having some all-seeing, all-wise government rescue us from our folly by directing and financing the new school.

If his argument is simply that the Federal government is the most efficient tax collector, and therefore it is easier to get money from the citizens via this route, why doesn't he say so? Why clothe a practical argument in philosophical garments?

I reject the philosophy that the nation's needs will only be met by Federal government planning. It is a philosophy founded on the premise of an immature, irresponsible America.

W. T. Knox
Cranford, New Jersey

No 'Big Issue'

Dear Sirs:

I read with interest in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s, article in your September issue his claim that "there is a profound issue between the parties, an issue . . . as clear cut . . . as the one the nation faced in 1932." The only difference in 1932 between the two major parties was what was the best method to be used to save our economic system from collapse, and the result we all know.

President Roosevelt built a system of reforms more thoroughgoing than any ever attempted before in this country, and yet in his State of the Union message to Congress in 1940, he admitted failure in these words: "We cannot report that all problems are solved. The fact of unemployment of millions of men and women remains a symptom of a number of difficulties in our economic system not yet adjusted. We have not yet found a way to employ the surplus of our labor which the efficiency of our industrial processes has created." But what he couldn't do in eight years of reform effort in putting men and women to work was done in a few months when World War II started. In other words, World War II took that reform program off the hook.

If Mr. Schlesinger would investigate the program of the Socialist Labor Party, he would find that it fits the times we live in because it calls for the collective ownership of the tools of production by all of the people. It would be up to all of the people, not just a handful, to decide what is needed, as things then would be made for use, and not made to sell at a profit, the cause of all world tension.

R. V. Brandborg
Little Falls, Minnesota

Masterly Analysis

Dear Sirs:

The Progressive has performed another great service in giving us Arthur Schlesinger's masterly analysis, "The Big Issue." It is comforting to know that this astute political thinker is advising with Senator Kennedy.

Leo S. Hobbins
St. Louis, Missouri

'These Moral Dandies'

Dear Sirs:

All the haggling over the degree of Senator Kennedy's liberalism reminds me that I recently came across a comment by George Bernard Shaw which seems most appropriate. Shaw had just learned that a Labor candidate for the House of Commons, Joseph Burgess, had refused to compromise on some issue and had lost his seat in Parliament as a consequence. This was Shaw's bitter comment:

"When I think of my own unfortunate character, smirched with compromise, rotted with opportunism, mildewed by expediency, dragged through the mud of borough council and Battersea elections, stretched out of shape with wire-pulling, putrified by permeation, worn out by twenty-five years pushing to gain—an inch here, or straining to stem a backrush, I do think Joe might have put up with just a speck or two on those white robes of his for the sake of the millions of poor devils who cannot afford any character at all because they have no friend in Parliament. Oh, these moral dandies, these spiritual toffs. . . . Who is Joe, anyhow, that he should not risk his soul occasionally like the rest of us?"

Here, I believe, is something worth pondering as we face the great decision of November 8 and continue to ruminate about the occasional specks in Kennedy's fine record.

James Frederick Nevins
Silver Springs, Md.

Satisfied with Kennedy

Dear Sirs:

In the classified advertising section of *The Progressive* for September I urged Stevensonians to write Senator Kennedy that they would not vote for him unless he firmly pledged to appoint Adlai Stevenson his Secretary of State. On the basis of a letter Kennedy has written me, dated August 30, and his recent speeches, I can now give him my support.

Senator Kennedy wrote that he could not at present name Stevenson as Secretary of State because "that would open up pressures to make other appointments," a reasonable assumption. But he states clearly that "Mr. Stevenson will have a significant role in our future affairs." Added together, this makes a firm enough pledge for me.

Kennedy also has convinced me that he is a true liberal, promising to give top priority when elected to strong civil rights legislation. Under President Kennedy I look forward to meaningful bills on federal aid to the aged sick, education, housing, urban renewal, distressed areas, and other welfare measures. Surrounded by such men as Stevenson, Bowles, and Humphrey, Kennedy could re-establish American initiative and leadership of the free world. And, acting from military, economic, and political strength, we could work towards an end to the insane nuclear arms race and for peace.

I hope other understandably bitter Stevensonians will join me in getting behind Kennedy. The very thought of Richard Nixon in the White House makes me shudder.

Allen Klein
Mount Vernon, New York

Kennedy by Default

Dear Sirs:

I am an old lady but am still growing up and am in need of a higher education. Can you help me answer these questions on the coming election of our President?

What is the difference between a rigged Democratic convention and a rigged Republican convention?

What is the difference between a Presidential candidate's campaign being paid for by a millionaire family and one being paid by a group of millionaire businessmen?

What is the difference between the cultivated Harvard accented political reasoning of John Kennedy and the commonplace political platitudes of Richard Nixon?

What is the difference between the political ambitions of Kennedy and the political ambitions of Nixon?

What is the difference between an open friendship of Nixon for the late Senator Joseph McCarthy and the silent, uncritical friendship of Kennedy for the same McCarthy?

Why did the old pros and the young pros shrug off their greatest asset in Adlai E.

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by Morris H. Rubin

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Stevenson to embrace Lyndon B. Johnson?

I still would like to vote for Stevenson but I am afraid to lose my vote, for I have hated Richard M. Nixon for the suffering he has caused to innocent people, for his McCarthyism, and for using that terrible Whitaker Chambers as a tool. So still disliking Kennedy, I feel forced to vote for him.

MARIE L. PARKHURST
Eugene, Oregon

'Kennedy Doctrine'

Dear Sirs:

A most happy circumstance of the many interrogations of Senator Kennedy by groups of the Protestant clergy, is their almost universal and unmistakable pleasure in his forthright answers. Probably no one has ever before so thoroughly and carefully outlined and affirmed all of our constitutional safeguards for the absolute separation of church and state.

If he is elected, it might even become a sort of a "Kennedy Doctrine," or at least a strong precedent, tending to further safeguard this separation from any later encroachment. Also both Kennedy and Dr. Norman Vincent Peale say that neither a man's religion nor lack of a formal religious affiliation should have anything to do with his qualification for President. I like this much better than Nixon's statement during the convention, that a man's religion is not an issue and that only if he had no religion should it be an issue.

LOU WILHELM
Portland, Oregon

What Kind of Catholic?

Dear Sirs:

After the collapse of the Summit Conference, Adlai Stevenson said:

> "It appears this year's campaign will be waged under the darkest shadows that ever hovered over the world—the mushroom clouds of a nuclear war that no one wants. This terrible danger—and how to avert it—will and should overshadow every other issue."

Surely averting war and the building of a stable peace in our world *is* the central issue in this campaign. And yet it is quite discouraging that the religion of Senator John Kennedy seems to have become the central issue for many people who seem more fearful of the intolerance of the Roman Catholic Church in Spain than the possible annihilation of our entire civilization in a nuclear war.

Being a Protestant missionary in a country dominated by the Spanish form of Catholicism I am certainly not unaware of the heavy hand of Rome in national and international affairs. But even here there are liberal Catholics active in political life (such as the outstanding Senator Claro M. Recto) who publicly resist the anti-democratic encroachments of Rome just as strongly as do the most ardent Protestants. Therefore the question to ask about Senator Kennedy's religion is not *what* it is but rather, "What *kind* of Catholic is he?" Kennedy's public record shows that he would certainly resist the pressures of his church as much as Baptist President Truman who appointed an ambassador to the Vatican, or Presbyterian President Eisenhower who recently showed his hearty agreement with the Catholic bishops' statement on birth control.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has pointed out that a Catholic President would perhaps be *more* resistant to the demands of the Roman Church in seeking *to* avoid the label of "partisan" than would a Protestant President who would be seeking to avoid the label of "bigot." An examination of the voting record of Catholics in Congress shows the greatest diversity among them, clearly demonstrating that there is no "conspiracy" on their part to undermine our democratic heritage as many would have us believe.

RICHARD DEATS
Union Theological Seminary
Manila, Philippines

Catholics Beat Stevenson

Dear Sirs:

Even if Senator Kennedy will, as he says, resist any improper papal pressure, there is some doubt as to whether he deserves or will get any large vote from Stevenson supporters. At the Democratic convention in 1956, the Larsen report by supporters of Senator Kennedy pointed out that many Catholic votes went over to the GOP in 1952. This was an admission that they either caused Governor Stevenson's defeat or contributed largely to it. Not a single state reputed to have a heavy Catholic vote went to Stevenson.

Therefore no Stevenson supporter needs to feel under any obligation to support Kennedy. Furthermore, the indications are now that if Kennedy is elected, he will appoint Chester Bowles as Secretary of State rather than Stevenson.

Senator Kennedy is without executive experience and his profile was without courage on the censure of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy. His brother Bob was a member of the McCarthy staff and his father a friend of McCarthy; so any effort to present him as a liberal should be viewed with suspicion.

But the issue which transcends all others is nuclear warfare. Kennedy has said that Berlin might be worth a little war. The Democrats have taken us into the last three wars while Nixon, being Quaker trained, probably is a better prospect to keep us out of another world war, which would indeed be a nuclear hell.

C. P. STEVENS
Escalon, Calif.

Voting Alternatives

Dear Sirs:

I sympathize with those who have recently written to *The Progressive* that they wish to protest-vote against Senator Kennedy, although they do not want to vote for Vice President Nixon either.

I am opposed to Kennedy, but I do not think that not-voting in November is the most effective way of registering protest. A more effective way, I believe, is to vote for a candidate who represents more closely the views to which one subscribes. If there is no such splinter-party candidate, one can write in the name of someone whom one prefers (although the procedure is tricky for Presidential elections). To be sure, this vote will not contribute to the *election* of one's candidate—but then neither will not-voting. It will give notice to the politicians that you are protesting (and are not merely being lazy) and *why* you are protesting.

J. WUBNIG
New Haven, Conn.

Dear Sirs:

Since there is no pacifist position represented in the parties running candidates for the national election, why not write in Martin Luther King, Jr., for President as a protest vote? He is a well known national symbol of nonviolent direct action, a policy our nation could well adopt.

It might be well to publicize in advance that some people will use their vote in this way.

MRS. ORIN D. DOTY
Minneapolis, Minn.

Dear Sirs:

At a time when the right to live as human beings has been denied many of our citizens and when the very existence of the human race is in question, the American people have no means to express their opinions in the coming national election on the two most crucial issues of our time—disarmament and integration.

It is as a direct result of the gravity of this situation that the Voters Write-In Committee for Peace and Integration has been formed to register a protest vote. Neither party stands on a platform advocating disarmament, neither party can guarantee that it will enact its civil rights plank. These two issues are too urgent to be left unattended.

The Committee has selected Norman Thomas and A. Philip Randolph as write-in

The Big Issue

by ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

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candidates to symbolize peace and civil rights on the ballot. By this action the group seeks to reintroduce onto the American scene the idea that the voter has the right to vote for issues rather than personalities.

This Committee is aware that others may recognize the urgency of these fundamental issues. Your participation will be most welcome.

DEENA METZGER, *Secretary*
Voters Write-In Committee
for Peace and Integration
6227 West San Vicente Blvd.
Los Angeles 48, Calif.

Dear Sirs:

Ernestine W. Brehmer wrote, in your September issue, that the two Presidential candidates "were men of my worst fears. I have no choice between them. Together, they have robbed me of my right to vote."

An understandable sentiment, but the wrong conclusion. Miss Brehmer, and other voters who find that neither of the two major parties deserves the vote, have an excellent but seldom used alternative to abstention. It is to pick one of the *minority* parties which, on at least one important issue, takes a worthy stand.

In addition to voting for that party's candidates, one might well write explanatory letters to, say, the national chairmen of both major parties. This will not elect minority candidates, but it will put the pressure of public opinion on the majors. To the extent that the latter are opportunistic, and the pressure mounts, they will be responsive.

R. L. CALHOUN
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Dear Sirs:

For a socialist, staying at home on election day may save one from compromising his principles but it is a neutralist attitude that does nothing to advance the socialist cause.

Our answer as life-long socialists is to support and vote for the candidates of the Socialist Labor Party.

Voting for the SLP candidates, Eric Hass for President, and Georgia Cozzini for Vice President, at least offers a positive and concrete way of showing our faith in socialism. The Socialist Party's position of presenting platform planks to the Democrats and Republicans while sitting out the election does not offer such an opportunity.

HAROLD FLINCKER
Committee for Real Electoral Expression
Box 83B, R.D. 1
West Harwich, Mass.

Nixon Article Disappointing

Dear Sirs:

The article "The Case Against Nixon," though written with the Editor's usual skill, is disappointing in several respects.

1. Disappointing because it is hard to see how a liberal can be for a candidate, who, like Jack Kennedy, was unable to discern any issue of principle in McCarthyism and who has a weak record on civil rights. Only the other day a state official here appeared on television, sponsored by the State Committee for Kennedy and Johnson, to denounce Nixon and Lodge as "integrators" and to praise Kennedy and Johnson for their consistent efforts to delay and to water down civil rights legislation! How can a liberal magazine be for a candidate with this kind of record on the two most important domestic issues of our age?

2. Disappointing because of factual errors. Nixon did not break a Senate tie vote and kill a measure providing for federal aid to education. As Lyndon Johnson said on TV, the bill was killed by the House Rules Committee. Nixon's vote on a tie went only to a particular amendment. The treatment of the Indo-China incident is inaccurate as your article itself shows. Nixon did not tell the newspaper editors that he personally supported intervention with American boys. He told them he would support such a position if this risk had to be taken in order to avoid further Communist expansion. Apparently the Administration determined that it did not.

3. Disappointing that the same issue of *The Progressive* which condemns Mr. Nixon so bitterly for having taken varying positions on issues carried an article praising his opponent for having "come by his liberalism in small stages."

If, as James MacGregor Burns argues, Kennedy's liberalism is all the stronger as a result of having been long in the making, why does not the same test apply to the Vice President?

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
School of Law
The University of Texas
Austin

Socialistic Trend

If John F. Kennedy is elected the "old Roosevelt domineering era" will be resumed. There will be more centralized government control. States' rights will be diminished. There will be more "give-away" schemes promoted, both foreign and domestic. This means higher taxes.

We need men like Adlai Stevenson or Barry Goldwater to pull our country out of the socialistic trend.

PAUL MILLER
Santa Ana, Calif.

Depth of Perception

Dear Sirs:

The October issue article on Henry Cabot Lodge, "Made in the United Nations," by David C. Williams, is an example of the depth of perception one comes to expect in *The Progressive*, particularly after reading an article on the Ambassador in *Time* which took the opposite view.

GEORGE E. OESTREICH, JR.
Eau Claire, Wisconsin

Sour Grapes

Dear Sirs:

All the post convention comments in *The Progressive*, *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, and *Frontier* sounded like sour grapes to me.

The only thing I have read so far that makes sense to me are the letters in "The People's Forum" in the September issue of your splendid publication by John Chappell, Jr., Stephen Shefler, and Mildred H. Biffar, all of whom are now behind Senator John Kennedy. I have always felt that Stevenson was the best man for the White House, but it was obvious that he did not want it.

R. BRUCE SPACKMAN
Roseburg, Oregon

Kempton's Gem

Dear Sirs:

Murray Kempton's "The Uncommitted" was a gem—one of the finest things you have ever published. Please give us much more of Kempton. He has a rare talent.

BAYARD FELL
Berkeley, California

Kempton Incomparable

Dear Sirs:

Murray Kempton's September issue article, "The Uncommitteed," was an incomparable presentation of the character of the men with whom we are confronted in the present campaign.

RAYMOND FINCH
New Hyde Park, New York

Poetry and Politics

Dear Sirs:

Murray Kempton, in "The Uncommitted" (September), deplores the passing of poetry from politics. As a poet, I disagree. If ever there was a time when efficiency, rather than poetry, was needed in government it is now. The space age has changed a lot of things. One more U-2 disaster and we're through.

I don't look to the President for poetry, but for the ability to form a peaceful and progressive social framework within which poets can sing their own songs.

Mr. Kempton longs for a touch of the irrational. Thank you, no. Not with the hydrogen bomb hanging over our heads.

EDITH LOVEJOY PIERCE
Evanston, Ill.

Mature Judgment Needed

Dear Sirs:

Your readers may be interested in the following letter, which I have sent to Senator Kennedy and Vice President Nixon:

"As a concerned citizen, I wonder if this campaign can escape from Madison Avenue techniques—and instead give evidence that people selected for positions of leadership can take time to think and to develop the mature judgment required by the hour. A month of solitude plus one speech showing wisdom would be preferable to what I much fear we shall receive. No, we don't need a religious mystic, but we do need a man.

"We need a constant adherence to the principles that will make democracy grow. These principles demand not the mere allowance of new ideas but the careful fostering of a climate in which constructive

thought is encouraged. Now is the time to speak out in favor of this sort of climate. There are still too many investigations of people who are merely in a thoughtful and fearless way performing the patriotic duty of thinking about the public welfare. The recent harassment of the great scientist Dr. Linus Pauling by a Senatorial committee is a case in point. It is the right of citizens to petition the government when their ideas disagree with those of people in power. Otherwise the right of petition has no meaning. Now is the time to speak.

"This is no time for a super-Boy Scout flexing of missile power, but a time which demands a leadership with imagination enough to lead us into the Twentieth Century."

Otis W. Coan
Los Angeles, Calif.

Hopes to Mend WIL Rift

Dear Sirs:

It is a cause of great sorrow to me that in 1954, with Elsie Johnson and about twenty other active members of the Chicago Branch of the WIL, I was forced to withdraw from the organization that had such noble beginnings.

My membership had lasted for more than twenty-five years and had given me the satisfaction and stimulation that can come only through work with loved and respected friends for a great and urgent cause.

The break need not have occurred had the WIL leadership helped, instead of, for the most part, discouraged and ignored, over a period of more than two years, our efforts at full and searching exploration of our differences in interpretation of WIL principles. These differences were seriously crippling the work of the Chicago Branch.

If, added to the generalization that the WIL opposed all totalitarianism, there had been an official WIL statement as to the nature of present-day Communism, its purposes, and its operations, especially in this country, pro-Communists, finding infertile ground in the WIL, would have left, and the ill-informed "fuzzy-minded" would either have followed them out, or remained and been exposed to sound education for peace work. Moreover, had such a statement been on file before McCarthyism boiled up, the membership would have had a solid base of common knowledge and mutual understanding and the rift in all probability would not have occurred.

It is my continuing hope that we may yet with full intellectual integrity and mutual good will work together again for peace and freedom in the League that was so dear to the heart of Jane Addams.

Marcia J. Lyttle
Chicago, Ill.

Nazis, Past and Present

Dear Sirs:

Perhaps I can help to resolve the apparent disagreement between Milton Mayer's statement that there are no former Nazis in office in East Germany and the list mentioned by W. W. Jones in the September People's Forum. It is quite true that those mentioned by Mr. Jones (and many more in the East German army, police, and other branches of government) served Hitler faithfully. But they are not *former* Nazis. They may be former SS officers, Gestapo torturers, and so on. But they are *still* Nazis—which is why they find the atmosphere of East German totalitarianism such a congenial one.

Maurice J. Goldbloom
Brooklyn, N.Y.

Mayer Arrogant

Dear Sirs:

Why do so many active libertarians who espouse causes similar to Milton Mayer's find him annoying and boring both in his writings and on the lecture platform?

It is not that he seems to be ubiquitous, repetitive, or compulsive in accentuating the quest for personal salvation in his zeal for the commonweal. Neither can it be his frequent historical inaccuracies and logical fallacies which have been pointed out at various times by readers here.

I submit that Mr. Mayer vitiates the cogency of his arguments so often because he has never succeeded in drawing the important distinction between remorse and contrition. He is so intent upon including himself among those whom he is attacking for derelictions, that his attitude amounts not to any attempted humility but actually to a display of arrogance, of self-preoccupation, and of a *mea culpa* so allegedly heinous that not even God Himself can forgive it.

This is an egotism that I, as well as many with whom I have discussed this attitude, find offensive. If Mr. Mayer will only continue to fight the good fight and merely admit contritely that, like most of us, he may not be made of heroic stuff, and that we are all susceptible to corruptions of flesh and spirit, he will be doing more than enough.

Mark Winnson
Wilmington, Delaware

Thank God for Murgatroyd

Dear Sirs:

Milton Mayer's Murgatroyd (September) sees the world as stupidly determined to blow itself up and he does what he can to stop it. Mayer himself sees us as unthinking hypocrites and he does what he can. Others see the world as full of the hungry, sick, and discouraged. Or full of families to be raised. St. Francis saw a world empty of love, so he just loved; it was all he could do. Personally I see a world full of freshmen—I'd like to open doors for some of them, even if it is only a crack.

Will Murgatroyd fill a baby's stomach, restore his manhood to a mental patient, or make a child laugh again? No, of course not. His mission is something else.

I thank God for Murgatroyd. I am grateful for Milton Mayer—he has done me a lot of good over the years. I thank God for St. Francis, Martin Luther King, Jane Addams, Helen Keller, and Ralph Bunche—and for all the others, too—teachers, relatives, friends, and strangers, who have helped me with those "unremembered acts of kindness and of love."

Esther C. Richards
Portland, Oregon

Praise for Richard Schickel

Dear Sirs:

I have just finished reading the excellent September issue. Among all the good feelings I have one fear: the absence of the reviews of Richard Schickel may indicate that his reviews and essays are not appreciated. We have not always agreed with Mr. Schickel but we have always been interested in his fresh, honest, and strongly expressed opinions, opinions obviously well based in a large store of knowledge of contemporary and classic fiction.

The Progressive has been fortunate to have as much writing as it has had from Mr. Schickel and we hope to see more.

Marshall W. Krause
San Francisco, Calif.

Today's Pharisees

Dear Sirs:

Murray Friedman's article, "Discord on Sunday," in the September *Progressive* certainly shines a spotlight on inanity that might be amusing if it was not so hypocritically blasphemous. It is obvious that the "fundamentalists" supporting the Blue Laws choose to ignore Jesus' fundamental practice and preaching with regard to the Sabbath. Jesus healed on the Sabbath, and in response to the Pharisees who were angry at His refusal to ignore people's needs on Sundays, He told them plainly that the Sabbath was made for man, not the other way around!

Our world is sick unto death today because of the attitudes and practices of these same pharisaical people who trot busily around proclaiming convenient bits of the Gospel while totally disobedient to the basic commandment to *love one another*. Part of loving consists of allowing others to enjoy the freedom God gave them to work when they choose, rest when they choose, and worship God in private.

If it is so sinful to work on Sunday, what are the ministers doing at their place of business on Sunday? What about all the "sinful" telephone operators, gasoline merchants, firemen, policemen, doctors, nurses, life guards, druggists, ambulance drivers, transportation employees and newspaper boys? These zealots would apparently banish them all to hell for breaking the Sabbath. Thank God, His Will is done, not theirs.

To this type of zealot "brother's keeper" means "brother's jailer." They are consumed with a need to control the most intimate aspects of other's lives. Their compulsion to control has now reached the grotesque point where they now insist that their proper sphere of influence extends even to the marriage beds of the world, where they would impose their birth control methods upon all and sundry!

To these people, freedom in any form is

anathema. Their lives are dedicated to suppression. Those of us who love freedom might just as well learn to recognize them and know what we're dealing with. Jesus did, in no uncertain terms.

MRS. DORSEY M. ROTH
Fort Wayne, Ind.

Christians and Sunday

Dear Sirs:

In his article, "Discord on Sunday," in the September issue, Murray Friedman wrote: "The first Sunday law was enacted in 320 A.D. when Constantine embraced Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire." But at that date Constantine was still Pontifex Maximus of the sun-worshipping pagan religion and his Sunday law was not a Christian institution at all. It was established in honor of the Sun God, and the Emperor referred to it as "the venerable day of the Sun."

The Christian bishops were appalled by this ruling since it was well known that the founder of the Christian faith had forbidden "the superstitious observance of days," for, as Origen put it, "To the perfect Christian all his days are the Lord's;" and Tertullian, in his *Answer to Jews* states that "To Christians, Sabbaths are unknown." However it was impossible to quarrel with Constantine, and the compulsory day of rest and recreation proved so popular that it was retained in the always accommodating and eclectic Catholic Church.

We might therefore be spared these time-wasting disputes about Sunday observance on Christian grounds, if it were understood that such observance is no more *Christian* than the bearing of arms which was never permitted in the original wholly-pacifist Christian church before the accommodation with Constantine. Hence the unpopularity of the Christians with the Romans, who pointed out that they accepted the hospitality of the Empire without being willing to fight for it, to which Origen replied that the only way a Christian was permitted to support a ruler was by prayer. Modern Churchianity, which gives its sanction to the observance of days and to the waging of "wars of defense," is certainly not Christian in the sense that it is perpetuating the instructions of Jesus Christ.

ESME WYNNE-TYSON
Selsey, Sussex, England

Each to His Choice

Dear Sirs:

I have just read "Discord on Sunday" and I would like to make a comment. True Christians will not interfere with anyone's freedom where a day is concerned. St. Paul's letter to the Romans, Ch. 14; V. 5-9, begins: "For one esteems one day above another; another esteems every day alike. Let everyone be convinced in his own mind." Jesus knew man's weakness in making an idol of a day, a book, or any other thing that kept man in bondage, that stopped spiritual growth. That is what the New Testament is all about.

MRS. RAYMOND FORREST
Montesano, Wash.

BOOKS

After the New Deal

THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT, III: THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Houghton Mifflin. 749 pp. $6.95.

Reviewed by

David A. Shannon

IN LATE 1934 and early 1935 President Roosevelt, like a Model T when you most wanted to get it started, was "stuck on center." The measures of the earliest New Deal had been enacted, and the voters in November, 1934, had returned heavier Democratic Congressional majorities than ever. But the depression was by no means over, and Left, Right, and phony Left demanded new departures with voices of growing strength. Within the Administration groups and alliances tugged and hauled over such basic matters as further industrial planning versus restoring competition and budget-balancing versus deficit spending. But Roosevelt did next to nothing while opposition mounted in all quarters. "He could not lead until he knew where he wanted to go." A political crisis impended if Roosevelt could not regain the initiative.

Roosevelt, it seems to me, never decided upon intellectual grounds what he wanted to do except in a most general way; he was above all a political man, and the political situation dictated which way to go: toward the Left. In terms of the polarized politics of the mid-1930's Roosevelt did not go very far Left, but from the vantage point of our own era of consensus the record of the Administration and the Congress in the spring and summer of 1935 seems a tremendous progressive achievement. By the end of the first session of the 74th Congress, Capitol Hill and the White House had put through the Social Security Act, the Wagner Act, Marriner Eccles' banking law, rural electrification, WPA, the Guffey Coal Act, the Public Utilities Holding Company Act, and a progressively amended tax program.

The run to the Left was a brief one. As late as January, 1935, Roosevelt himself had described his budget message as "tory." In September, 1935, Roosevelt wrote publisher Roy Howard, ". . . the 'breathing spell' of which you speak is here—very decidedly so." The New Deal was substantially on the books. Enough had been accomplished, however, to give Roosevelt in 1936 the greatest electoral victory any Presidential candidate has ever won. The Right took a thorough drubbing, the Left for the most part went along with Roosevelt, and the phony Left after Huey Long's assassination bogged down in an impossible alliance of Father Coughlin, Gerald L. K. Smith, Dr. Townsend, and William Lemke.

This excellent book opens with a section of about two hundred pages on the angry voices that demanded something more or something different, from Huey Long to the homegrown radicals of the period, too long neglected, such as Tom Amlie of Wisconsin and Maury Maverick of Texas. A slightly longer section treats the enactment of the second New Deal and is followed by a shorter treatment of the difficulties of the New Deal with the Federal courts, stopping short of the Supreme Court fight of 1937. The final section culminates in the 1936 elections.

Schlesinger's research is wide, especially for a general book like this, which could be expanded into a shelf of volumes. The writing is first-rate.

Schlesinger writes narrative history as well as any American historian of this century. He has a sense of drama, wit, and a sharp eye for irony. He relieves reader weariness—after all, it is a huge book—with apt quotations and revealing anecdotes. In a sketch of a few sentences, full of well-turned phrases, he gives the reader what is necessary to know of his characters' personalities. Sample: "The last of the prewar muckrakers, [Upton] Sinclair somehow kept a gentle but durable innocence while all around him—Steffens to his left, Mark Sullivan and Hearst to his right—capitulated to images of power and success. His books were brisk and sentimental, saturated with fact and suffused with moral indignation."

Not many historians of this generation write successfully for a wide non-professional audience. It is fortunate that one who does chooses to write about Roosevelt and the Great Depression, for there seems to be after fifteen years almost as much popular misinformation and misconception about F.D.R. as there is about Lincoln after almost a century. Just as the popular view of Lincoln as The Great Emancipator vastly oversimplifies and distorts reality without being absolutely wrong, so does the popular view of Roosevelt as The Great Liberal.

Americans of all shades of political opinion need to be reminded that Roosevelt "avoided ideological commitment . . . even avoided intellectual clarity," that even at the height of his most liberal period he maintained friendly relationships with Democratic city bosses of the most squalid sort and party conservatives such as Bernard Baruch and Jesse Jones, that in December 1934 even Morgenthau's tax plan was too radical for F.D.R.'s taste, that he never threw his support behind an anti-lynching bill, and that he hoped his "oratorical extremism would nullify the effect of . . . legislative and administrative moderation" and thereby give "new heart to his friends" while "diminish[ing] the grievances of his enemies." People also need to be reminded that Alfred M. Landon was not by any means a nasal, naive Neanderthal. Governor Landon, incidentally, allowed Schlesinger access to his papers and consented to be interviewed, and the Landon that emerges from these pages is a somewhat more sophisticated and liberal person than was generally thought in 1936.

As excellent a book as this is—the best of the three volumes, in my opinion, because the subject-matter better fits the author's conceptions and interests—I must enter a few dissents. Schlesinger's decision to consider the legislative history of the Wagner Act in the previous volume blurs one important difference between the first and second New Deals and, because Roosevelt resisted Wagner's bill until he saw it would pass anyway, the author tends to give the White House too much credit for the record of the 74th Congress.

When one considers the background of the Wagner Act, one wonders about the validity of the assertions about the unreliability of the Senate progressives. Perhaps the Senate progressives were inadquate, perhaps Roosevelt was right in thinking that he could get more by working with Southern conservatives than with Northern and Western progressive prima donnas, but quoting statements by Harold Ickes and Rex Tugwell about the progressives' unreliability, rather than documenting the charge by close description of their actions, is not persuasive. The treatment of the Roosevelt coalition in 1936, which makes valid points not made before, would have been strengthened by more consideration of the American Labor Party of New York than the almost passing references made. Indeed, more attention to state and local politics throughout the volume would have enriched the story.

Nevertheless, *The Politics of Upheaval* is impressive. It deserves the wide audience it will get, and the audience will be politically wiser and better informed for having read it.

THE REVIEWERS

DAVID A. SHANNON teaches American history at the University of Wisconsin; he wrote "The Decline of American Communism." DAVID FELLMAN, professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, wrote "The Defendant's Rights." LUCY P. CARNER is a member of the national board of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. ARTHUR WEINBERG edited a book on Clarence Darrow titled "Attorney for the Damned." FREDERICK C. MOSHER is a professor of political science at the University of California. JOHN M. SWOMLEY is executive director of the Fellowship of Reconciliation.



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Four Insights Into Civil Liberties

FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES, edited by Harlan B. Phillips. Reynal. 310 pp. $5.75.

FREEDOM IN THE BALANCE: OPINIONS OF JUDGE HENRY W. EDGERTON RELATING TO CIVIL LIBERTIES, edited by Eleanor Bontecou. Cornell University Press. 278 pp. $5.75.

LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION, by Leonard W. Levy. Belknap (Harvard University Press). 353 pp. $6.50.

COMSTOCKERY IN AMERICA, by Robert W. Haney. Beacon. 199 pp. $3.95.

Reviewed by

David Fellman

WHILE THE books under review differ a great deal in style and subject-matter, each constitutes a valuable addition to our literature on civil liberties. The collection of Judge Edgerton's opinions explores the mind and record of a distinguished Federal jurist. Levy's book is a searching inquiry into the historical background of American legal doctrine regarding the freedom of speech and press. Haney looks critically into the vexing question of censorship of literature concerned with sex. And Justice Frankfurter's book of reminiscences illuminates many salient aspects of the civil liberties history of our country for the past half-century as they came to a focus in the life of this extraordinary man.

Whatever one may think of Justice Frankfurter—and like all first-rate public figures he has his detractors as well as admirers—no one has ever suggested that he is not an interesting man. This stands out clearly in this unusual book. What is unusual about it is that it was not originally intended for this sort of publication. Six years ago the Justice agreed to participate in Columbia University's Oral History Research program by reviewing selected aspects of his life in tape-recorded interviews. Since Justice Frankfurter is one of the great conversationalists of our time, these interviews have all the sparkle and wit and movement which characterize the oral speech of an interesting, insightful, and articulate man. The reader will learn much about many things from this book, but above all it's fun.

Justice Frankfurter discusses with remarkable recall many things, his boyhood status as an immigrant, his student years at Harvard, his early work as a lawyer and in the government, his war services, his teaching experience at the Harvard Law School, his connection with various great civil liberties cases, such as those of Tom Mooney and Sacco-Vanzetti, and his New Deal experiences. The book ends with his appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court. Perhaps the most fascinating parts are the Justice's opinions regarding the many distinguished public men whose lives touched his own, ranging from T.R., Bryan, Stimson, and Wilson to Morgenthau and F.D.R. Some of this is high-level gossip, but it is never dull. Teachers, books, politicians, lawyers, defendants, causes, elections—these and many others pass in review.

It was an equally inspired idea for Eleanor Bontecou to gather together and edit some representative opinions of Judge Henry W. Edgerton, who left his professorship at the Cornell Law School in 1937 to sit on the important Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, where he still serves with great distinction. Supreme Court Justices get so much public attention that able members of the lower courts tend to get lost in the shuffle. Miss Bontecou's volume ought to be adequate assurance that this will not happen to Judge Edgerton.

Judge Edgerton's principal contributions to our public law have been in the civil liberties field. Included in this volume are opinions dealing with freedom of religion, speech, and press, the legislative investigating power, the security programs of the Federal government, fair judicial procedures, the treatment of aliens and Negroes. The opinions are characterized by fine legal scholarship, clarity and directness of speech, vigorous reasoning, a deep compassion for the weak and the unfortunate, and commitment to enduring constitutional principles. As the Judge remarked in a security case, "We cannot preserve our liberties by sacrificing them."

Leonard W. Levy, professor of history at Brandeis University, sheds much light in his new book, *Legacy of Suppression*, upon the meaning of the concepts of freedom of speech

and press in American history from early colonial days down to about 1800. A beautifully written book, based upon exhaustive documentary research, it argues convincingly that contemporary English views regarding the concept of seditious libel as a proper limit upon freedom of political expression prevailed in America throughout the colonial period, and down through the formative constitutional period to the end of the Eighteenth Century. Levy makes it abundantly clear that "the persistent image of colonial America as a society in which freedom of expression was cherished is an hallucination of sentiment that ignores history." He points out that the colonial legislatures were the worst offenders against freedom of speech, because they did not concede that the individual had a right to criticize them. Furthermore, Levy concludes that the men who wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights accepted common law concepts on the subject of seditious libel. It was not until about 1800 that a truly libertarian theory of free speech began to be stated.

Levy makes it clear that it is unhistorical to impute to the authors of the First Amendment intentions which they did not have. Nevertheless, we have read into that Amendment a generous conception of freedom of speech. Perhaps this proves that the intent of the Founding Fathers is not an ineluctable rule of interpretation, but only one of many aids to construction. The moral is that we read the Constitution today in the light of our own needs and purposes, and are not slavishly committed to the views of our ancestors. The old common law concept of seditious libel has gone into limbo, which is where it belongs.

Trial judges, juries, and appellate courts all over the country have been wrestling for some years, and particularly since the beginning of the postwar apprehensions about juvenile delinquency, with problems of censorship relating to publications dealing with sex. Haney's book, *Comstockery in America*, is a competent and readable survey and analysis of these problems. He dissects the doctrines which have been elaborated by the courts, the methods and purposes of private groups which sponsor nonlegal forms of censorship, and the various fields, such as books, magazines, movies, and television, in which censorship has reared its ugly head. The author is opposed to censorship.

Here is an interesting paragraph which suggests Haney's point of view and lively style: "Many-sided though it is, censorship possesses the one unifying emotional response of fear—fear of a world which would, if we faced it, threaten us with the task of becoming individual human beings. Our blushes and smirks and self-righteous denunciations of four-letter words, lewd pictures, and all the other paraphernalia of obscenity and pornography are little more than the attempt to feel noble when we are really being absurd. And we pass on through generations this legacy of fear. All the muck and dirt which pornographic literature and photography can pour into our bookstores or onto our newsstands are trivial beside the real damage to the human soul—the systematic production of frightened and inept men and women which goes under the name of censorship."

Jane Addams' Legacy

JANE ADDAMS — A CENTENNIAL READER. Edited by Emily Cooper Johnson. Macmillan. 326 pp. $6.

PEACE AND BREAD, by Jane Addams. G. K. Hall Co. 267 pp. $1.25. Paper bound. Available from Women's International League for Peace and and Freedom, 2006 Walnut Street, Philadelphia 3, Pa.

Reviewed by

Lucy P. Carner

AN IMPORTANT legacy from the observance of the Jane Addams Centennial is the anthology of her writings, *Jane Addams—A Centennial Reader*. Since many of her books are out of print and others difficult to obtain, this record is of immense value in making available in one attractive volume the essence of the thinking of Jane Addams on the wide range of her concerns, and in her own inimitable words. These words, as Justice Douglas remarks in his introduction, "are today a real tonic, even though they were written about conditions that we like to think have passed away."

The book is arranged topically

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with selections culled not only from her published volumes, but also from magazines and reports available only in specialized libraries, and ranging all the way from the well-known "devil baby" piece of folklore to "Disarm and Have Peace." The sections deal with social work, the position of women, child welfare, the arts, civil liberties, and international peace. Each section is introduced by an authority, pointing up the relevance of Jane Addams' words to the issues of today. The list of introducers guarantees a lively volume — Helen Hall of the Henry Street Settlement, Ashley Montague, Katharine F. Lenroot, Aline Saarinen, Hilda A. Smith, Roger Baldwin, John Haynes Holmes.

Jane Addams was a woman not only of great works, but also of great ideas, and to both she brought, as Helen Hall points out, "the clarity and self-discipline of the artist." "We are indebted," Miss Hall continues, "to her deeply philosophical mind as she took the joys and sorrows of those around her and fitted them into their place in history—making what had gone before, what was, and what should be into an understandable pattern of life, invested always with her own warmth and insight."

Peace and Bread is both an historical record and an intimately personal interpretation of Jane Addams' intellectual and spiritual struggle as she labored for peace in the midst of war. It is timely that in these days of increasing international tension this little book should appear in its third edition. The problems faced by Jane Addams in World War I have many similarities to the problems of today, and the policies she espoused are still pertinent.

As was her custom, Jane Addams observed a problem at first hand. She learned in the depths of her being from the hospitals and devastated cities of war-torn Europe, from the chancellories of the great, from the prisons of her own Chicago the cruelties, the "curbed intelligence and thwarted good will" of nations at war. As the first president of the organization later known as the "Women's International League for Peace and Freedom," she worked for continuous mediation by the neutral nations; the feeding of starving people, not as a tactic in the cold war, but "solely and only because they are hungry"; for a League of Nations based upon the meeting of human needs and strong enough to express the new spirit of ordinary people desiring a better world; for freedom of speech and the rights of conscientious objectors; for a peace treaty free from the futility of revenge.

Unlike many of her fellow workers in other crusades, she was unable to support the participation of the United States in the war. Perhaps her greatest legacy in the long run is not the policies she espoused, wise as these still seem, but her loyalty to a conviction wrought out of uncertainty and pain. "It therefore came about," she wrote, "that ability to hold out against mass suggestion, to honestly differ from the convictions and enthusiasms of one's best friends did in moments of crisis come to depend upon the categorical belief that a man's primary allegiance is to his vision of the truth and that he is under obligation to affirm it."

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When Congress Was Alive with Debate

BOLD VOICES. Edited by Richard L. Grossman. Doubleday. 474 pp. $5.95.

Reviewed by

Arthur Weinberg

THERE WAS A time in the history of this country when Congress was a forum for open debate. Public relations men and press secretaries played little or no part in presenting a Senator's or Representative's opinions to his constituency. Congress was an arena for political argument; its members stood up, spoke, and debated with fellow members. Issues were argued. Oratory was lively. The Congressman did not let the press conference, the newsletter to voters back home, or the panel discussion on TV take "final precedence over their own special platform in the Capitol building."

In this Presidential year when there is debate between the two candidates of the major parties on television, a book has just been published which recreates the era of great debates in the halls of Congress by some of its most distinguished debaters and dissenters. Richard L. Grossman has compiled and edited a provocative book, *Bold Voices.*

The book includes some of the most famous speeches given in Congress, all by debaters and dissenters: John Randolph opposing the War of 1812; the maiden speech of Robert M. LaFollette, where as a freshman Congressman he "defines the ethical ideal for his colleagues;" William E. Borah opposing the nomination of Charles Evans Hughes as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court; Clement L. Vallandigham's near-treasonous attack on Lincoln's Civil War policy; Daniel Webster's Union at any cost.

Grossman prefaces each oration with opinionated, reasoned, and lively comment. He is a serious student of history and professes fear that Congress is no longer a forum of debate, but rather an arena for activity. In his introduction, he writes: "A public which wants to read 'How Congressmen from This Area Voted Last Week' rather than read what those Congressmen said about the issues be-

fore them will get a Congress that is a loosely knit federation of investigating committees and Presidential candidates."

The author blames the constituency: "Indict a whole people for the vacuousness of its tribunes? Indeed, in a constitutional democracy there can be no other place to fix the responsibility. Even if the decline of debate, the evasion of controversy, the fear of expression come as a result of Congress altering its own character over the years, the blame still rests on a constituency that is more concerned with facts than ideas, more intrigued by investigation than by contradiction, more respectful of a Right Vote than a Right Thought."

Americans Abroad

FROM MAIN STREET TO THE LEFT BANK: STUDENTS AND SCHOLARS ABROAD by John A. Garraty and Walter Adams. Michigan State University Press. 216 pp. $4.

IS THE WORLD OUR CAMPUS? by Walter Adams and John A. Garraty. Michigan State University Press. 180 pp. $3.75.

THE OVERSEAS AMERICANS by Harlan Cleveland, Gerard J. Mangone, and John Clarke Adams. McGraw-Hill.

Reviewed by

Frederick C. Mosher

IT REQUIRES no great acuity to observe that the role of the United States in the affairs of the world beyond our borders has changed remarkably in the last two decades. From a largely self-contained, insulated, and introversive society, we have emerged with historic suddenness to a posture of intense interest in the developments of every country and of almost pathological concern about the attitudes of other people towards ourselves. Our new international responsibilities were thrust upon us rather than sought and built up step by step. We were little prepared for them by prior experience, by training, or by the accustomed set of our spectacles. We had—and still have—even no established body of doctrine, nor any very solid understanding of objectives to govern our overseas activities.

It is little wonder, therefore, that our ventures into world affairs have been attended by at least occasional mistakes, embarrassments, and failures. In recent years a variety of travel books, novels, and journalistic accounts have dramatized these shortcomings and performed a public service in attracting attention to this serious problem of American national performance. Prominent among them have been Burdick and Lederer's *The Ugly American,* Philip Wylie's *The Innocents Abroad,* and Eben Neal Baty's *Citizen Abroad.*

It is now particularly timely that we should be provided systematic, thoughtful, and objective evaluations and critiques of various aspects of our overseas work that we may better plan and operate in the future. The books under consideration here are products of just such kinds of studies. The two short volumes by Adams and Garraty were prepared under the auspices of Michigan State University's Institute of Research on Overseas Programs, organized several years ago to study overseas activities of American universities under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation. *The Overseas Americans* is the culminating report of a study begun in 1956, also under the auspices of the Carnegie Corporation. This research has been carried on by the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University and has resulted in more than a dozen publications.

The two reports by Adams and Garraty deal entirely with educational programs in continental Europe and Turkey. *From Main Street to the Left Bank* describes and evaluates the variety of programs for American college students in Europe. The authors report that there were more than 7,000 young Americans studying in Europe in 1956-57. Principal attention is directed to the three kinds of formally organized programs: the straight exchange arrangement between a European and an American university; the "Junior Year Abroad" arrangement begun in the Twenties by the University of Delaware and by Smith College and widely spreading in recent years; and the branch system whereby an American university sets up and operates a branch in Europe, like Stanford University at Stuttgart.

The report itself is based almost exclusively on several hundred interviews conducted in Europe with participants, leaders, teachers, and others, both European and American. It is not in any sense a statisical analysis; rather it concerns such general subjects as problems of student relationships with Europeans, problems of academic adjustment, impact of the programs upon the students' personalities, and effects upon European educational systems.

Early in the Eisenhower Administration, the International Cooperation Administration promoted a system of technical assistance under which American universities, with government assistance, would enter directly into contracts with foreign universities in the development and conduct of educational and research programs overseas. *Is the World Our Campus?* is a description and appraisal of various inter-university arrangements of this kind in Europe and Turkey in such fields as public administration, business, veterinary medicine, and others. Based again upon an extensive program of interviewing, this work concerns the problems of administering such programs, of academic adjustment, curriculum, financial management, and inter-cultural relationships of American and native faculties.

The Syracuse study of *The Overseas Americans* has a broader focus and reflects a somewhat more ambitious research effort. Unlike the other two, it is aimed at the less developed, non-European countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin-America, and concerns itself principally with Americans having full-time jobs overseas. It estimates that there are more than 100,000 such persons, of whom about one-third work for the government, somewhat fewer than that for missionaries, and about one-quarter for business. The study deals with the reasons Americans work abroad, their special problems of living and working there, including particularly what is referred to as culture shock, the attributes of the successful overseas worker, and the significance of our overseas commitments for American education. Here again, the principal research tool is the interview. In-

tensive interviews were conducted with employees—as well as foreign nationals—in six selected countries. This is probably the best informed—and the most informative—of all recent studies on the work and lives of Americans away from home.

These three books are highly readable and challenging explorations of topics of great importance to all of us. The reader is frequently unsure which of the conclusions and proposals are based upon research findings and which were formulated in the writers' minds independently of, and perhaps prior to, the research. Yet it is doubtful that any amount of scientific research in areas of enormous complexity such as American operations overseas will lead to incontrovertible findings and recommendations for the future. Perhaps the greatest contribution of research in such a field is to educate us so that our thinking for the future may be richer and our decisions wiser. In this respect, these studies have contributed significantly. They have approached difficult topics with sympathy, understanding, curiosity, and insight.

Timely Warning

ON THE BRINK, by Jerome Davis and General Hugh B. Hester. Lyle Stuart. 192 pp. $2.95.

Reviewed by

John M. Swomley, Jr.

A TIMELY warning to move away from the "brink of war" and end the cold war is the essential message of *On the Brink*. The authors range widely over the field of international relations, suggesting solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East, commenting on the significance of Sputnik, and urging that American economic aid be channeled through the United Nations.

One of the chief values of the book is its accumulation of little known facts on the role of the United States in world affairs. On the other hand, at some crucial points there is a disturbing failure to document statements.

My major criticism of the book is its superficial treatment of two important problems. The whole question of American militarism and American military power is dealt with in the shortest chapter—only four pages long. The problem of Communist expansionism and the complexities of Russian-American relations are passed over too lightly, presumably because the authors feel the American people need a picture other than the one usually presented in the press. "Our papers have blown up the evils of Russia out of all proportion. They lose no opportunity to depict Soviet evils 'pressed down, running over.'" My own feeling is that the book would have been strengthened if the problems inherent in both Russian and American power blocs had been recognized more clearly and related to the compromises and adjustments both must make.

The authors rightly conclude that "if we genuinely wish to build peace, we must try to understand the Communists, not to hate them."

On the Brink is easy and fast reading, an unusually helpful contribution to an understanding of the world in which we live and an earnest plea for world peace.

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

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